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SUMMARY
The emphasis on performance, cost, and reliability has changed for NASA
launch vehicles over the history of manned space flight. In the 1960’s, Apollo was ini-
tially designed to meet the President’s requirements of “...landing a man on the [M]oon
and returning him safely to [E]arth”; however, the final design was based on perfor-
mance and schedule while reliability was not considered as important. In the 1970’s,
the Shuttle was initially designed for high flight rates and low production/operations
cost, but was finally restrained by the peak yearly funding that severely compromised
both operations cost and reliability. In 2005, the Exploration Systems Architecture
Study for future launch vehicles and in-space transportation systems took a balanced
figure of merit approach of performance, affordability, reliability/safety, extensibility,
and programmatic risk. Performance, cost, and reliability were evaluated quantita-
tively while extensibility and risk were evaluated qualitatively.
This dissertation is focused on the quantitative metrics of performance, cost, and
reliability for future launch vehicles. Methods are developed that hold performance
constant for a required mission and payload so that cost and reliability can be traded.
Reliability strategies such as reducing the number of engines, increasing the thrust-to-
weight ratio, and adding redundant subsystems all increase launch vehicle reliability
for a fixed performance. However, there are few references that illustrate the cost of
increasing launch vehicle reliability in a disciplined, integrated approach.
For launch vehicle design, integrated performance, cost, and reliability disciplines
are required to show the sensitivity of cost to different reliability strategies. A method-
ology is presented that demonstrates how to create the necessary launch vehicle re-
liability models and integrate them with the performance and cost disciplines. An
xviii
integrated environment is developed for conceptual design that can rapidly assess
thousands of launch vehicle configurations. The design process begins with a feasible
launch vehicle configuration and its mission objectives. The performance disciplines,
such as trajectory analysis, propulsion, and mass estimation are modeled to include
the effects of using different reliability strategies. Reliability models are created based
upon the launch vehicle configuration. Engine reliability receives additional atten-
tion because engines are historically one of the leading causes of launch vehicle failure.
Additionally, the reliability of the propulsion subsystem changes dynamically when
a launch vehicle design includes engine out capability. Cost estimating techniques
which use parametric models are employed to capture the dependencies on system
cost of increasing launch vehicle reliability. Uncertainty analysis is included within
the cost and reliability disciplines because of the limited historical database for launch
vehicles. Optimization is applied within the integrated design environment to find
the best launch vehicle configuration based upon a particular weighting of cost and
reliability. Limitations of this methodology, such as the focus on space hardware, are
also are discussed.
The Saturn V is used as a demonstration problem to show the capability of this
methodology and validate the models with existing historical data. Various reliabil-
ity models are compared to validate the basis of the present reliability model. An
integrated environment combining the performance, cost, and reliability disciplines
is used to show the sensitivity of various system metrics, such as gross mass, system
cost, and reliability, to changes in reliability strategies such as the number of engines
and redundancy.
The results show that both the Apollo and the ESAS launch vehicles could be
optimized to be significantly cheaper, be more reliable, or have a compromise solution




1.1 Thesis Goals and Objectives
The objective of this dissertation is to create a methodology that links system cost
and reliability for launch vehicle design. The result of using this design process is a
set of optimal launch vehicle configurations based upon different weightings of system
cost and reliability. Uncertainty analysis is also included to show the range of cost
and reliability estimates. The set of optimal configurations can assist the process of
selecting a final vehicle configuration by showing the sensitivity of a launch vehicle’s
cost to increases in reliability.
Another objective of this dissertation is to increase the amount of information
available to a top-level decision maker. There are scenarios during conceptual design
where certain launch vehicle configurations may not be evaluated quantitatively; this
reduces the amount of available information about a launch vehicle concept. While
the reasons for eliminating a concept may be validated when the concept is evaluated
quantitatively, the eliminated concept may lead to other configurations that were
not previously considered. Therefore, the choice of whether or not to quantitatively
evaluate certain launch vehicle configurations can be eliminated by implementing this
methodology.
Another goal is improving the efficiency of the launch vehicle design process. An
integrated environment for considering the performance, cost, and reliability disci-
plines can be created by using the methodology outlined in this dissertation. Thou-
sands of vehicle configurations can be studied in a matter of hours and the process is
automated to allow system designers the time to analyze the results.
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Reliability is defined as “the probability that an item (component, subsystem,
system) will perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period
of time.”[81] The reliability of a launch vehicle is the probability that the vehicle will
complete its mission successfully. This metric can also be referred to as the probability
of loss of mission by subtracting the success probability from one.
A cost metric is important for launch vehicle design because sustainable programs
are generally created by minimizing system cost. The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) is constrained by the budget approved by Congress
and only a subset of those resources can be devoted to programs such as launch vehicle
development. Therefore, optimizing a launch vehicle configuration for cost as well as
its reliability will enable NASA to pursue the vehicle’s development and the missions
that require the launch vehicle.
The methodology created in this dissertation will be used to explore the design
space of a baseline launch vehicle configuration created by a top-level system designer.
The mission objectives and constraints of the launch vehicle will be constant. Addi-
tionally, some of the engine parameters, such as the cycle type and chamber pressure,
will be constant. The performance disciplines, such as trajectory analysis, propulsion,
and mass estimating, will be modeled to couple cost and reliability. Configuration
changes, such as reducing the number of engines or adding another power subsystem,
will be used to increase system reliability. The corresponding system costs are cal-
culated using the subsystem and component mass estimates. Uncertainty is included
in both the cost and reliability disciplines to create confidence bounds and show the
range of possible cost and reliability values. Optimization is applied in the design
process to find the best combination of design variables for a weighted value function
of cost and reliability. The steps for implementing this methodology are discussed in
Section 1.3 and Chapter 3 reveals the details for creating the necessary models.
A set of design variables are used to change the configuration of a baseline launch
2
vehicle with the goal of increasing its reliability. To determine the design variables,
the question of how to increase system reliability must be answered. Research is
presented to explain the different strategies that can be used to increase launch vehicle
reliability. Within this research, the primary drivers of launch vehicle reliability are
revealed. Once the primary drivers are known along with the techniques for increasing
system reliability, design variables can be determined for use in studying how vehicle
configuration changes can increase system reliability. The configuration changes will
be fully integrated with the performance and cost disciplines to examine how they
are affected by increasing vehicle reliability.
A more detailed goal of this methodology is to examine the system effects of
increasing reliability on both cost and performance. The cost of increasing system
reliability may vary depending on the baseline vehicle configuration. Another goal is
to calculate the cost of using a specific reliability strategy. There remains a question
about the most cost effective manner to increase system reliability and if one reliability
strategy is more cost effective than another. While system cost is one of the metrics,
the performance disciplines will also be affected by increasing launch vehicle reliability.
Another goal of this methodology is to examine how increasing the system reli-
ability will affect the performance of a vehicle. The launch vehicle gross mass and
trajectory will change as system reliability is increased, but uncertainty exists about
the magnitude of those changes. Accomplishing all of these goals will create a process
that can provide additional information to make more informed decisions during the
conceptual design phase.
1.2 Motivation
In January of 2004, President George W. Bush announced his “Vision for Space
Exploration.” [6] Within this statement, the President outlined a mission for the
human return to the Moon. To enable the mission to the Moon, a new heavy lift
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launch vehicle is required. With a set budget for NASA, the new launch vehicle must
be designed for minimum cost. However, the launch vehicle must also be designed
to perform the mission and to do so reliably. There are dire consequences, such as
additional cost or program cancellation, if a vehicle must be redesigned to perform its
mission or to improve its reliability. Thus, future space transportation systems must
consider cost and reliability when selecting a final design.
The Exploration System Architecture Study (ESAS) created the foundation for
accomplishing the Vision for Space Exploration [66]. ESAS is reviewed in more detail
in Section 2.2.3. In this study, NASA engineers examined a wide variety of lunar
architectures to determine which plan would best enable the United States to return
to the Moon. Within each architecture, different vehicle models were created to
calculate the various Figures of Merit (FOM) used for architecture comparison. The
launch vehicles were evaluated across a set of quantitative and qualitative metrics.
The quantitative FOMs were safety/mission success, effectiveness/performance, and
affordability; the qualitative FOMs were extensibility/flexibility and programmatic
risk. This dissertation will focus on the quantitative FOMs. Mission success and
system reliability will be synonymous in this dissertation. System cost will only
include design, development, testing, evaluation, and total production; operations
cost is neglected.
The Exploration System Architecture Study was given a time constraint of 90
days to develop an architecture and recommend a final solution. Due to this time
constraint, a number of launch vehicle configurations were not included in the study.
A decision was made to only evaluate launch vehicles that use existing hardware [66],
with a focus on using existing engines. Therefore, thousands of launch vehicle con-
figurations were eliminated from the design process without being evaluated for their
quantitative system metrics.
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There is an opportunity to improve the efficiency of evaluating thousands of per-
mutations of a launch vehicle configuration. Without evaluating a launch vehicle
design quantitatively, it is uncertain how an updated configuration will compare to
the baseline concept. Additionally, evaluating an alternative launch vehicle config-
uration without restrictions could lead to another concept that may fit the original
constraints. Inspiration comes from the optimization community where many tech-
niques approach an optimal solution from the infeasible region [92]. By using current
computing resources, every advantage should be taken to create additional informa-
tion about a launch vehicle concept for use in deciding the final vehicle selection.
An example of a configuration in ESAS that showed reason for future study was
a vehicle with engine out capability on the Earth Departure Stage (EDS). An engine
out scenario is where a vehicle can operate when one engine fails in a benign manner.
“For upper stages, results indicate that engine-out is a preferred capability” [66]. Due
to the restricted study time, concepts like the EDS engine out case were not included
in any of the final design solutions. These concepts were left to consider during the
preliminary design phase.
Few references exist about the sensitivity of a launch vehicle’s cost to its relia-
bility. The ESAS report showed changes to reliability and cost for a few selected
concepts [66]. However, there was not a direct linkage between cost and reliabil-
ity. The effectiveness of increasing a system’s reliability by using different reliability
strategies, such as engine out, is not well defined. Uncertainty exists about the most
cost effective method for increasing system reliability and if one approach is consis-
tently favored over another. An integrated environment can be used to complete
trade studies that show the effects of using different reliability strategies. The results
reveal which design variables deserve further study because they are the significant
parameters for determining a vehicle’s cost and reliability. An integrated environ-
ment is beneficial because the process can be automated and additional work can be
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completed in a given amount of time.
The primary goal of this methodology is to create additional information to assist
with selecting the final launch vehicle design. Time constraint concerns will be re-
duced because this process can evaluate thousands of launch vehicle configurations in
a matter of hours while maintaining a comparable level of fidelity to past conceptual
design studies. The sensitivity of cost to increases in system reliability can be deter-
mined by using this design process. Resources within the space community are limited
and moving along an incorrect path could result in unnecessary expenditure and/or
program cancellation. Therefore, the methodology created in this dissertation is ben-
eficial for launch vehicle design because the results provide additional information to
make a more informed decision.
1.3 Methodology Outline
A series of steps are required to complete this methodology. This section will briefly
outline the steps to link system cost and reliability for launch vehicle design. The
detailed modeling is discussed in Chapter 3 for the performance, cost, and reliability
disciplines.
• Step 1: Obtain top-level performance requirements about the launch vehicle
configuration under study.
– The trajectory requirements:
∗ The final orbit conditions, such as altitude and velocity.
∗ The payload requirement. If the final stage is used to provide an
in-space burn, then the in-space velocity requirement is needed.




∗ Engine cycle type, which leads to the vacuum Isp.
∗ Chamber pressure.
∗ Expansion ratio.
– Reliability failure rates for each subsystem and component.
• Step 2: Create the performance models.
– Determine the range of parameters for performance analysis.
∗ Parameters may include stage thrust-to-weight ratio, the number of
engines, engine thrust-to-weight ratio, etc.
– Create response surface equations to improve design efficiency.
∗ Response surface equations are discussed in Section 3.1.8.1.
∗ Determine the cases to run for the response surface equations.
– Use response surface equations to replace the propulsion discipline.
∗ The independent parameter is the thrust level and the dependent pa-
rameter is the engine thrust-to-weight ratio.
– Utilize response surface equations to replace the trajectory analysis.
∗ The independent variable is the stage thrust-to-weight ratio and the
dependent parameter is the stage mass ratio.
∗ Find the lowest stage thrust-to-weight ratio that closes the vehicle as a
minimum bound. Use previous knowledge and experience gained from
this process to find an upper bound.
∗ Create another response surface to calculate the operating time of each
stage. The independent parameter is the stage thrust-to-weight ratio
and the dependent parameter is the stage burn time.
– Create a mass estimating model.
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∗ Determine the mass breakdown structure.
∗ Use Mass Estimating Relationships (MERs) to calculate subsystem
mass based upon vehicle characteristics. MERs are reviewed in Sec-
tion 3.1.3.
∗ The inputs to the mass discipline are the stage thrust-to-weight ratios,
stage mass ratios, and the reliability strategies that affect the mass,
such as engine out.
∗ The mass estimating model must be created in a manner to include
reliability strategies such as engine out and power subsystem redun-
dancy.
∗ Include the response surface equations from the trajectory and propul-
sion disciplines.
∗ Use iteration, such as the SOLVER routine in EXCEL, to close a
vehicle. Closing a launch vehicle can be accomplished by changing the
stage propellant mass to match the stage thrust-to-weight ratio with
the correct stage mass ratio.
– Validate the integrated performance models against existing models or
flight data.
• Step 3: Create the reliability models.
– Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are
recommended for use as the reliability modeling technique. They are dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.3.2 and Section 3.3.3.5, respectively.
– Reliability modeling should be performed at the subsystem indenture level.
Indenture levels are discussed in Section 3.3.1. Recommendations are made
to separate the engine from the propulsion subsystem and model the engine
at the component level.
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– Create reliability models with the capability to analyze different configura-
tions. Dynamically updating fault tree analysis is recommended to capture
the effects of changing configurations, such as adding engine out capability.
An example of dynamic fault tree analysis is shown in Section 3.4.4.
– Redundancy models using common cause failure must be created when
using identical components. Common cause failure is discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.3.3.
– Create engine out modeling capability as discussed in Section 3.4.1.
– Create launch vehicle stage and system reliability models. The stage re-
liability models are created by combining reliability estimates from the
subsystem and component models. The vehicle reliability model is created
by combining the stage reliability estimates. Stage and system reliability
modeling is discussed in Section 3.4.4.
– Validate the present model with existing software and existing launch ve-
hicle reliability models.
– Research historical failure rates of subsystems and components for use
in reliability uncertainty analysis. Section 3.4.3 lists references that can
provide historical reliability estimates.
– Create a reliability growth model for use in comparing the initial reliability
of various launch vehicle configurations. The Department of Defense has
compiled a list of general reliability growth models [11].
• Step 4: Create the cost model.
– Determine system cost breakdown structure.
∗ Use the mass breakdown structure as a guide and calculate cost at the
same indenture level.
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∗ Calculate the Design, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (DDT&E)
cost.
∗ Calculate the Theoretical First Unit (TFU) cost.
– Determine the subsystem technology levels to select analogous relation-
ships.
– Use cost estimating relationships from an established cost model for sub-
system and component cost estimates or develop a cost estimating tool
and validate the tool with an accepted software package.
– Ensure that the cost model can incorporate different reliability strategies,
such as using two sets of power components to provide redundancy.
– Combine the subsystem and component cost estimates into a stage and a
vehicle cost estimate.
– Use established procedures for estimating uncertainty based upon the cost
estimates.
• Step 5: Create an integrated design environment.
– Create an Overall Evaluation Criterion (OEC) for use in optimization. The
OEC is a combination of the system Figures of Merit and is discussed in
Section 3.7.2.
– Link the performance, cost, and reliability disciplines by passing the ap-
propriate variables from one discipline to another.
– The system design variables will be the stage thrust-to-weight ratio and
any reliability strategies, such as changing the number of engines and using
engine out capability.
– Use an optimization technique that can incorporate discrete design vari-
ables, such as a genetic algorithm. The genetic algorithm optimization
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technique is described in Section 3.7.
∗ The applications in this methodology require at least 12 iterations
with no change in the objective function to ensure an optimal design
is found.
∗ Other characteristics of the genetic algorithm include tournament se-
lection with two participants, a 70 percent crossover rate, and a 20
percent mutation rate.
– Optimize the configuration for a specific weighting of the Figures of Merit.
– Repeat the optimization for as many different weightings as desired. A
script can be written to automate this process.
• Step 6: Post-processing of the results.
– Compile the optimal solutions into a plot showing the pareto frontier. A
70 percent confidence level was used as the optimal value for system cost
and reliability.
– Use the 10 percent and 90 percent confidence levels to illustrate uncertainty
bands.
– Compile the design settings for the optimal configurations into a results
table.
– Examine the results and draw conclusions.
The process outlined above will change the configuration of a launch vehicle based
upon a set of design variables while constraining the system performance. The goal of
changing the configuration is to increase system reliability while meeting the original
mission objectives. An integrated model of the design disciplines is used to examine
the sensitivity of increasing system reliability on the cost and performance metrics.
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1.4 Summary
Two applications of this methodology are presented. The first problem examines the
Saturn V launch vehicle from the Apollo program. The objective is to show a variety of
optimal Saturn V configurations based upon a weighting of system cost and reliability.
The Saturn V was chosen because the vehicle was flown twelve times during the Apollo
program and data exists to validate the discipline models. Once validation of the
Saturn V system is shown, the figures in the results section illustrate how the Saturn
V reliability could have been increased by changing the design configuration. Potential
design changes include varying the stage thrust-to-weight ratio, the number of engines
on each stage, and adding engine out capability on each stage. The option of using
redundancy on additional subsystems, such as the power and avionics subsystems, is
also considered.
The second application is for the Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) proposed by the
Exploration Systems Architecture Study to perform the heavy lift capability needed
for missions to the Moon [66]. This application was selected to demonstrate how the
methodology could benefit conceptual design studies such as ESAS. The results will
reveal a set of configurations that can be used to increase CaLV reliability and the
corresponding system cost. The CaLV baseline used existing engines, which affects
the system cost and is reflected in the results.
The next chapter of this dissertation will review systems engineering and how it
applies to the design process. Additional literature review is provided to describe
past approaches for completing launch vehicle design. Non-aerospace methods are
also considered for coupling system cost and reliability. Chapter 3 will reveal the
details of modeling the performance, cost, and reliability disciplines. Chapter 4 will
show the results of applying this methodology to the Saturn V and the Cargo Launch




There are a variety of approaches to engineering design. Systems analysis considers
all phases of a concept’s life-cycle during the conceptual design phase. This chap-
ter begins by reviewing the principles of systems engineering and explaining why it
should be applied during the design phase. The next section discusses the different
approaches used for launch vehicle design.
Within launch vehicle design, there are a variety of methods for implementing
the systems engineering process. Many of the recent techniques include optimization
to find the best combination of design variables for a system metric. This chapter
includes a review of different launch vehicle design approaches along with a review
of other aerospace design methods. Outside of the aerospace industry, reliability
allocation techniques can be used to link cost and reliability; some of those approaches
are also discussed. This chapter concludes with a set of research questions that this
dissertation will attempt to answer.
2.1 Systems Engineering
Systems engineering is a process that can be used to aid in selecting an engineering
design. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines systems engineering as:
“... a comprehensive, iterative and recursive problem solving process, applied sequen-
tially top-down by integrated teams. [Systems Engineering] transforms needs and
requirements into a set of system product and process descriptions, generates infor-
mation for decision makers, and provides input for the next level of development.” [14]
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The DoD refers to integrated teams as Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), which
include interdisciplinary experts from each area of the product life-cycle [14]. IPTs
consist of management, technical discipline experts, specialty areas such as quality
assurance, and business analysts who have knowledge of financial and contracting
issues.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the systems engineering process. A set of requirements, such
as the mission objectives and constraints, are passed on to the engineers, who use
engineering principles to create a design that satisfies the requirements. The process
of creating a design occurs within the oval in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1: DoD Systems Engineering Process [14].
To execute the process outlined in Figure 2-1, systems engineering practices recom-
mend integrated development to ensure that all aspects of the life-cycle are considered.
Figure 2-2 illustrates the different elements of a system life-cycle [14].
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Figure 2-2: System Life-Cycle Elements [14].
The DoD refers to integrated development as “Integrated Product and Process
Development (IPPD)” [14]. IPPD is defined as “...a management methodology that
incorporates a systematic approach to the early integration and concurrent applica-
tion of all the disciplines that play a part throughout a systems life cycle.” [40] The
Georgia Institute of Technology has developed a design process utilizing the funda-
mentals of IPPD [86]. Figure 2-3 illustrates the IPPD process at the Georgia Institute
of Technology.
By considering all aspects of a system’s life-cycle, additional knowledge is intro-
duced during the design phase that has traditionally been omitted from the early
system definition. This is one reason why systems engineering is recommended over
the traditional design approach.
“The conventional way of doing product design has been to carry out all of the
steps serially...these serial functions have been carried out in distinct and separate
organizations with little interaction between them. Thus, it is easy to see how the
design team will make decisions, many of which can be changed only at great cost in
time and money, without adequate knowledge of the manufacturing process.” [13]
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Figure 2-3: IPPD at the Georgia Institute of Technology [86].
The costs of a system are determined early in the design phase as decisions are
made about the system definition. “...[T]he design process consists of the accumu-
lation of many decisions that result in design commitments that affect about 70 to
80 percent of the manufactured cost of the product.” [13] In the traditional design
approach, problems that occur during the manufacturing phase are very costly to fix
because redesign effort cascades through a complex system. “If the design proves to
be faulty just before the product goes to market, it will cost a great deal of money to
correct the problem.” [13] Figure 2-4 illustrates a notional cost comparison between
the traditional manner of design and using a concurrent approach.
During the design phase, systems engineering and IPPD are used to bring all the
disciplines together to eliminate faulty designs before they reach the manufacturing
phase. Figure 2-5 illustrates the concept of introducing knowledge earlier in the design
by using integrated development. The additional knowledge gained from evaluating
the complete life-cycle during the conceptual design phase will lead to better decisions
about the final configuration.
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Figure 2-4: Traditional Design versus Concurrent Engineering [86].
Figure 2-5: Design Paradigm Shift [51].
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The methodology created in this dissertation aims to fill a small role in the overall
systems engineering process by providing a means to perform integrated launch vehicle
design. The process outlined in Chapter 3 will fit in the Synthesis and Systems
Analysis areas of Figure 2-1. Using this methodology will lead to creation of an
integrated framework that can be used to perform rapid studies. This methodology
could be applied during the conceptual design phase, where very few design choices
have been made. The design phases are discussed further in Section 2.1.1.
Many of the references discussed earlier provide an excellent guide for the overall
systems engineering process. The references review the major tasks that should be
completed to ensure a system’s life-cycle elements are considered. However, these
references do not provide in-depth details about how to accomplish some of the tasks,
such as Synthesis and Systems Analysis.
Additional references, which are reviewed in Section 2.3, provide the technical
foundation for completing segments of the Synthesis and Systems Analysis portion
of Figure 2-1. Other literature reveals how to create an integrated environment for
launch vehicle design and is examined in Section 2.3.1.
2.1.1 Design Phases
The methodology is created for use during the conceptual design phase, which is
the design phase where much of the vehicle configuration has yet to be determined.
Figure 2-6 is a diagram illustrating the design phases according to the NASA Systems
Engineering Handbook [62].
Figure 2-6: NASA Design Phases [62].
Each design phase is described in greater detail below. The conceptual design
phase in this dissertation is equivalent to the preliminary analysis in Figure 2-6.
18
• Pre-Phase A: Advanced Studies
The goal of this design phase is to create ideas and initial concepts for various
missions. These missions will be based on opportunity and the current need
within the science community.
• Phase A: Preliminary Analysis
In the preliminary analysis phase, the mission is studied in more detail to ex-
amine its feasibility. Feasibility assessments are completed by performing trade
studies. A study is also completed to ensure that the mission fits within NASA’s
overall objectives. Two other tasks completed during the preliminary analysis
phase are establishing the “[t]op-level requirements” and identifying the system
FOMs [62].
• Phase B: Definition
In the definition phase, a baseline design that will satisfy the mission objec-
tives is established. The “initial configuration management” and the baseline
system requirements are defined during this phase. Other products that are
completed during the definition phase are a project plan, including the sched-
ule, and the concept of operations. This design phase is referred to as detail
design throughout the remainder of the dissertation.
• Phase C: Design
In the final design phase, a complete design of the system is created. This
includes all of the lower level requirements for the subsystems. After the end
of the final design phase, system manufacturing begins. The subsystems are
created first and then integrated together to create the final product. All qual-
ification and acceptance level testing is completed on the subsystems prior to
system integration. However, some decisions are re-evaluated based upon the
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results of certification testing. The next step is to complete the launch vehicle
and deploy a payload in orbit. Once the launch vehicle flies successfully, the
operations phase of the system life-cycle will begin.
2.2 Historical Launch Vehicle Design
This section will review three different launch vehicles and explore how their design
was developed. The goal is to learn from existing methods and try to improve upon
the design process by using systems engineering principles. The launch vehicles under
review are the Saturn V, the Space Transportation System (STS), and the as yet to
be manufactured Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV).
The Saturn V and CaLV are elements of a larger mission that involves multiple ve-
hicles. A conflict appears to occur between using integrated design and designing the
launch vehicles as their own entity. However, this conflict is removed by requirements
analysis, as shown in Figure 2-1, which considers all of the other vehicle needs in the
mission before determining the launch vehicle requirements. Once the requirements
are determined, this methodology is used to evaluate alternative configurations of a
launch vehicle. Thus, the review will focus on the launch vehicle design even though
the launch vehicle is one element of a larger mission.
2.2.1 Saturn V
The Saturn V was developed for the Apollo program, which sent United States astro-
nauts to the Moon in a series of missions from 1969 to 1972 [85]. The Apollo program
began as a follow up to the Mercury program, which launched the first American into
space. However, NASA did not receive the full go-ahead to try for a lunar landing
until President John F. Kennedy delivered a speech to Congress in 1961. “...I believe
that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out,
of landing a man on the [M]oon and returning him safely to [E]arth.” [43]
The Saturn V was a three stage launch vehicle and is illustrated in Figure 2-7.
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The first stage of the Saturn V is called the S-IC, the second stage is the S-II, and
the third stage is the S-IVB. The first stage used five F-1 engines; the propellant was
liquid oxygen and a refined form of kerosene known as RP-1. The F-1 engine cycle
was a gas generator. The second stage used five J-2 engines, which also employed a
gas generator engine cycle. The propellants were liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.
The third stage used a single J-2 engine.
Figure 2-7: Saturn V.
The Apollo program chose between four different lunar architectures to satisfy
the mission objectives [58]. Each architecture had its own set of vehicles which were
designed together to meet the total mission objectives. Once Lunar Orbit Rendezvous
(LOR) was selected, the Saturn V became the launch vehicle responsible for launching
the Apollo missions to the Moon.
With very little heritage, NASA engineers focused on satisfying the performance
objectives to ensure that the mission could occur. Therefore, very few trade studies
for evaluating different Saturn V configurations were completed. One trade was com-
pleted to decide between using four and five engines on the S-IC. Five engines were
selected to add design margin due to uncertainty about the final mass of the vehicles
launched on top of the Saturn V [5].
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The Saturn V reliability was based on comparisons with launch vehicles used
for the Mercury program and various missile systems [58]. Different models were
created that evaluated the system reliability of various configurations, such as the
number of engines on each stage and the use of engine out capability on the S-II
stage. However, the reliability models produced mission success probabilities that
were so low that NASA moved away from using quantitative methods to calculate
system reliability [70], [22].
Early cost estimates were not conducive for use in trade studies. During the early
Apollo program, cost estimates were created by using “...analogies, intuition and
guesses...” [33]. The cost estimates were developed by the design engineer responsible
for a particular subsystem or component. Thus, integrated cost models did not exist
to determine how the configuration would affect system cost.
Time is another reason why few trade studies for the Saturn V design were com-
pleted. The first United States manned space flight, which did not orbit the Earth,
occurred in May of 1961 and NASA engineers were expected to land on the Moon
by the end of the decade. Additionally, computers were still in the infancy stages
during the Apollo era, and engineers did not have the tools and capability of the cur-
rent space flight program. In fact, many of the “computers” of the Apollo era were
women who performed the needed analytical calculations on mechanical calculators
and slide rules [57].
The methods for completing conceptual design in the space industry have been
greatly upgraded over the past four decades. These methods can provide additional
information to make more informed decisions that should result in less redesign and
costly changes later in the program’s development. The Space Transportation System
(commonly referred to as the Shuttle) capitalized on some of the lessons learned
regarding conceptual design but there was still room for improvement.
22
2.2.2 Space Transportation System
The Space Transportation System (STS) followed the Apollo program. During Apollo,
Vice-President Spiro Agnew led an effort to determine the next direction for the
United States space program [60]. President Richard Nixon then made the decision
to pursue a strategy for expanding into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) based on projected
cost [3]. The STS was originally rejected until NASA obtained support from other
agencies, such as the DoD and the Air Force, and also guaranteed “...that the Shuttle
would be the only launch vehicle developed in the 1980’s.” [3] The Shuttle had its
first flight on April 12, 1981.
Figure 2-8 illustrates the Space Transportation System. The STS was built to
carry astronauts and payloads to Low Earth Orbit and is a partially reusable system.
Figure 2-8: Space Transportation System.
There are four main elements that compose the STS:
1. Orbiter: This element carries the astronauts to and from space. Any science
payloads, such as telescopes or satellites are carried inside the orbiter’s payload
bay. This element is reused after each flight.
2. External Tank: This segment stores propellant for use by the orbiter propul-
sion system during vehicle ascent. The External Tank is discarded after every
flight.
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3. Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs): These are the engines on the orbiter
that help power the STS to orbit. The engines use a staged-combustion engine
cycle and the propellants are liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. The engines
are also reused after every flight.
4. Solid Rocket Boosters: The two boosters also provide thrust for the STS to
reach orbit. They burn for approximately 120 seconds and then drop off the
vehicle. The boosters land in the Atlantic Ocean and are retrieved for additional
use.
The Shuttle design was influenced by payload requirements from NASA, the DoD,
and the Air Force [3]. The desired concept was a fully reusable system that would
reduce operations cost compared to the existing expendable launch vehicles. Thus,
performance and operations were the initial significant figures of merit for the pre-
liminary Shuttle design.
During the early 1970s, the Shuttle development became constrained by the bud-
get. While the life-cycle cost of the desired system was predicted to be lower than
the selected concept, the peak year funding was too great for NASA’s budget [3].
Thus, NASA was forced to move away from its desired concept: a fully reusable sys-
tem with fly back boosters [96]. The partially reusable system was predicted to cost
more during the operational phase but would have a lower development cost. Later
in the design phase the booster stages were changed from liquid to solid propellants,
as illustrated in Figure 2-8, to reduce the development cost even further. However,
the engineers knew that the solid rocket boosters would result in a higher operational
cost.
During the design, NASA completed trade studies to compare the cost of differ-
ent concepts. Performance modeling was becoming more sophisticated as computers
gained more power. The cost discipline also became more refined after the Apollo
era. The Air Force had developed a “Space Planner’s Guide” which devoted a chapter
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to mass based Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) to be used in projecting space
vehicle costs [33]. These CERs were parametric equations that depended on the mass
of the vehicle and are discussed in more detail in Section 3.5.
Cost estimates for the STS were created using the cost estimating relationships
and analogies to other systems, such as winged-body aircraft, when the CERs did not
exist. However, these cost estimates were calculated after the designs were created
because the traditional serial approach was still used for design. Additionally, with
the focus on development cost, life-cycle cost was sacrificed in order to ensure the
Shuttle was built.
The reliability for the initial Shuttle designs relied upon qualitative techniques
such as Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA). FMEA is discussed in greater
detail in Section 3.3.3. These qualitative techniques were not conducive to trade
studies during conceptual design because they relied upon expert opinion. When
quantitative reliability analysis was performed, estimates were quoted “...without
any formal systems analysis to support such...” [70] results. Thus, reliability was not
a primary figure of merit for design decisions.
The Shuttle initially focused on full reusability and low operations cost but because
of yearly budget constraints, the focus became the development cost. The result is
a system with high operating costs and two accidents during its lifetime. The STS
provides an excellent lesson learned about the pitfalls of neglecting the total life cycle
and quantitative reliability analysis during conceptual design. These lessons learned
were demonstrated during NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study and its
Cargo Launch Vehicle that was created considering all aspects of the system’s life-
cycle.
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2.2.3 Cargo Launch Vehicle
In 2004, President George W. Bush announced his Vision for Space Exploration [6]
which includes the objective of returning to the Moon no later than 2020. In response
to the Vision, NASA carried out the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS)
with the goal to select the vehicles that would carry American astronauts back to the
Moon [66].
Figure 2-9: Cargo Launch Vehicle [66].
One of the vehicles studied during ESAS was a Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) and
the selected concept is illustrated in Figure 2-9 [66]. The CaLV is designed to carry
a lunar lander to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The second stage of the CaLV, the Earth
Departure Stage (EDS), continues the launch to LEO, will rendezvous with the crew
capsule and service module, and boost all three elements to the Moon. Figure 2-10
illustrates the concept of operations for human missions to the Moon [66].
The CaLV is composed of the Solid Rocket Boosters, the lower booster stage,
and the previously mentioned Earth Departure Stage. The Solid Rocket Boosters
are 5-segment boosters derived from the Space Transportation System but with an
additional segment. The booster, or core, stage uses five SSMEs from the Shuttle
which are modified for use on the CaLV. The Earth Departure Stage uses two J-2S
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Figure 2-10: ESAS Human Missions to the Moon [66].
engines, which are a derivative engine of the J-2 used on the Saturn V. The J-2S was
an engine in development during the Apollo era but the program was canceled before
the J-2S had an opportunity to fly [77]. Like the original J-2 engine, the J-2S is a gas
generator engine that uses liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen as its propellants.
The ESAS evaluated many different Cargo Launch Vehicle concepts before select-
ing the final design. Each launch vehicle was evaluated for many different metrics,
once the feasibility of the design was established. Figures of Merit (FOMs) included
safety, reliability, extensibility, effectiveness, risk, and life-cycle cost [66]. Extensibil-
ity and risk were evaluated qualitatively by a “consensus of discipline experts.” [66]
Effectiveness was partly evaluated at the architecture level for metrics such as cargo
delivered to and returned from the lunar surface. Effectiveness also included system
availability and system operability which could be evaluated at the vehicle level.
In order to compare each of the different concepts, an integrated process was used
that combined experts from all of the life-cycle elements. Concepts were created
by using“...parametric sizing and structural analysis...” while vehicle lift capability
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was determined with: “...the generation of three-Degrees-of-Freedom point-mass tra-
jectory designs anchored by the sizing, structural, and subsystem assessment work.
Output of the vehicle concept development work was forwarded to the operations,
cost, and reliability/safety groups for use in their analysis.” [66]
The reliability of each CaLV concept was assessed with a quantitative technique.
NASA had learned from the Challenger accident that quantitative reliability assess-
ments were needed [70]. The launch vehicle reliability modeling in ESAS was com-
pleted by using different analysis tools, such as the Flight-oriented Integrated Relia-
bility and Safety Tool (FIRST) and the Space Shuttle Quantitative Risk Assessment
System (QRAS). The launch vehicle reliability focused on the propulsion subsystem;
detailed estimates of the propulsion subsystem were created by examining parts and
assemblies such as engines, feed lines, and auxiliary power units. The Solid Rocket
Boosters, separation systems, payload shroud, and the thermal control system were
other elements included in the CaLV reliability estimates. The reliability modeling,
which included uncertainty analysis, was used to evaluate various CaLV concepts to
provide a range of system reliability estimates. Trade studies were performed on the
type of engine, number of engines, engine out capability, and the overall CaLV con-
figuration, such as whether the vehicle had a side mount or included Solid Rocket
Boosters.
The cost modeling used the NASA/Air Force Cost Model, which is based on
parametric cost estimating relationships, to calculate development cost. Parametric
cost modeling and NAFCOM are discussed in greater detail in Section 3.5 and Sec-
tion 3.6. The operations and support costs were prepared by NASA Kennedy Space
Center experts [66].
The ESAS made a number of high-level assumptions that guided their vehicle
designs. The decision was made to avoid “clean-sheet” designs because of “high de-
velopment costs...and lengthy development schedules...” [66]. Additionally, “...ESAS
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management directed the team members to use existing LV elements, particular en-
gines...New design elements were acceptable where absolutely necessary, but had to
be clearly superior in safety, cost, and performance to be accepted.” [66]
The Exploration Systems Architecture Study demonstrated how systems engi-
neering can be used to select a final vehicle design. As recommended by the earlier
references, all aspects of the vehicle’s life-cycle were considered. Due to the short
study time, the ESAS relied on expert judgment for selecting key trade areas and the
final selection of a launch vehicle concept. The ESAS did not have time to use an
integrated design environment to determine the “optimal” architecture or the “best”
launch vehicle concept for cost and reliability.
2.2.4 Apollo and ESAS Comparison
While Apollo tried to use systems engineering processes for conceptual launch vehicle
design, the methods and tools were not advanced enough to provide detailed results.
As discussed earlier, design variables were changed one at a time and performance
margin was used as a solution for uncertainty about the final mass. Many different
trade studies could not be completed due to the time constraint and the modeling
capability.
Figure 2-11 is a chart that compares the Figures of Merit for the four lunar archi-
tectures that were under consideration during the Apollo era [58]. However, because
the Apollo engineers did not have the advanced tools and methods practiced today,
it is unknown if the architectures compared in Figure 2-11 were optimal solutions for
their metrics. It is uncertain if the launch vehicle used to enable each of the archi-
tectures is the optimal configuration for the given mission constraints. Furthermore,
each architecture was sized for a different performance level, thus making cost com-
parison difficult. Figure 2-11 also reveals the low levels of probability of success on
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Figure 2-11: Apollo Mission Mode Comparison [58].
first flight. Without a common analysis for each option, the uncertainty in the evalu-
ation, and a lack of overall evaluation criterion, the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR)
architecture was driven by political compromise between the centers and qualitative
risk assessment from the decision makers [58].
Figure 2-12: Loss of Mission Architecture Comparison [66].
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The Exploration System Architecture Study was able to evaluate numerous ar-
chitectures using systems engineering processes and tools. Figure 2-12 shows a com-
parison of the different architectures and their probability of loss of mission. As
mentioned earlier, many different Figures of Merit were used to evaluate each archi-
tecture created during ESAS.
A variety of launch vehicle concepts were also evaluated for a given set of mission
constraints. Figure 2-13 is a small representation of the different Cargo Launch
Vehicles assessed for their use in the lunar campaign.
Figure 2-13: CaLV Design Candidates [66].
Figure 2-14: CaLV FOM Comparison [66].
As mentioned earlier, each CaLV concept was evaluated by six primary Figures of
Merit (FOMs). An example of the FOMs for shuttle derived CaLV concepts is shown
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in Figure 2-14. Due to the current computing capability and refinement of systems
engineering processes, various CaLV designs were evaluated within a few months.
The Exploration System Architecture Study had a 90 day time constraint and
thousands of alternative launch vehicle configurations were not considered. The
present methodology aims to fill that information gap by creating the capability to
quantitatively evaluate thousands of launch vehicle designs in a rapid manner. Ad-
ditionally, ESAS used an integrated manual process of passing information from one
discipline group to another for design. The design process can be improved with an
integrated environment that can take advantage of numerical techniques to find an
optimal solution. The next section further explains how this methodology could be
used during the conceptual design process.
2.2.5 Methodology Utility
The methodology created in this dissertation will attempt to add to the information
generated in ESAS by examining configurations that are “clean-sheet” launch vehicles.
This methodology will begin with a configuration like the selected CaLV and re-open
its design space by changing design variables, such as the number of engines and
stage thrust-to-weight ratio. The goal is to examine which design options could be
included on the CaLV to increase its reliability and how those design options affect
the system cost. In order to make a fair comparison, the launch vehicle must meet
the same mission objectives and constraints as the CaLV.
While ESAS used an integrated process, they did not create an integrated envi-
ronment for launch vehicle design. Concepts were created that satisfied the mission
constraints and then passed along to the reliability and cost disciplines. By using
an integrated environment, the sensitivity of each launch vehicle configuration to dif-
ferent design parameters can be determined. Optimization can be included in an
integrated environment to provide a mathematical foundation for selecting a concept
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based on its system metrics. However, creating and using an integrated environment
does have disadvantages compared to the process used in ESAS.
Using an integrated environment typically requires creation of parametric models
for each discipline in a launch vehicle, which could reduce the fidelity of the de-
sign process. Furthermore, system experts may be removed from the design process
with an automated environment, which also removes a level of fidelity. When using
optimization, only quantifiable system metrics can be included. Qualitative system
metrics, such as risk, must be evaluated after a vehicle design is completed. There-
fore, optimization may find an optimal configuration that is later eliminated because
of its development risk or flexibility.
The process created in this dissertation will attempt to remove some of the con-
cerns regarding the use of an integrated environment for launch vehicle design. The
fidelity of the models created for use in this dissertation will be comparable to the
fidelity of the models used during ESAS. Additionally, while only system cost and
reliability are chosen as the metrics to compare launch vehicle configurations, other
quantifiable metrics can be included because of the manner in which this methodol-
ogy was created. A key assumption during ESAS was the use of existing engines and
the results shown in Section 4.2.4 include a comparison of a CaLV concept that relies
upon the SSME and J-2S engines.
The benefits of using an integrated environment include rapid assessment of launch
vehicle concepts and the finding of the significant parameters that drive the system
metrics. Another benefit is using optimization to automate the process of finding the
best combination of design variables for the system metrics. The time constraint of
previous studies may be eliminated because thousands of different launch vehicle con-
figurations can be evaluated within a few hours. The caveat is that the environment
must be developed first. Finding the significant parameters should lead to further
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study regarding these variables with the goal of providing additional information be-
fore any final decisions are made. The goal of this methodology is to create additional
information and further assist a decision maker with selecting a final launch vehicle
configuration.
2.3 Launch Vehicle Design Literature
There are a few books that have been written about conceptual launch vehicle de-
sign [31], [94], [38], [20]. Many of these references advocate using systems engineering
principles and describe how to create models for each of the different disciplines. The
mass estimates are completed using parametric equations; these equations calculate
mass based upon system characteristics and are discussed in Section 3.1.3. Physics
based modeling is recommended for the trajectory and propulsion disciplines and
these books give excellent detail about how to create these models.
None of these books describe how to create an integrated environment that incor-
porates all of the disciplines required for launch vehicle design. A designer would have
to use their own approach for integrating each of the disciplines when using the refer-
ences discussed above. No guidance is given about which variables should pass from
one discipline to another to enable integrated launch vehicle design. Additionally,
very little is discussed about using optimization to find the best vehicle design. How-
ever, there is a book that outlines the conceptual design process for launch vehicles
and explains how optimization can be included.
Reference [34] depicts an approach used for conceptual launch vehicle sizing at
NASA’s Langley Research Center (LaRC). The different tools used in the process are
described and a flow diagram illustrates which discipline passes information to another
discipline. Hammond also emphasizes the importance of introducing knowledge earlier
in the design phase by using trade studies and sensitivity analysis. A similar figure to
Figure 2-5 is shown, which describes how a paradigm shift is needed to better control
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costs. Hammond reinforces the argument that costs are set by decisions made during
the conceptual design phase.
An integrated environment for modeling hypersonic vehicles called “HOLIST” is
discussed in Reference [34]. “[HOLIST] is used for design, analysis, and optimiza-
tion of airbreathing hypersonic vehicles...HOLIST helps eliminate disconnects among
disciplines, enable rapid multidisciplinary parametrics, allows the evaluation of de-
sign sensitivities, and enables optimization of the vehicle design and trajectory.” [34]
However, HOLIST does not include cost or reliability.
Hammond also reviews optimization techniques including how to incorporate ex-
isting analysis tools. Collaborative optimization is examined because this technique
does not require modification of present analysis tools; the modules can be used as
they currently exist. Additionally, these analysis modules can be run in parallel;
thus, the analysis module that requires the longest operating time also determines
the concept design time.
A collaborative missile design environment is also reviewed by Hammond. “This
system provides analyses of missile system and subsystem performance in all the fun-
damental engineering disciplines including cost modeling, solid modeling, propulsion
modeling, [etc.]...” [34]. A knowledge-based system then moves through the design
environment to create a missile concept that matches the desired missile performance
while satisfying the constraints. If the performance cannot be matched then “...the
knowledge-based system will assist the user in determining which requirements and
constraints should be eased to arrive at a viable design.” [34]
Like many of the previously researched references, the details of implementing
these approaches are left to be determined. In the approach used for sizing a concep-
tual launch vehicle, the reference mentions only point designs and it is unclear if the
design tools are fully integrated.
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2.3.1 Integrated Launch Vehicle Design
An early design process that nearly integrated the launch vehicle disciplines is dis-
cussed in Reference [90]. The authors present the design process used to create a
fully reusable two stage launch vehicle. The traditional aerospace disciplines are in-
corporated, such as trajectory and propulsion, and trade studies are performed to
determine different design characteristics, such as the staging point. The trade stud-
ies were completed one at a time with vehicle point designs created for each single
variation in design variable. Quantitative cost and reliability models are not included,
but they are discussed qualitatively; certain design options are favored because they
are believed to increase reliability or reduce costs.
Reference [67] is one of the earliest approaches for creating an integrated environ-
ment for launch vehicle design. Olds combines the technical disciplines for the design
of a rocket-based combined cycle concept into one framework and used optimization
to find the minimum dry weight. The technical disciplines were represented by differ-
ent analysis tools but neither reliability nor cost was included. A surrogate for cost,
the dry mass, was used as the objective function and the optimization techniques
minimized the dry mass.
While Olds showed that the performance disciplines could be integrated into a
framework for launch vehicle design, there were some drawbacks to the approach. For
each iteration of the design process, it was not guaranteed that a feasible launch ve-
hicle would be created using the combination of design variables. Each cycle through
the analysis modules required “four to eight hours” and a design usually needed three
iterations before it was completed. Therefore, infeasible designs were being created
with a process that could last up to a day. The acknowledgment is made that the
computing power of today is orders of magnitude better compared to the computing
power used in Reference [67]. However, the percentage of infeasible designs for one
study was 33 percent which is a high percentage of designs that do not benefit the
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conceptual design process. Finally, it was unclear how easily the reliability and cost
disciplines could be added to the integrated environment. Adding extra variables
would increase the run time but it was unknown how much additional time would be
required.
Another early integrated design environment was created for hypersonic launch ve-
hicles at the NASA Ames Research Center [83]. The Hypersonic Vehicle Optimization
Code (HAVOC) integrates different performance disciplines, such as aerodynamics,
trajectory, and propulsion, into a single monolithic design code. Various subroutines
are used to represent each of the disciplines and a complete run of HAVOC results in
a single point design.
While HAVOC represents another approach for creating an integrated launch ve-
hicle design environment, the program has some drawbacks. First, HAVOC is limited
by its focus on hypersonic launch vehicles. Additionally, HAVOC does not include the
cost or reliability disciplines in its analysis. The subroutines must also be updated
as higher fidelity modeling techniques become available as opposed to using presently
developed discipline tools.
Another design approach was proposed by Unal and et al. that used Response
Surface Methodology (RSM) and optimization for launch vehicle design [91]. A set of
design variables was chosen for study and Design of Experiments (DOE) techniques
were used to create a series of design runs with the input parameters. Each design
run was evaluated by the disciplines to create a vehicle concept. Dry mass was used
as the response variable and the parameter to minimize in the optimization scheme.
A second order polynomial equation, also known as a response surface equation, was
created using regression and calculated the dry mass of the launch vehicle based on
the input parameter settings. The equation was used in an optimization scheme to
determine the design variable settings that resulted in the lowest vehicle dry mass.
One disadvantage to using the RSM approach is that the process is limited by
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the number of design variables. Reliability and cost were not included in this study
and the number of design variables would grow in order to include those disciplines.
The number of runs required to create a response surface equation increases quickly
with the addition of more design variables. Furthermore, this process is limited by
the range of the design variables. If the range is too large, then the response surface
will produce a poor fit of the launch vehicle design process.
Braun and et al. applied collaborative optimization to integrated launch vehi-
cle design and optimized a vehicle configuration for the lowest cost [4]. The cost
considered technology applications and subsystem cost. The disciplines were repre-
sented with “stand-alone” analysis tools and were integrated into a single framework
for optimization. The optimization problem contained 95 input parameters and 15
constraints.
The process used in Reference [4] was a good approach because it integrated her-
itage design tools. Additionally, the problem used a large number of design variables
to optimize the launch vehicle. However, using collaborative optimization typically
requires calculating gradients of the objective function. Using gradients is not con-
ducive to problems with discrete variables, such as the number of engines. Braun and
et al. were able to work around this by imposing constraints that corresponded to
the discrete variables. However, the appearance is given that complete “clean-sheet”
launch vehicles cannot be studied with this process because a discrete variable was
imposing a specific constraint. In this case, the number of engines imposed a con-
straint on vehicle thrust-to-weight ratio, but these two variables can be decoupled in
launch vehicle design.
Considerable time was also required in the process used by Braun and et al. [4]
While computing power has increased by orders of magnitude since the study, the
number of function calls was in the thousands. One of the benefits of using collab-
orative optimization is the process can be distributed among different computers.
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Therefore, the time required for one cycle through the analysis process is equal to
the time required for the longest discipline analysis. Yet, if the longest discipline re-
quires a significant amount of time to run, then the complete process will also require
significant amounts of time.
Collaborative optimization was also used in another integrated design environment
to study the effects of technology on launch vehicle design [56]. In Reference [56], a
set of technology scenarios were applied to a single stage to orbit launch vehicle with
the goal of minimizing system cost. The system cost is a combination of the vehicle
development and technology costs. Each technology scenario determined the total
technology resources and the optimizer finds the best combination of technologies to
minimize the total cost for a fixed performance level.
Moore and et al. [56] are subject to the same constraints as discussed in Refer-
ence [4]. Collaborative optimization requires gradient calculations; therefore, using
discrete design variables such as the number of engines on a stage is not possible. The
optimizer requires knowledge about the cost of technology to reach certain thresholds.
Therefore, discipline experts must be involved in the design process to estimate how
the performance and system cost is affected by various technologies. Additionally,
there is no quantitative reliability model; therefore, design options may beneficial for
reducing cost but could also lower vehicle reliability.
Reference [79] reviews a survey of multidisciplinary analysis techniques and their
application to launch vehicle design. Rowell and et al. [79] discuss the disciplines
typically required for launch vehicle design and the areas where an increase in model
fidelity is needed. Specific areas which need an improvement in model fidelity include
operations analysis, cost estimation, and reliability. The authors compare and con-
trast using a monolithic synthesis code, such as HAVOC, for launch vehicle design
with an environment where discipline specific tools are integrated together. A higher
level of fidelity is typically achieved for launch vehicle design by using more specific
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discipline tools [79]. The authors finish with a review of optimization techniques and
a vision for future launch vehicle design environments.
Monell and et al. [55] discussed an integrated design environment used for the Next
Generation Launch Technology program. The Advanced Engineering Environment
(AEE) was used for evaluating reusable launch vehicles and integrated the perfor-
mance, cost, and reliability disciplines. The AEE also attempted to address data
management with the creation of a database environment for storing previous design
cases.
The AEE did have some disadvantages. The reliability discipline was recognized
as one of the least mature disciplines within the environment. Additionally, it was
unclear if the reliability varied as different design options were considered. There was
also no optimization within the design environment. The authors discuss problems
with tool maturity since they relied upon discipline experts to develop the analysis
modules [55]. There was a lack of collaboration which led to various integration
challenges. Once the environment was created, six weeks were required to complete
129 designs.
Reference [25] reviewed a reliability and safety tool created for application within
an integrated environment for conceptual space vehicle design. The tool focused on
second generation Shuttle concepts and other reusable space vehicles. Analogies are
drawn from previous Shuttle reliability analyses [25] to provide the baseline reliability
estimates in the risk oriented program optimization tool (ROPOT). The tool com-
pares a functional breakdown of a new design with the Shuttle to make determinations
about the system reliability and safety. Scenarios are examined where the reliability
of certain components within the new concept is increased to examine the effects on
system reliability. The results illustrate how specific component reliability thresholds
can be reached and further increasing component reliability does not provide a large
system reliability benefit. The design options that enable the component reliability
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to reach those thresholds are also discussed.
Another study using ROPOT was completed the following year [27]. In this study,
different reusable space vehicle concepts were examined for their reliability and safety
metrics. The reusable concepts had different performance levels and required differ-
ent launch vehicles to perform the orbit insertion. A cost model was included that
calculated the development and operations cost of each design. While the application
focused on the reusable space vehicle, the reliability and safety metrics were also in-
fluenced by the choice of launch vehicle used to boost the reusable concept. Various
mission scenarios were created and the reusable concepts were evaluated across a set
of reliability and safety metrics.
While the approach in Reference [25] and [27] provides a comparison of different
reusable concepts, the use of optimization is unclear. There is little discussion about
optimizing the design variables to provide a minimum cost solution with high system
reliability and safety. Furthermore, the integration into a larger environment with
the traditional performance disciplines is not discussed in great detail. The authors
do not reveal the level of difficulty for modifying the baseline reliability estimates as
more data becomes available. Finally, the comparison of space vehicles with different
performance levels makes the selection of a final concept more challenging because
the capability of each concept is different.
A more recent publication provided a comprehensive review of launch vehicle
design methods, including optimization, for use in an integrated environment [80].
Rowell and Korte discuss the needs for future launch vehicle design, such as higher
fidelity modeling, continued advances in optimization, and the creation of integration
frameworks. The authors discuss how the integration framework used for coupling
the discipline tools may determine the optimization technique for launch vehicle de-
sign. Ideally, the process of selecting an optimization technique for a design process
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should be decoupled from the integration framework, but for some commercial soft-
ware packages, the optimization technique is in fact determined by the framework
employed.
Each of the technical disciplines is reviewed along with their corresponding de-
sign variables in Reference [80]. Rowell and Korte mention that the fidelity of some
disciplines, such as operations analysis, reliability, and cost estimation do not have
the same fidelity as the more traditional aerospace disciplines. Different optimization
techniques and the use of uncertainty analysis are also discussed for their application
to launch vehicle design. Rowell and Korte review different studies that used inte-
grated launch vehicle design and then make recommendations about the capabilities
needed to further this area of research.
Rowell and Korte discuss uncertainty analysis, which is not used in most past
studies [80]. Uncertainty analysis is important during conceptual design because
some of the disciplines, such as mass estimates and cost, rely upon historical data
to forecast future values. Using uncertainty analysis enables a design engineer to
examine the range of possible results during the launch vehicle design process.
McCormick created a process for the optimization of launch vehicles using an inte-
grated environment and including uncertainty analysis [52]. A launch vehicle design
was optimized for minimum dry mass while including uncertainty from three different
disciplines. Reference [52] focused more on determining how to include uncertainty
analysis and the best method for performing uncertainty analysis. A comparison
was made between different uncertainty techniques such as Monte Carlo Simulation
and Discrete Probability Optimal Matching Distribution. Another important com-
ponent of Reference [52] was the capability to distribute the analysis among multiple
networks.
While McCormick provided a good reference for how to use uncertainty in an
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integrated framework for launch vehicle design, there is still an opportunity for ad-
ditional enhancements. The optimization process involved only three disciplines and
did not include cost and reliability. Furthermore, the optimization technique used
a gradient based method; an approach for including discrete design variables is not
included. Finally, the variable ranges are left to be determined by the engineer with
little information about where to find uncertainty ranges.
In summary, there have been numerous launch vehicle design studies that im-
plement a wide range of approaches. Some rely upon optimization of the analysis
disciplines while others use approximations to speed up the design process. In most
studies, the reliability and cost disciplines are not included and the ease at which they
can be added is unknown to the outside reader. Having a flexible process that can
include additional models based on the design engineer’s preferences is an advantage
because there are many different ways to approach launch vehicle design. In many
of these studies, uncertainty analysis is not included. Uncertainty analysis is another
tool that can be used in launch vehicle design to provide additional information by
revealing the range of the system metrics.
The methodology outlined in this dissertation will attempt to improve upon the
design processes outlined in the literature. The contribution of this methodology
would be a process that can be used to rapidly assess thousands of launch vehicle
configurations in a matter of hours while including uncertainty analysis and the reli-
ability discipline. While the focus is evaluating designs for their cost and reliability,
the methodology is flexible enough to include additional quantitative system metrics.
The result of using this methodology is increased knowledge about a launch vehicle
design for making more informed decisions during the conceptual design phase.
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2.4 Related Aerospace System Studies
Reference [24] uses heritage data to forecast future launch vehicle reliability. Fragola
and Collins examine the Saturn, Jupiter, Juno, and Redstone launch vehicle families
to predict the Saturn V reliability if the number of Saturn V flights was increased be-
yond twelve. The authors use operational anomalies along with mission success rates
to forecast their reliability estimates. The inclusion of launch anomalies reveals that
the Saturn V may have been closer to failure than previously realized; the anomalies
show a more consistent reliability pattern with the other launch vehicles of the Apollo
era.
The authors discuss how including heritage data is important because traditional
reliability analysis may be too optimistic. In this methodology, the historical reli-
ability analysis of launch vehicles is considered and results are presented for both
the Saturn V and CaLV application. In the approach discussed in Reference [24],
it is not clear how a conceptual launch vehicle design could use the data beyond a
first order analysis. Specifically, launch vehicle reliability will change with configu-
ration changes, but it was unclear how these configuration changes would affect the
reliability forecast in Reference [24].
A detailed reliability analysis was performed for the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV),
which will carry the astronauts to orbit once the Shuttle is retired [26]. Fragola and et
al. [26] evaluated the probability of mission success and the probability of loss of crew
for the CLV. The study includes detailed failure analysis using high fidelity modeling
such as finite element analysis. The detailed failure analysis leads to a rigorous safety
examination for all phases of operational flight.
The approach used in Reference [26] may be difficult to apply during the con-
ceptual design phase. Engineering judgment is relied on to provide some reliability
estimates; therefore, discipline experts would have to be involved with the concep-
tual design process to use this detailed approach. Additionally, it was unclear how
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changing the configuration, such as using engine out, would affect the reliability cal-
culations. Rapid reliability estimates may not be possible by the approach detailed
in Reference [26] because altering the configuration may change the detailed failure
models. While Reference [26] is a higher fidelity reliability analysis compared to this
methodology, the significant reliability drivers are still revealed in the current method-
ology because of the reliance on the baseline launch vehicle reliability estimates.
Other aerospace sectors have completed integrated design studies. One of the
earliest examples is an aircraft design synthesis code created by Galloway and et
al. [29] The General Aviation Synthesis Program (GASP) performed parametric de-
sign studies for aircraft during the conceptual design phase. GASP was a monolithic
design code with subroutines representing the various performance disciplines. Within
GASP, an aircraft design was created and then evaluated for its cost metrics. There
was no reliability or optimization within this design environment.
As mentioned earlier, Reference [34] reviews an integrated missile design process
that employs a knowledge-based system to create a concept. In another study, col-
laborative optimization was studied for the conceptual design of aircraft [44]. The
study was completed by some of the same authors who published the application of
collaborative optimization to launch vehicle design. The collaborative optimization
of an aircraft is similar to a launch vehicle because the disciplines are evaluated us-
ing parallel computing and gradient based techniques are used to find the optimal
configuration.
Another paper reviewed many of the aircraft design processes that have been em-
ployed [53]. McMasters and Cummings showed that aircraft conceptual design relies
upon many of the same techniques used in launch vehicle design. For example, aircraft
design uses analysis modules for each of the disciplines in an integrated framework
with optimization. Multidisciplinary optimization techniques were reviewed in Ref-
erence [53] including how they were applied to the aircraft design process. Finally,
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the authors highlighted many of the same challenges faced during conceptual launch
vehicle design: the fidelity of models during the conceptual design phase and the need
for advancing optimization techniques.
Rotorcraft design also faces many of the same problems incurred by both the
launch vehicle and aircraft design communities. A comprehensive survey paper showed
that a comparable approach to launch vehicle design could be used for rotorcraft de-
sign [30]. A set of analysis modules are integrated together in one environment and
optimization is used to find the best rotorcraft design. Again, model fidelity is a
large concern because of errors caused by using low fidelity modeling to enable vehi-
cle optimization. Aeroelastic analysis is specifically cited because of the large errors
that occur when comparing an optimized design with a higher fidelity aeroelastic
model. The computational time when using the higher fidelity aeroelastic analysis
is extremely high and nearly prohibitive for rotorcraft optimization. However, opti-
mization in rotorcraft design has been shown to lead to better solutions; therefore,
optimization may be better used as a guide to find improved concepts [30].
In summary, other aerospace industries may use similar approaches for performing
design. Many of the problems that plague launch vehicle designers, such as compu-
tational time and model fidelity, are also faced by other aerospace system engineers.
However, system engineers are able to achieve similar goals during the conceptual
design phase, which are to determine the driving parameters and move toward an
optimal design. There are still other approaches to system design, especially when
considering cost and reliability. Value based methods and reliability allocation tech-
niques are two alternative approaches that may be useful for design.
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2.5 Alternate Design Approaches to Couple Cost
and Reliability
One area which examines linking reliability and cost discusses relating the cost of
reliability to a financial concept known as Net Present Value (NPV). NPV is a
calculation used for determining the future net cash flow while accounting for the
time value of money. In Saleh and Marais [82], the authors’ goal is to determine
the optimum level of reliability by finding the maximum value of NPV, which would
result in a positive cash flow. Different levels of redundancy are discussed and the
NPV of each design is compared with an example satellite application.
The authors begin by demonstrating how current estimates of NPV over-estimate
the system value since reliability is not incorporated. A different calculation for NPV,
which includes reliability, is then used to compare the NPV of a theoretical system
with 100% reliability. This comparison establishes the cost benefit of improved re-
liability. The value of redundancy is then incorporated by using a new failure rate
in the calculation of NPV to determine the NPV of a system with a specific level
of redundancy. This calculation becomes the basis for the cost of increasing system
reliability. For these calculations, a cash flow model has been created using assump-
tions regarding the currency generated when the system is in operation. Finally, the
cost of using different levels of redundancy is calculated by multiplying the additional
components by their individual cost. An optimizer is used to determine the design
with the largest difference between its cost for increased reliability in the development
phase and the operational value added by using increased reliability.
Saleh and Marais [82] is a well developed model for determining the level of reli-
ability while incorporating cost. This model could be applied to the area of human
space transportation if the value of exploration could be established. The cost of un-
reliability could be quantified by using the cost of investigations when failure occurs.
However, establishing the value of exploration is extremely difficult. The methodology
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proposed in this body of work further differs because it integrates the performance,
cost, and reliability into one integrated design environment. The design engineer
can examine the sensitivities of vehicle mass and system cost to increasing system
reliability.
One of the most interesting aspects of Saleh and Marais work [82] is the quan-
tification of using component redundancy. This calculation is put into units easily
understood by system managers without relying upon assumptions used by current
cost estimating tools in the space industry. Therefore, further study is needed to
combine the best practices of both methodologies.
An additional study applied a genetic algorithm to optimize a system’s reliability
with a budget constraint [69]. Uncertainty analysis was included by using distribu-
tions for the component failure rates instead of single point values. The methodology
application was a personal computer and the goal was to find the optimal configu-
ration by using redundancy to increase system reliability while considering a hard
cost constraint. Each design was run 200 times and the 5th percentile of the system
reliability was considered that design’s objective function evaluation. Figure 2-15
illustrates the baseline configuration used in the study.
Figure 2-15: Block Diagram of Computer Application [69].
The approach in Reference [69] provides a baseline that can be improved upon for
application to launch vehicle design. While only redundancy options were included
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in Reference [69], reducing the operating time of a launch vehicle is another way to
improve its reliability if the failure rates are constant. Additionally, changing the
configuration of the computer only affected cost and reliability. For launch vehicle
design, adding subsystem redundancy or using engine out requires re-sizing the vehi-
cle to meet the payload requirement. Therefore, selecting different combinations of
redundancy may result in infeasible configurations. However, the study showed that
the reliability model of a configuration can be changed dynamically during the design
process, which is important when studying the different configurations of a launch
vehicle.
Another study also used genetic algorithms to solve a reliability optimization
problem [7]. The goal was to determine the optimum level of redundancy for each
subsystem in a series of subsystems. The subsystems had multiple component choices
that could be used to provide redundancy. Each of the component choices had a given
mass, cost, and reliability. The genetic algorithm then selects the best combination of
component choices for each subsystem that maximized the reliability of the complete
system.
The approach described in Reference [7] may be too simplistic for launch vehicle
design. Selecting different reliability strategies for a launch vehicle cannot be based on
a known mass, reliability, or cost effect because the problem is coupled. Using engine
out for a three engine configuration will produce a very different result compared to
using engine out on a five engine configuration. Additionally, the problem discussed
in Reference [7] was deterministic and did not include any uncertainty in the mass,
reliability, or cost estimates. Therefore, a design engineer could not evaluate the
range of system metrics for the optimized design.
Many different studies have been dedicated to solving the reliability allocation
problem, which is the problem of finding the most cost effective solution for high
system reliability. A design process that attempts to find the optimal balance of
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reliability and cost for a launch vehicle is essentially the same type of problem. Dif-
ferent strategies are applied to increase system reliability while studying the penalties
imposed on the concept for using those reliability strategies. The difference occurs
because of the manner in which the system metrics are evaluated. For launch vehicles,
every change in configuration which increases system reliability must go through the
complete design cycle before the system metrics can be measured. As mentioned ear-
lier, different configurations will respond differently to the same reliability strategy.
Yet, there are lessons learned from examining reliability allocation techniques which
are included in this methodology.
2.6 Summary of Techniques
The goal of systems engineering and its principles are to evaluate all aspects of a
design’s life-cycle in order to select a final design, as shown in Figure 2-1. The elements
of a system’s life-cycle were illustrated in Figure 2-2. Considering the elements of a
system’s life-cycle is important because the cost is largely determined by the decisions
that are made during the design, as shown in Figure 2-5.
Cost is not the only metric for comparing alternative design configurations. While
the majority of the Section 2.1 was focused on making decisions to minimize Life-Cycle
Cost (LCC), design engineers may want to include other metrics, such as reliability,
when evaluating different concepts. A minimum cost design may have a much lower
reliability compared to an alternative configuration with a higher cost. The process
outlined in this dissertation includes both system cost and reliability, and is flexible
enough to add other quantifiable system metrics.
A variety of design processes exist for both launch vehicle design and linking cost
and reliability. Many of the launch vehicle design studies integrated their design dis-
ciplines into one framework and used optimization to find the best solution; however,
few incorporated cost and reliability into the design environment. Additionally, few
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studies were found which used uncertainty analysis in the design of launch vehicles.
This methodology will try to close some of the missing gaps while including the best
practices from previous work.
This dissertation fills a void by outlining a detailed process explaining how to
create an integrated environment for use in launch vehicle design. Major elements
of the launch vehicle’s life-cycle are considered in order to evaluate many different
configurations with a specific set of mission objectives. The fidelity of launch vehicle
reliability analysis is increased compared to previous design environments. The fi-
delity of the performance and cost analyses will still be comparable to current launch
vehicle design approaches; however, as with other design studies, the cost discipline
would benefit from using higher fidelity analysis techniques. Additionally, the effi-
ciency of the launch vehicle design process is improved compared to previous design
studies because thousands of launch vehicle configurations can be quantitatively eval-
uated within a few hours; this efficiency has not been demonstrated by any of the
previous design studies.
The parameters that have the largest effect on the system metrics of a launch
vehicle can be determined by using this methodology. The significant parameters are
important because their settings will heavily influence the system cost. Additionally,
information is created which explains how system cost is affected by increases in
launch vehicle reliability. The creation of the integrated environment provides the
capability to perform rapid launch vehicle assessment and increase the amount of
information that can be introduced during the conceptual design phase.
2.7 Research Questions
The methodology outlined in this dissertation will be used to solve a series of research
questions. These research questions are derived from the literature and experience
with launch vehicle design. A set of hypotheses answering the research questions is
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presented in Section 3.9.
1. How is launch vehicle reliability increased?
• What techniques exist for increasing launch vehicle reliability?
• Are any techniques favored over another (such as engine out versus adding
power subsystem redundancy)?
2. What improvements can be made to the launch vehicle design process?
• How can reliability be included in launch vehicle design?
• What tools should be included within the conceptual design framework?
• What design variables should be passed among the different disciplines?
• What time improvements can be made over the previously cited research?
3. How is the system affected by configuration changes?
• How much is system reliability affected by including (1) subsystem redun-
dancy such as dual power subsystems, (2) engine out, and/or (3) reducing
flight time?
• What are the performance effects of using (1) subsystem redundancy, (2)
engine out, and/or (3) reducing operating time?
• How is cost affected by the various reliability strategies?
4. How can the launch vehicle design process include uncertainty analysis?
• Which disciplines should include uncertainty analysis?




The methodology for linking system cost and reliability is developed in this chap-
ter by revealing the details of how to create the necessary performance, cost, and
reliability models. Launch vehicle sizing is discussed in this chapter to provide a
foundation for why certain disciplines are included in the launch vehicle design pro-
cess. An examination of different reliability techniques is also included in this chapter
along with the present method for calculating launch vehicle reliability. Various cost
estimation procedures are reviewed and the approach for calculating system cost is
presented. Optimization techniques are considered and a justification is made for
using a genetic algorithm. The final sections of this chapter show how the integrated
environment is created using the performance, cost, and reliability models developed
in this dissertation.
3.1 Performance Disciplines
The methodology for linking cost and reliability relies upon performance models to
complete the sizing of a launch vehicle. The effects of improving reliability through
the use of engine out or adding full subsystem redundancy will not be known unless
the performance aspects are also included. This section describes one method for
creating and integrating the performance models of a launch vehicle. The goal of
integrating the performance models is to calculate vehicle characteristics, such as the
subsystem masses and stage burn time, for use in the cost and reliability disciplines.
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3.1.1 Launch Vehicle Description
The goal of a launch vehicle is to launch a specific mass, the payload, into a specific
orbit. For example, the Falcon 1 launch vehicle advertises the ability to launch a
payload weighing 1,590 pounds to a 108 nautical mile circular orbit [19] while the
Space Transportation System (STS) can reach a circular orbit of 110 nautical mile
with a 63,500 pound payload [41]. The payload mass and final orbit requirements
for a launch vehicle may vary depending on the requirements of the mission. For
example, the STS can reach a 320 nautical mile orbit if the maximum payload is
reduced to 40,600 pounds [41].
A launch vehicle will use a series of stages to accomplish its mission. These stages
are stacked on top of each other to form the vehicle, as shown in Figure 2-7 for the
Saturn V. The Saturn V was a three stage launch vehicle responsible for launching the
Lunar Module, and the Command and Service Module (CSM) to the Moon. Each
stage in Figure 2-7 fired sequentially beginning with the lowest stage. Each stage
relied upon its own set of subsystems for successful operation. For example, the S-IC
stage in Figure 2-7 had its own set of engines, avionics, power, and other subsystems
that were all integrated within the stage. Once the S-IC stage performed its mission,
the S-IC stage would drop off the vehicle and the S-II stage would begin its mission.
A successful launch occurs when all stages had completed their individual missions.
Decisions about launch vehicle characteristics, such as the number of stages, are
made during the conceptual design phase. These decisions are made by creating the
different launch vehicle configurations and calculating the vehicle’s system metrics.
The performance metrics typically include the vehicle’s mass, its thrust to weight
ratio, the trajectory a vehicle will fly, and the required engine performance. A number
of different analysis modules are evaluated to calculate the performance metrics during
conceptual design. The analysis modules used to evaluate the performance metrics
are discussed in this section.
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3.1.2 Mission Constraints
When evaluating a series of launch vehicle configurations, the mission constraints
should remain constant for a fair comparison. The payload and the final orbit are
examples of two mission constraints. The payload is the specific mass that must
reach a particular orbit. Additional mission constraints may exist, such as maximum
dynamic pressure (max q) and maximum acceleration (max gs). These constraints
will lead to a trajectory that requires more propellant for the launch vehicle when
compared to a trajectory without the maximum dynamic pressure and/or maximum
acceleration constraint. The explanation for requiring additional propellant mass
when there are trajectory constraints is discussed in Section 3.1.6.
The mission constraints for the Saturn V and Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) appli-
cations are listed in Appendix I. These constraints are the same mission constraints
as the original launch vehicles. For the Saturn V, the final orbit parameters were
calculated from mission performance [84], while the mission objectives for the CaLV
were found within the Exploration System Architecture Study [66].
3.1.3 Mass Estimates
The mass estimates of a launch vehicle are determined by using Mass Estimating
Relationships (MER). An MER is an equation developed from regression of historical
databases that uses vehicle characteristics to estimate the mass of a subsystem or
component. Since a launch vehicle is a one of a kind system, there is some error when
using MERs because of the reliance upon historical space systems to forecast future
subsystem masses.
The MERs used in the application of the methodology are from Rohrschneider [78].
An example MER is shown in Equation 3-1. This equation estimates the mass of the
crew cabin from the number of crew. The values “2347” and “0.5” are estimated
using a regression analysis of the historical database.
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MCrewCabin[lb] = 2347 ∗N0.5crew (3-1)
The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) for the Saturn V is listed in Appendix E.
Each of the subsystems listed in Appendix E has an associated MER used to estimate
the mass of that subsystem. A comparison with the actual Saturn V [95] is also listed
in Appendix E. The CaLV WBS is listed in Appendix E with a comparison between
ESAS [66] and the model used in this dissertation. For the CaLV, the models created
from previous work by Young and et al. [99] were built upon for application of this
methodology.
3.1.4 Propulsion
Another analysis area used to complete a launch vehicle design is the propulsion
discipline. The propulsion model calculates the required engine characteristics based
upon the design configuration. Using a conceptual design tool, engine characteristics
such as the engine thrust, engine thrust-to-weight ratio, and Isp are determined.
The engine thrust provides the vehicle’s acceleration, while the engine thrust-
to-weight ratio provides a higher fidelity method for calculating engine mass when
compared with MERs. Engine Isp is a measure of efficiency for a rocket engine,
similar to the miles per gallon rating in an automotive motor. Isp measures how
much thrust can be provided compared to the rate of the propellant burned; Isp units
are in seconds. Equation 3-2 illustrates how to calculate Isp, where ‘T’ is the thrust
and
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Since the thrust varies depending on the ambient pressure, the Isp will also vary
depending on this pressure. A high vacuum Isp value for an engine that uses liquid
propellants is 450 seconds. The Solid Rocket Boosters on the Space Transportation
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System have a vacuum Isp of around 266 seconds; solid rockets are less efficient than
liquid engines.
A conceptual powerhead design code called Rocket Engine Design Tool for Opti-
mal Performance - 2 (REDTOP-2) [74] is used for the analysis in this methodology.
Figure 3-1 illustrates the user interface for REDTOP-2. REDTOP-2 requires a user
to set a number of design parameters such as the engine thrust level, chamber pres-
sure, and cycle type to calculate the desired output variables. The output variables
in this methodology are Isp and engine thrust-to-weight ratio which have excellent
agreement with all relevant rockets that have been produced.
Figure 3-1: REDTOP-2 User Interface.
3.1.5 Trajectory Analysis
To finish sizing a launch vehicle, the propellant mass is required which can be calcu-
lated using trajectory analysis. The trajectory discipline depends upon the mission
constraints, such as those discussed in Section 3.1.2, along with a set of input vari-
ables. These input variables include the vehicle thrust-to-weight ratio, the dry mass
of each stage, and the Isp of the engine on each stage.
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The trajectory analysis in this methodology is completed by using the Program
to Optimize Simulated Trajectories (POST) [71], which is a three degree of freedom
trajectory simulation widely used at NASA. The trajectory is solved by integrating
the equations of motion over time for a specific set of mission objectives. POST can
be used to find a trajectory that minimizes the amount of propellant required. The
vehicle mass will decrease because the mass of the tanks and supporting structure is
reduced when the propellant mass decreases. Additionally, graphs such as the launch
vehicle position versus time and the acceleration versus time can be created once the
trajectory analysis is completed.
Another parameter calculated with trajectory analysis is the burn time of each
stage on the launch vehicle. The burn time is important for the reliability analysis
because the burn time will dictate how long each subsystem needs to operate. Table 3-
1 is a first order reliability comparison of the S-II stage of the Saturn V. As the burn
time increases on the S-II stage, the reliability decreases. This occurs because of the
governing failure distribution that is used to calculate reliability which is discussed
in Section 3.3.2. Table 3-1 demonstrates how the trajectory and reliability disciplines
are coupled.
Table 3-1: S-II Reliability Comparison.




Creating a conceptual launch vehicle design requires iteration of certain parameters
between the trajectory, mass, and propulsion disciplines. The iteration process is
discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.7. A few of the iteration parameters are in the



















g ∗ (sinγ)dt− TV Closses (3-3)
The rocket equation is used to determine the amount of velocity boost to a payload
provided by its launch vehicle; the velocity boost is referred to as “delta-V”. A payload
has been defined as the mass needed at a specified position and velocity. The first
parameter in Equation 3-3 is gravity and the second parameter, Isp, was discussed
earlier in Section 3.1.4.
The next term in Equation 3-3, dm
M
, is the natural logarithm of the mass ratio after
completing the integration. Mass ratio is defined as the initial mass of the vehicle





The initial mass is equivalent to the gross lift-off mass for a launch vehicle while
the final mass is the used propellant mass subtracted from the gross lift-off mass.
The final mass is also equivalent to the dry mass of the vehicle plus any residual
propellants. The dry mass of a vehicle is all of the hardware, such as the propulsion
and avionics subsystems, needed to create a launch vehicle. The additional terms in
Equation 3-3 will be discussed later.
The mass ratio reveals the effectiveness of the vehicle for providing additional
velocity. A higher mass ratio leads to a higher velocity change provided by the
propulsive vehicle. Figure 3-2 is a notional example that shows how the delta-V
increases with an increasing mass ratio. The analysis for Figure 3-2 included no losses
and an Isp of 450 seconds. For reference, the CaLV used later in this dissertation has
a baseline mass ratio of 3.5 for the first stage and 4.2 for the second stage.
An infinite mass ratio is impossible to achieve because increasing the propellant
mass increases the tank mass. As a result, the vehicle gross mass will increase and
59
Figure 3-2: Effects on Delta V of Increasing the Mass Ratio.
the thrust of the engine must be increased in order to maintain a constant vehicle
thrust-to-weight ratio, which is important for the trajectory. Therefore, increasing
the gross mass by increasing the propellant mass can cause the required engine thrust
to reach an infeasible level.
The thrust-to-weight ratio of the vehicle is important due to the remaining terms
in Equation 3-3 because they determine the time of flight. These terms are the losses
that occur while the vehicle is performing its propulsive maneuvers. The D
m
term
is the velocity loss due to drag since the vehicle is flying in the atmosphere; if the
vehicle is already in orbit then this term is negligible. The next term, g ∗ (sinγ),
is the velocity loss due to gravity. This loss occurs because the vehicle is partly
thrusting in the same direction as the gravity force. For example, a launch vehicle
begins its trajectory with the thrust vector aligned in the opposite direction of gravity.
Therefore, the vehicle is ascending to orbit while overcoming gravity. As the vehicle
begins to pitch over toward its final flight path angle, the gravity losses lessen because
the acceleration vector is no longer in the complete opposite direction as the gravity
vector. The flight path angle is defined as the angle between the velocity vector and
the local horizon; the local horizon is defined as a perpendicular line to the position
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vector [32]. The final loss in Equation 3-3 is the thrust vector loss which occurs
because the acceleration and position vector are not aligned. These vectors are not
aligned because the vehicle is changing position while thrusting.
The vehicle thrust-to-weight ratio determines the trajectory that is flown by the
vehicle. With a higher thrust-to-weight ratio, a launch vehicle can quickly escape the
dense part of the atmosphere and attempt to minimize drag losses. Additionally, the
vehicle can begin to pitch over to minimize gravity losses after escaping the dense
atmosphere. However, there is a “sweet spot” for minimizing losses because of the
interaction between the propellant mass and the dry mass of the vehicle. As the
thrust-to-weight ratio increases, the required dry mass may increase, which increases
the system cost. However, if the thrust-to-weight ratio is too low, then velocity
losses increase, which increases the required propellant mass, which then increases
the required dry mass.
Figure 3-3 is a comparison between two POST trajectories delivering the same
payload to orbit. The trajectories have been optimized for a minimum propellant
mass solution. The trajectories differ because of their different vehicle thrust-to-
weight ratios. The solid line trajectory is the original Saturn V, while the dashed line
trajectory is a Saturn V configuration with engine out on the S-II stage.
Figure 3-3: Saturn V Trajectory Comparison.
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The vehicle thrust-to-weight ratio of the dashed line trajectory is lower than the
nominal Saturn V; this can be seen in Figure 3-4 where the vehicle with the solid line
trajectory reaches a higher velocity at 400 seconds compared to the vehicle with the
dashed line trajectory. The vehicle with the dashed line trajectory will not reach its
orbital velocity until much later in the flight, which increases its required propellant
mass compared to the nominal Saturn V.
Figure 3-4: Saturn V Velocity Comparison.
The vehicle with the dashed line trajectory is exhibiting a behavior called lofting,
where a vehicle reaches a higher than necessary altitude because it does not have
the proper velocity at the required altitude. Therefore, the vehicle with the dashed
line trajectory must continue to burn until it reaches the required orbital velocity;
this increases the propellant mass compared to the nominal Saturn V trajectory.
In Figure 3-3, the vehicle represented by the dashed line trajectory must have a
higher mass ratio than the nominal Saturn V because the vehicle with the dashed
line trajectory is overcoming more losses.
While a minimum propellant mass trajectory will minimize the dry mass of a
launch vehicle, it is unknown if a minimum dry mass configuration is an optimal
design with regard to cost and reliability. Figure 3-32 will show that the engine cost
increases with engine thrust. Therefore, while minimizing the propellant mass will
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lead to a lower dry mass, the thrust required to achieve this trajectory may result
in a higher vehicle cost compared to a configuration that does not use the optimal
trajectory. Only an integrated model will be able to determine the full effects on the
system cost and reliability of changing the thrust-to-weight ratio.
The vehicle thrust-to-weight ratio can change due to a number of parameters.
A decrease in engine thrust will lead to a lower vehicle thrust-to-weight ratio and
may increase the required propellant mass to provide the velocity boost. Adding
subsystem redundancy by using multiple subsystems will decrease the vehicle thrust-
to-weight ratio because the dry mass will increase with additional subsystem mass.
Mass sensitivity ratio is the sensitivity of vehicle mass to changes in the vehicle
configuration. Equation 3-5 illustrates the mass sensitivity ratio used to examine the





To calculate Equation 3-5, mass is added to a stage, such as the S-IVB. The entire
vehicle grows in size to account for the additional mass and this change in mass from
the original configuration is divided by the added mass. Table 3-2 lists how the mass
sensitivity ratio changes as mass is increased on different stages of the Saturn V.
Table 3-2: Saturn V Mass Sensitivity.
Element S-IVB S-II S-IC
Added Mass [lb] +1000 +1000 +1000
S-IVB 3200 0 0
S-II 7700 3500 0
S-IC 35000 11400 4400
Saturn V (total) 45700 14900 4400
Element Mass Multiplier Mass Multiplier Mass Multiplier
Saturn V 45.7 14.9 4.4
In Table 3-2, the gross mass of the Saturn V does not change significantly when
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1000 pounds is added to the S-IC stage in column four. The S-IC stage is the first stage
of the launch vehicle and therefore adding mass only affects the initial vehicle thrust-
to-weight ratio. However, the gross mass changes significantly when 1000 pounds is
added to the S-IVB stage in column two. The S-IVB stage must provide both the
propellant for the final burn to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and the Trans-Lunar Injection
(TLI) burn. Therefore, any changes in S-IVB mass must also increase the propellant
for both S-IVB burns in order to keep the mass ratio constant. Additionally, as
discussed earlier, when the propellant mass is increased, the dry mass will increase.
The S-IVB engine thrust must increase to maintain a constant stage thrust-to-weight
ratio to fly the same trajectory. These changes on the S-IVB stage cascade to the
S-II stage, where the S-II engines must also increase their thrust level to use the same
trajectory. The S-IVB and S-II changes cascade to the Saturn V. As a result the
Saturn V must grow in size to maintain a constant mass ratio and vehicle-thrust-to-
weight ratio. Thus, any changes on the S-IVB will have a large impact on the whole
vehicle, as seen in Table 3-2.
In Table 3-2, the mission objectives were constant. However, as discussed earlier,
the question remains about whether a minimum propellant mass trajectory leads to
an optimal solution with regard to system reliability and production cost. Therefore,
a wide range of trajectories are explored within the integrated model to find the best
vehicle configuration for a combination of cost and reliability.
3.1.7 Completing the Sizing Process
The vehicle sizing process is completed by using the mass estimates from the MERs in
conjunction with the trajectory and propulsion discipline to create a vehicle design.
In this methodology an aerodynamics analysis is completed based on the baseline
launch vehicle configuration and it is assumed that the aerodynamic results will not
vary by a large amount based upon design changes. Iteration is required within the
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trajectory, mass, and propulsion disciplines because the MERs cannot create mass
estimates of the vehicle without the propellant mass, but the trajectory analysis
requires a payload and dry mass for operation. The iteration process is referred to as
“closing” a vehicle design and is illustrated in Figure 3-5.
Figure 3-5: Closing a Launch Vehicle Design.
Figure 3-5 illustrates closing a three stage launch vehicle as completed in this
methodology. A design engineer selects a stage thrust-to-weight ratio and uses tra-
jectory analysis to determine the required mass ratio. In this methodology, response
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surface equations replace the trajectory analysis and are discussed further in Sec-
tion 3.1.8.1. The stage thrust-to-weight ratio and stage mass ratio are used to com-
pute the subsystem masses in the mass estimation tool. The stage propellant mass
is calculated first within the mass discipline, and then the supporting structure and
subsystem masses are computed. The stage thrust-to-weight ratio, gross mass, and
number of engines are used to calculate the engine thrust; the engine thrust is passed
to the propulsion discipline. Another response surface equation replaces the propul-
sion discipline and is used to calculate the engine thrust-to-weight ratio based upon
the engine thrust. The engine mass is computed using the engine thrust-to-weight
ratio and engine thrust. A new gross mass is calculated with the updated engine
mass.
Iteration may occur because the stage thrust-to-weight ratio and stage mass ratio
do not match their initial values. Therefore, the subsystem masses are calculated in a
loop that runs until the stage thrust-to-weight ratio and stage mass ratio equal their
initial values.
The iteration process occurs one stage at a time. The subsystem masses of the
top stage are computed first because this stage is the payload for the second stage.
In turn, the second stage is the payload for the first stage. Once all of the stages
have converged on their respective thrust-to-weight ratios and mass ratios, the launch
vehicle is considered closed.
There is the possibility that the chosen thrust-to-weight ratio cannot complete
the mission. If the thrust-to-weight ratio is too low, the iteration loop will never
converge and the thrust-to-weight ratio must be increased to close a vehicle design.
The minimum thrust-to-weight ratios for the Saturn V and CaLV applications were
found by finding a ratio that would barely close the vehicle design. If the thrust-to-
weight ratio is too high, then the vehicle masses become prohibitive for closing the
launch vehicle concept.
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The process illustrated in Figure 3-5 is one reason why Response Surface Equations
(RSEs) were used for the trajectory and propulsion discipline. A range of thrust-to-
weight ratios for each stage on the Saturn V and CaLV were closed with POST
and REDTOP-2 prior to creating an integrated model. Therefore, the efficiency of
closing a launch design, as shown in Figure 3-5, is improved because the intensive
computational programs, such as POST and REDTOP-2, are subsequently removed
from the design process.
3.1.8 Integrating the Performance Disciplines
Figure 3-6 is a design structure matrix for the performance analysis modules and
illustrates how the disciplines are integrated together to create a launch vehicle design.
The black dots in Figure 3-6 indicate which parameters are used as inputs and outputs
for each discipline. The design engineer controls the thrust-to-weight ratio of each
stage, the number of engines per stage, and other reliability options that are discussed
further in Section 3.4. Based on the configuration selections, the subsystem masses
of the launch vehicle are calculated with the process shown in Figure 3-6.
Figure 3-6: Design Structure Matrix for the Performance Disciplines.
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The iteration process discussed in Section 3.1.7 has been eliminated through the
use of Response Surface Equations (RSEs). RSEs are polynomial equations that can
be used in place of an original analysis module. RSEs are used for both the trajectory
and propulsion disciplines in Figure 3-6. The trajectory RSEs use the stage thrust-to-
weight ratio to calculate the stage mass ratio and burn time while the propulsion RSE
uses the engine thrust to calculate the engine thrust-to-weight ratio. The process of
creating RSEs is explained in the next section.
3.1.8.1 Response Surface Methodology
Response Surface Methodology (RSM) can be used to create meta-models that speed
up the design process [18]. Meta-models are polynomial equations, also called Re-
sponse Surface Equations (RSEs), and can be used in place of an analysis module.
RSEs introduce error but techniques can be used to minimize the error introduced
into the design process. Additionally, the time saved by using an RSE instead of an
analysis module may be considerable.
RSEs use a set of independent variables to model the analysis behavior. These
independent variables are chosen due to their large effect on the desired response of
the original analysis module. An example of an RSE is shown in Equation 3-6.














‘R’ is the desired response, the ‘b’ values are the coefficients and the ‘x’ variables
represent the design choices. During the RSE creation process, the user will determine
the order of the equation by examining how well the meta-model fits the original
analysis. The width of the design variable ranges also affects how closely the RSE
represents the original analysis module. Once the ranges are determined, a series of
case studies are created to generate the response data needed for completion of the
RSE.
68
The number of analysis runs can be determined by a variety of methods. A full
factorial will evaluate every design variable combination and lead to the best fit, pro-
vided that the analysis module is capable of being approximated with polynomial
equations. However, using every design variable combination may be prohibitive be-
cause of time considerations. Therefore, techniques such as a Design of Experiments
(DOE) can be used to accelerate the process of data collection [18]. DOEs are sta-
tistical methods for determining the optimum number of cases to run through the
analysis module to fit a RSE. The number of runs is determined by how many design
variables are in use and the number of levels for these design variables. A DOE such
as a Central Composite Design (CCD) requires only 15 runs for a three variable, three
level study while a full factorial design requires 27 runs.
Table 3-3: DOE Run Comparison.
DOE Type 3 Vars. 7 Vars. 12 Vars.
Full Factorial 27 2,187 531,441
CCD 15 143 4,121
Box Behnken 15 62 2,187
Table 3-3 lists a comparison of the number of analysis runs needed by each DOE
technique to generate an RSE for three different sets of variables. Once a DOE
technique is selected, a table is populated with the design variables and the analysis
module is run an appropriate number of times.
Once the data set is generated by the analysis module, regression is used to fit the
data to a RSE. Regression is an optimization technique that attempts to minimize the
difference between the predicted value of the RSE and the actual value of the analysis
module [35]. This optimization scheme will change the RSE coefficients until the error
is minimized. The exact process of performing regression will vary depending on the
number of variables [35]. The regression technique may result in a poor fit of the
analysis module and additional steps must be taken to increase the goodness of fit.
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The quality of fit for a response surface equation is important because the RSE
is representing a required analysis module. A measure of goodness of fit is R2, which
measures the proportion of variation due to the design variables. A high R2, such as
0.98, is desired when representing analysis modules with RSEs. Another measure of
fit quality is R2 − adjusted, which measures the same variation except by excluding
every data point in the table of cases. Likewise, a high value on the order of 0.98 is
desired when using RSEs. If these values are not achieved, then higher order terms
can be used. For example, if an RSE is a quadratic equation, cubic terms can be
included in an attempt to increase the goodness of fit. However, the addition of
higher order terms artificially increases both the R2 and R2 − adjusted terms [35].
Another method for increasing the fit quality is to include more analysis runs in
the RSE generation. Decreasing the ranges of the design variables will also increase
the goodness of fit. Transforming the variables is another technique for increasing
the goodness of fit. The responses and/or the design variables can be transformed
with a logarithmic function. Once a good fit of the RSE is established, the user can
substitute the RSE for the analysis module and accelerate the design process.
3.2 Present Method for Evaluating Launch Vehi-
cle Performance
In order to improve the computational time of the integrated environment, the two
computationally intensive programs, REDTOP-2 (propulsion) and POST (trajectory)
are replaced with response surface equations. Both POST and REDTOP-2 can take
minutes to run whereas an RSE is instantaneous. As mentioned earlier, the indepen-
dent variable of the propulsion RSE is the engine thrust and the dependent variable
is the engine thrust-to-weight ratio. Two RSEs are used over a range of thrust levels
for the J-2 application to increase the accuracy of the RSEs. The high thrust RSE,
with thrust levels up to 400,000 pounds, is shown in Equation 3-7. The RSE ranges
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and the goodness of fit statistics, such as the R2 value, are listed in Appendix F. An
RSE is used because the J-2 engine thrust-to-weight ratio changes as engine thrust




Figure 3-7 illustrates how the engine mass changes with engine thrust. While
Figure 3-7 appears linear, the engine thrust-to-weight ratio is actually increasing
slightly as engine thrust increases. For a low thrust engine, such as a 100,000 pound
thrust level, the engine thrust-to-weight ratio is 69. A high thrust engine, on the
order of 400,000 pounds, has an engine thrust-to-weight ratio of 74. The engine
thrust-to-weight ratio increases because some components within the engine, such as
the controllers and avionics boxes, do not increase in mass with increasing thrust
levels.
Figure 3-7: Engine Mass as a function of Engine Thrust.
An assumption is made that the vacuum Isp value is constant over the range of
vacuum thrust levels. Figure 3-8 is created using REDTOP-2 [74] and plots vacuum
Isp as a function of thrust for the J-2 engine.
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Figure 3-8: Vacuum Isp as a Function of Thrust for the J-2 Engine [74].
For trajectory analysis, POST requires additional time and the program can be
difficult to solve depending upon the input parameters. Therefore, a set of RSEs have
been created to replace the trajectory discipline in Figure 3-6. The independent pa-
rameter for the RSE is the stage thrust-to-weight ratio and the dependent parameter
is the stage mass ratio. Equation 3-8 is the RSE for the S-II stage of the Saturn V.
MRstage = 5.19 + (−6.28) ∗
T
W stage









Each stage has its own RSE based upon the stage thrust-to-weight ratio. For
example, both the booster and Earth Departure Stage of the Cargo Launch Vehicle
have their own trajectory RSEs. All of the RSEs were created as a step prior to
creating the integrated design environment. The RSE ranges and the goodness of fit
statistics are listed in Appendix F. The constraints for the trajectory analysis are
listed in Appendix I.
Response surface equations were also created to calculate the burn time of each
stage based on the stage thrust-to-weight ratio. Equation 3-9 shows the RSE for
calculating the Earth Departure Stage burn time based upon its thrust-to-weight
ratio. The burn time for the injection to the Moon has also been captured with an
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RSE based upon Figure 3-10. All of the statistics pertaining to the burn time RSEs
are listed in Appendix F.
BTstage = 1676.8 + (−4523.6) ∗
T
W stage









When using RSEs, validation is important in order to show that the RSEs can ap-
proximate the original analysis module accurately. Validation of both the propulsion
and trajectory RSEs are shown in Chapter 4 when the results are discussed.
The stage burn time is an important parameter for the reliability discipline and
is calculated by the trajectory analysis. The burn time provides an operating time
for each subsystem and greatly affects the reliability estimate of the stage, as seen in
Table 3-1. The next section discusses why reliability and time are coupled. The next
section also reviews various reliability analysis techniques and the modeling used in
this methodology.
3.3 Reliability Modeling
Reliability was defined earlier as “the probability that an item (component, subsys-
tem, system) will perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated
period of time.” [81] For launch vehicles, the reliability is the probability of success-
fully completing its mission. A launch vehicle reliability estimate can be converted
into another metric, called the Mean Flights Between Failure (MFBF), which esti-
mates an average number of flights between launch vehicle failures and is discussed
in more detail in Section 3.3.2.
Reliability can be modeled using failure rates and the operating time for each
subsystem in a launch vehicle. The operating time is a function of the launch vehicle’s
trajectory and is the same for each subsystem on a particular stage.
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A first order example is used to illustrate the relationship existing between the
performance, cost, and reliability disciplines. The thrust-to-weight ratio for the Earth
Departure Stage (EDS), the second stage of the Cargo Launch Vehicle, was partially
selected by examining the gravity losses for the trans-lunar trajectory. Figure 3-9
illustrates how the gravity losses are a function of the EDS thrust-to-weight ratio.
Figure 3-9: Gravity Losses as a Function of EDS Thrust-to-Weight Ratio [66].
If the EDS is assumed to weigh 350,000 pounds at the time of the burn to the
Moon, then there is an EDS thrust difference of over 150,000 pounds for the range of
thrust-to-weight ratios. A first order calculation of the corresponding engine develop-
ment cost shows that the difference in engine cost could be between 500 million dollars
[FY ’04] and 700 million dollars [FY ’04], in addition to the difference in production
cost per engine. Additionally, the difference in EDS mass from selecting between two
thrust-to-weight ratios will cascade down to the booster stage and cause large differ-
ences in required engine thrust for a set booster thrust-to-weight ratio. The booster
engine development cost is then affected by the wide range of booster engine thrust.
Furthermore, reliability conflicts with cost because a higher stage thrust-to-weight
ratio reduces the burn time which can increase the system reliability.
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Figure 3-10 illustrates how the burn time decreases with vehicle thrust-to-weight
ratio. While the difference of 400 seconds may appear small, the difference in reli-
ability on a vehicle such as the Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) is almost 50 percent
using the estimates shown later in this dissertation. A first order calculation shows
the mean flights between failures can increase from 150 flights to 230 flights for the
CaLV when varying the EDS thrust-to-weight ratio between 0.4 and 1.0. Therefore,
while decreasing the EDS thrust-to-weight ratio will benefit the cost discipline, a
lower EDS thrust-to-weight ratio also decreases the system reliability. An integrated
environment can rapidly assess the effects of changing a design variable, such as stage
thrust-to-weight ratio or engine out capability, to find an optimal launch vehicle con-
figuration for a given weighting of cost and reliability.
Figure 3-10: TLI Burn Time for Varying EDS thrust-to-weight ratio [66].
In this section, various methods for analyzing system reliability are discussed
along with their advantages and disadvantages. The concept of reliability growth is
reviewed and an approach to incorporate reliability growth into the methodology is
presented. Different techniques for improving reliability are presented in this section.
The section concludes with a detailed description of the method used for calculating
launch vehicle reliability.
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3.3.1 Reliability Breakdown Structure
Reliability can be calculated at many different indenture levels of a launch vehicle to
produce the system reliability estimate. An indenture level is a plane on which all
of the subsystems, components, assemblies, or parts are of the same complexity [12].
The indenture levels of a launch vehicle are similar to the Work Breakdown Structure
in Appendix E. The lowest possible indenture level would be the individual parts
making up an assembly, such as the bolts, nuts and structure. A description of each
indenture level relevant to this methodology is listed below.
1. Architecture
A reliability calculation at the architecture level results in a complete mission
estimate. For example, multiplying the reliability of every element in the Apollo
missions, such as the Command and Service Module, the Lunar Module, the
Saturn V, etc., would result in the probability of success for a lunar mission.
• Element/System
The reliability calculation at the element/system level is the reliability of
a single vehicle, such as the Saturn V. First order reliability analysis can
be conducted at this indenture level, such as the example in Table 3-1, or
the element/system reliability can be calculated by including the reliabil-
ity estimates of the lower indenture levels. The launch vehicle reliability
calculation in this methodology will be completed by using the reliability
estimates of the lower indenture levels.
– Stage
A launch vehicle is composed of stages (with the exception of a sin-
gle stage to orbit launch vehicle). The stage reliability estimate is
calculated using the subsystem reliability estimates, which are calcu-
lated on the next indenture level. The stage reliability estimates are
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then combined to calculate the system reliability estimate, which is
the preceding indenture level.
∗ Subsystem
The majority of the reliability analysis in this methodology will
occur at the subsystem level. The subsystem level is the indenture
level of the power, avionics, and other subsystems within a launch
vehicle. This indenture level is equivalent to many of the levels in
the WBS in Appendix G.
· Component
Some reliability analysis used in calculating launch vehicle re-
liability can occur at the component level. Examples of items
at the component level are the engines, feed system, and other
components that are within the propulsion subsystem. Engine
reliability is a significant parameter of launch vehicle reliability;
therefore, in this investigation, the engines are separated from
the propulsion subsystem and the engine reliability is calculated
at the component level.
Additional indenture levels could include objects such as assemblies and parts.
Assemblies are items that make up a component, such as an engine turbine, while
parts are the items, such as turbine blades, that make up assemblies. Reliability as-
sessment at the assembly or parts level is generally performed in Phase C, the detailed
design phase. For conceptual design, reliability analysis down to the component level
will suffice for calculating launch vehicle reliability. While the detailed engine com-
ponents, such as the feed lines and controllers are not modeled explicitly, the single
engine reliability includes their effects. The significant subsystems and components
will be revealed by applying this methodology even though a level of fidelity in the
engine reliability analysis has been sacrificed.
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3.3.2 Calculating Component and Subsystem Reliability
Reliability at the component level can be calculated using the survivor function of
a governing failure distribution. The survivor function calculates the probability of
successful operation at any given time [47]. An example of a survivor function is the
exponential distribution shown in Equation 3-10.
Ri(t) = e
−λit (3-10)
Equation 3-10 is the formula for calculating the reliability of a component or
subsystem with an exponential distribution as the governing failure distribution. In
Equation 3-10, λ is the failure rate associated with the component and t is the time
of operation. The units of the failure rate are failures per unit time. The unreliability
of a system is equal to one minus the reliability.
The failure rate is determined by the hazard function, which is shown in Equa-
tion 3-11 for the exponential distribution. The hazard function is the probability that
an item will fail at precisely time t.
hi(t) = λi (3-11)
The inverse of the failure rate is the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF), which is an
average measure of the amount of time that will elapse before a component fails. For
launch vehicles, MTTF is equivalent to MFBF when the exponential distribution is
used and the units of MTTF are failures per mission.
From Equation 3-10, there are two methods for improving reliability. One ap-
proach is to decrease the failure rate shown in Equation 3-11. The other method for
increasing reliability is to reduce the operating time. For launch vehicles, increasing
the thrust-to-weight ratio will decrease the time to orbit. As the time decreases in
Equation 3-10, the reliability will increase, as shown in Table 3-1.
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An exponential function is a special form of the Weibull distribution and is impor-
tant because the distribution has a constant failure rate with time. The exponential
distribution exhibits the memoryless property, which means that the probability of
failure in the next instant of time is the same as when the component began operating.
The Weibull distribution is another common failure distribution. A familiar ex-
ample of the Weibull distribution is the failure rate curve, also known as the bathtub
curve, exhibited by electronic components. The curve is illustrated in Figure 3-11.
Figure 3-11 is the compilation of three Weibull distributions pieced together. The
curve represents the burn in period where (I) the failure rate is initially high but
decreases, (II) a period of constant failure rate, and (III) a period of degradation as
the failure rate increases again.
Figure 3-11: Bathtub Curve Created by Multiple Weibull Distributions [87].
The formulas for the reliability and the failure rate of the Weibull distribution
are given by Equation 3-12 and Equation 3-13, respectively. The shape parameter is
denoted by the symbol κ and the scale parameter is denoted by the symbol λ. The
exponential distribution is a special case of the Weibull distribution where κ is equal
to one. By using a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter larger than one, a
degrading component can be modeled. The component’s failure rate will increase








In summary, different failure distributions can be used to calculate the reliability
of a part, assembly, component, or subsystem. For expendable launch vehicles, the
failure distribution is typically the exponential distribution [59], [23] because of the
relatively short lifetime of the vehicles. Therefore, in this analysis, all component and
subsystem reliability calculations will use the exponential distribution as the govern-
ing failure distribution. In addition to a variety of distributions that can be used
to calculate single component reliability, there are a number of different techniques
when using the component reliability estimates to calculate the system reliability. A
review of the different methods for analyzing the system reliability is the focus of the
next section.
3.3.3 Reliability Analysis Techniques
There are a number of techniques that can be used to complete a system reliability
analysis. Some of the more common practices include Reliability Block Diagrams
(RBDs), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).
A more rigorous analysis is a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), which combines
Master Logic Diagrams (MLDs) with event trees and FTA. Other reliability analysis
techniques include Petri nets and Markov chains. This section will discuss a few of the
common reliability practices. By understanding how to quantify system reliability,
techniques can be applied to increase the vehicle’s reliability.
3.3.3.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative analysis with the goal of
identifying all failure modes and their consequences in a system. “FMEA analysis at-
tempts to predict possible sequences of events that lead to system failure, determine
80
their consequences, and devise methods to minimize their occurrence or re occur-
rence [54].” Since many industries use FMEAs, the Government has established the
military standard MIL-STD-1629A [12].
There are two different approaches to performing a FMEA: hardware and func-
tional. The hardware approach begins with identifying each of the parts in the system.
A part was defined previously as a lower level object that comprises assemblies, such
as a turbine blade. The hardware method should be used when all objects of the
same indenture level are known.
A functional approach should be used when all of the system levels cannot be
identified. A functional FMEA defines the system into specific functions as opposed
to hardware. The functional FMEA is still effective in identifying problem areas
but should be replaced with a hardware scheme as additional knowledge becomes
available. A FMEA is most effective when hardware is used in the analysis.
The first task in FMEA is to “define the system [12].” An initial step is to create
a functional block diagram of the system and then identify the elements within the
functions to the lowest indenture level. This task will be incomplete if the items for
completing a function are still unknown.
The next step is to ascertain all of the failure modes for each of these objects or
functions if the hardware is unknown. Failure modes are identified such as premature
operation, intermittent action, failure to stop working and degradation of perfor-
mance [12]. Once the failure modes have been pinpointed, their consequences must
be established: a local effect, a higher abstract effect, and an end effect. The local
effect is how the failure directly affects the item itself. The abstract effect details how
the failure affects the next higher level, like an assembly or a subsystem to which the
component belongs. The end effect is the result of the failure on the highest level of
propagation. In addition to identifying the effects of a failure, the type of failure is
classified. These grades range from category I for a catastrophic failure to category
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IV for a minor failure. The failure mode must be classified by the worst possible out-
come. These categories are listed in reference [12]. Categories I and II are identified
as the most critical because they lead directly to loss of vehicle and loss of mission,
respectively.
The next step in FMEA is describing the failure detection and preventative mea-
sures. Any corrective actions that reduce the risk after failure should be identified.
All backup systems, redundancy, and alternative modes of operation must also be
clarified for each failure mode. Finally, the effects of these backup systems and/or
corrective actions must be defined.
Throughout the FMEA process various documents should be created. A standard
worksheet has been established to help with the FMEA process and an example
worksheet is shown in Figure 3-12 [18]. The worksheet can also be used for a slightly
more rigorous process that includes the criticality modes and is called Failure Modes,
Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
Figure 3-12: FMECA Worksheet [18].
In addition to the worksheet, a list of all category I and II failure modes must be
created. The information on this list should include design features that will minimize
the occurrence the category I and II failure modes. Another file to create is a critical
item list, which is a record of all single point failures. A single failure point is a
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breakdown that results in system failure without any type of backup or redundancy.
FMEAs may not be an appropriate reliability analysis technique during the con-
ceptual design phase because they are most effective when they are hardware based.
However, FMEAs can be useful for conceptual design by identifying category I and
II failure modes. These modes are especially important because failure in these areas
may have severe consequences. If the failure modes are recognized early enough in
the design, then a different configuration or design strategy can be used to eliminate
or reduce a critical failure mode. Additionally, all single point failures must be ad-
dressed to ensure a more reliable system. The Apollo engineers used FMEA to list
multiple failure modes of their components. To perform the quantitative analysis, the
engineers used Reliability Block Diagrams.
3.3.3.2 Reliability Block Diagrams
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) are a quantitative technique that can be used for
reliability analysis. Early spacecraft reliability analysis was completed using RBDs, as
seen in Hershkowitz, and et al. [36] for the Apollo vehicles. RBDs follow the physical
layout of the system and use a block representation. The block representation begins
at the top level by decomposing the system into its hardware subsystems. Within
these subsystems, block representations of the components are created. These blocks
are strung together to represent how each component must operate in the system
for success. The manner in which these blocks are constructed determines how the
calculations are performed.
Figure 3-13: Series Reliability Block Diagram.
In a series system, top level success is achieved when every component in the
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series operates successfully. A diagram of a series system is shown in Figure 3-13.






The formula for calculating a series system is Equation 3-14; the component re-
liabilities are represented by Ri and the system reliability is Rs. The component
reliabilities could be calculated using Equation 3-10 if the governing failure distri-
bution is the exponential distribution. Since reliability never equals unity, system
reliability will decrease with each additional series component. Improving subsys-
tems with the lowest reliability causes the biggest improvement in system reliability
for elements in series. Techniques for increasing subsystem and component reliability
are discussed in Section 3.3.5.
In a parallel system, there are multiple paths to achieve success. Parallel systems
are used to represent redundant components. Full redundancy is a scenario where
only one component out of a set of components is required to operate for system
success. An illustration of a parallel system is shown in Figure 3-14 where only one
of three components must be functioning for the system to operate properly.
Figure 3-14: Parallel Block Diagram.
The formula for calculating the reliability of fully redundant components is shown
in Equation 3-15. The component reliabilities are represented by Ri and the system
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reliability is Rs. Again, the component reliability can be calculated with Equation 3-
10. Using parallel configurations will increase the system reliability because only one





Using identical components when only one is required will lessen the probability
that a single component failure will lead to system failure. There are two primary
disadvantages to using identical components to provide redundancy. First, mass and
maintenance time increase when any redundancy is used. The second disadvantage
is due to Common Cause Failures (CCFs). CCFs can bypass component redundancy
completely if, for example, a manufacturing defect is present in all redundant com-
ponents.
3.3.3.3 Common Cause Failure
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) can bypass redundancy that uses identical compo-
nents by causing these components to fail because of something inherent in all of the
components. One example of CCF could be a manufacturing defect that invaded all
components in a particular batch.
When using identical components to provide redundancy, common cause failure
effects should be included because the reliability benefit is not as large compared to
redundancy calculations that do not include CCF. Upon component failure, an identi-
cal component will exhibit a 10 percent CCF rate; that is, 10 percent of the time that
a component fails, its identical component will also fail [73]. For three components of
the same type, the percentage grows to 75 percent for the third component failure;
in other words, if the first two components fail, the third component will also fail 75
percent of the time due to CCF.
Common cause failure can be included in any system reliability analysis by using
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the Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) method [54]. In this methodology, a reduced version
of the MGL method known as the “Beta” (β) model is used. The full MGL model is








Within this dissertation, only dual components (i.e. a one out of two system) are
used for redundancy. This strategy was chosen because a triple redundant system
(i.e. one out of three) is almost as likely to fail as a dual redundant system because of
common cause failure [72]. Figure 3-15 illustrates why the benefit from using triple
redundancy is minimal [73].
Figure 3-15: CCF Impacts of Different Component Configurations [73].
The governing failure distribution in Figure 3-15 is the exponential distribution;
the failure rate for a single component is 5.5E-5. The unreliability of a single com-
ponent is illustrated by the top line in Figure 3-15. The bottom two lines, the pink
and brown lines, show the benefits of redundancy without considering common cause
failure. However, once CCF is considered, as represented by the middle two lines
in Figure 3-15, the reliability benefits of using identical components in a parallel
configuration are significantly reduced.
Figure 3-15 is heavily dependent on the common cause failure probabilities along
with the component failure rate, but the graph exhibits the same characteristics until
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the failure rate for a single component becomes unreasonably high. One mention
should be made about the STS-9 mission, which utilized a triple redundant APU
system. During the landing phase, two APUs caught on fire but the orbiter was able
to land safely because it had one additional APU [88].
3.3.3.4 Complex Reliability Block Diagrams
RBDs can also be more complex, such as when they are used to represent a shared
load. A shared load is when each of the components performs a fraction of the
work necessary to make the subsystem function. The operating requirement of each
component is less because there are multiple components to help perform the total
function. Yet, when there is a component failure, the remaining components have to
match the increased burden required to make the subsystem operate. An example
of a shared load subsystem is the propulsion subsystem of a Boeing 777 with its
two aircraft engines. FAA regulations mandate that a passenger aircraft have the
capability to take off with one engine out; the single engine is performing the workload
of two engines. An example applicable to space systems is engine out capability.
Engine out can be referred to as an ‘m’ out of ’n’ set of components. An ‘m’
out of ‘n’ set of components is one where if ‘m’ components are working, then the
subsystem is operating. The equation for calculating the reliability of this type of
subsystem with RBDs is shown in Equation 3-17. The component reliabilities are
represented by Ri and the subsystem reliability is Rs. While an ‘m’ out of ‘n’ system
is not a fully redundant scenario and does not provide the same reliability benefit, it





Calculating the system reliability using reliability block diagrams requires that
all of the components be combined into the proper system configuration. Many
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components will be combined in a series configuration because these components are
required to function for successful system operation. The Apollo engineers created
a large reliability block diagram for the Command and Service Module, the Lunar
Module, and the Saturn V [36]. Each of the components were combined into their
subsystems and the subsystem reliabilities were combined using Equation 3-14 to
calculate the system level reliability.
RBDs do have their limitations. Both the diagram and number of calculations are
substantial for complex applications, as seen in the Apollo reference [36]. Additionally,
RBDs cannot be used for varying failure conditions where the failure rate may change
during the operation time. An example of a varying failure rate could be a shared
load scenario, where the component failure rate changes when its workload increases.
3.3.3.5 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault trees are a common technique for performing reliability analysis in complex
aerospace systems. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is used to determine the probability
of a top level event. A top level event is an undesirable occurrence such as loss of
mission. All sub-levels are either gates or events that are responsible for the top level
event occurring. The fault tree’s lowest levels are individual components that make
up the system.
For the same system, reliability block diagrams and fault tree analysis will cal-
culate the same result. The difference between the two approaches is Fault Tree
Analysis calculates unreliability, which is one minus the reliability. Therefore, either
technique can be used to achieve the desired result.
FTA begins with identifying a top level undesirable event. Depending on the
application, the set of elements, subsystems, or components that affect the top level
event must be compiled. These items are organized within the fault tree to reflect
whether they are redundant, singular, or part of an ‘m’ out of ‘n’ system. A fault
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tree example is shown in Figure 3-16.
Figure 3-16: Notional Fault Tree Diagram.
A fault tree diagram uses specific terminology to represent the system [54]. The
symbols represent one of three basic objects: an event, a gate or a transfer gate. An
event is a component with a probability of failure. A gate illustrates redundancy or
series systems with “OR” and “AND” type gates. An “AND” gate indicates that
all components listed below the gate must fail before failure occurs. In Figure 3-16,
objects C4 and C5 must fail before G2 will fail.
An “OR” gate signifies that only one of the components listed below the gate
must fail before a breakdown happens. In Figure 3-16, G1 will fail if either objects
C2 or C3 fail. There are also variations on both “OR” and “AND” gates such as a
voting gate, which represents the ‘m’ out of ‘n’ scenario. Transfer gates are used for
complex systems when the complete fault tree becomes large.
The calculation methods are very similar to the RBD analysis method, except
failure probabilities are calculated instead of success probabilities. For components
in series, such as C2 and C3 in Figure 3-16, the probability of failure (or unreliability)







For fully redundant components, Equation 3-19 is used to calculate the probability






There are a variety of software packages available for calculating system reliability
with fault tree analysis. One software package, RELEX [75], will be used to verify
some of the reliability models needed in the application of this methodology. An
example of a reliability model with the RELEX software is shown in Figure 3-23.
The main disadvantage of using a fault tree is for large complex systems. As with
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs), fault trees can become very large and challenging
to calculate for complex systems. Additionally, the underlying failure rate cannot
be varied during the analysis. Therefore, fault trees have the same problems with
dynamic analysis that RBDs encounter.
3.3.3.6 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a rigorous method of reliability analysis that
incorporates multiple reliability techniques. Familiarization with the system is the
first task in PRA and is important because the system must be decomposed into
great detail for an effective PRA. Additionally, this familiarization will help with
determining the quantitative reliability techniques to use in the PRA.
The next task is to compile a list of initiating events. These events begin scenarios
that lead directly to an undesirable end state, such as loss of vehicle. Typically these
scenarios are a string of multiple events that must occur in order to reach a specific
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end state. There are exceptions where an initiating event will lead directly to a
hazardous end state. All analysis will be based on the list of initiating events.
FMEA is one technique that can be used to identify initiating events. If a FMEA
is already complete, then using this analysis as a reference is one way to locate the
initiating events. If a previous FMEA does not exist, then the system should be bro-
ken down into a functional block diagram. The top level functions that are critical
for success are noted, and all other sub-functions, subsystems, and components will
be decomposed from these top level blocks. Another technique for use in identifying
initiating events is a Master Logic Diagram (MLD). MLDs are a hierarchical repre-
sentation of the system by functional categories [45]. A benefit of using MLDs is that
the initiating events are more easily identified because analysts can visualize what
functions are critical for mission success. Once all of the initiating events have been
identified, event sequence diagrams can be created.
Event sequence diagrams (ESDs) are block representations of scenarios that hap-
pen once an initiating event has occurred. There may be multiple scenarios depending
on the number of mitigating strategies. If there is only one safety feature, then the
event sequence diagram will only have one block with two possible results: a favorable
and an unfavorable end state.
An example of an ESD is shown in Figure 3-17. This diagram has three possible
outcomes. After the initiating event occurs, two outcomes are favorable and one
outcome is undesirable.
The next step in Probabilistic Risk Assessment is to convert Figure 3-17 into
an event tree. Event trees use Boolean algebra to calculate the probability of an
initiating event. A Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) event tree is shown in Figure 3-
18. Each ending branch of the tree represents a different scenario; probabilities of
scenario occurrence are located to the right of the branch end [23]. To compute the
likelihood of failure from the initiating event, the probability of occurrence of the
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Figure 3-17: Notional Event Sequence Diagram.
singular events in the tree must be calculated. The singular events are calculated
with fault tree analysis and combined to determine the total probability.
Figure 3-18: Shuttle Event Tree [23].
Probabilistic risk assessment was completed for the Space Transportation Sys-
tem [23]. The PRA created a rigorous definition of the system and calculated the
loss of vehicle and loss of crew probabilities. The study referenced was completed
before the Columbia accident and estimated the mean loss of vehicle to be one per
131 missions. The Shuttle Orbiter and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) are
the two main elements that lead to loss of vehicle. Within the SSME, turbomachin-
ery is the biggest cause of failure, while the auxiliary power units are the leading risk
contributor on the orbiter.
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PRA originated in the nuclear industry [54] and the nuclear industry uses different
quantitative reliability techniques to assess system safety. Methods such as cause
consequence diagrams, Markov analysis, and block diagrams are used for determining
the safety level at nuclear power plants [39]. There are many ways to complete a PRA
and the application will determine which quantitative reliability methods are most
appropriate.
The limitations of PRA are defined by the methods for calculating the top level
event probability. The STS PRA used fault trees and event trees and was limited
by their capability. The STS PRA also assumed an exponential distribution which
may not be appropriate for a reusable system with a long lifetime. Since the compo-
nents of the STS will degrade over time, the Weibull distribution may have been a
more appropriate failure distribution. One example of degrading components is the
shuttle wiring system, which has been in the vehicle since its development. Using
an exponential distribution for the wire failure rate does not reveal how hazardous
the wires have become [87]. A relatively new technique called Stochastic Petri Nets
(SPNs) is attempting to address the aging concern in a more rigorous manner by
incorporating the ability to use dynamically changing failure distributions for single
component reliability analysis.
3.3.3.7 Stochastic Petri Nets
Stochastic Petri Nets are a state space tool built on the Petri Net foundation. SPNs
have the same goal of all other quantitative reliability techniques: to calculate sys-
tem reliability [50]. The most important aspect about SPNs is the ability to model
dynamic scenarios such as a varying failure rate like the one mentioned in the shared
load problem. Another use for SPNs is the application of redundancy. Many times
redundant components are switched on when the initial component fails; the sec-
ond component is known as a cold spare. The failure rates of both components are
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assumed to be the same even though the redundant component has not been used.
SPNs can model this scenario properly and treat the redundant component as a brand
new part. Figure 3-19 illustrates a shared load example from Reference [93].
Figure 3-19: SPN Example Problem [93].
In Figure 3-19, there is a state that represents system operating (i.e. “system ok”),
a state for single component failure, and another state for system failure. The tokens
(i.e. black circles) in Figure 3-19 move throughout the diagram to represent each of
the different states. A token in system failure will represent a failed mission. The
black boxes are transitions and are associated with governing failure distributions,
such as the exponential distribution. Thus, the transitions will dictate the manner
in which tokens move between the different system states. The arrows illustrate the
direction of token movement. In Figure 3-19 an inhibitor is represented by the line
with a circle at the end and marked with a “2” in the middle. Due to the inhibitor, the
tokens in Figure 3-19 cannot move directly to the failure state until one component
fails. When a component fails, a token will move to the component failed state. Since
only one component is operating, the second token is exposed to a higher failure rate.
System failure is now more likely than the initial component failure because of a
higher failure rate.
Stochastic Petri Nets use Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) to calculate system
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reliability [93] by counting the number of times a token enters the system failed state
during the total simulation. If one run of the Monte Carlo simulation ends before a
token reaches the failed state, the mission occurred successfully. If a token enters the
failed state before the end of one MCS, the system has failed. The simulation uses
thousands of runs to ensure the true failure probability is calculated.
Another state space technique for reliability analysis is called Markov chains.
Markov chains are similar to SPNs because Markov chains also use different system
states to calculate an overall reliability estimate. However, SPNs are more rigorous
than Markov chains because Markov chains can only use the exponential distribu-
tion [87]. SPNs can use a variety of distributions to model failure rates and can be
configured to represent the bathtub curve exhibited by electronics.
Stochastic Petri Nets can represent a higher fidelity model of a complex system
with respect to reliability analysis. The opportunity to use varying failure rates
enhances its capability over the more traditional reliability tools. In the current
software package, the failure distribution parameters are single point values, making
uncertainty analysis difficult. Uncertainty analysis is an important part of reliability
since many failure rate parameters are assumed or derived from similar components.
Therefore, the reliability analysis technique used in this dissertation will combine the
best attributes of both SPNs and FTA to incorporate uncertainty analysis.
3.3.4 Reliability Growth Modeling
As a system’s operating life increases, the reliability of a system may increase. The
increase in reliability over time is defined as reliability growth and was shown to exist
empirically by Duane [17]. Reliability growth occurs because engineers are correcting
design defects throughout the system’s lifetime [48]. There are a variety of models
that can be used to forecast the reliability growth of a new system [11].
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One reliability growth model is the Duane model which is shown in Equation 3-
20 [17]. The number of failures per total test time is λ, ‘K’ is a constant, ‘T’ is the
total test time, and α is the reliability growth constant. The Duane model is a power
law formulation that depends on α to determine the rate of growth.
λ = KT−α (3-20)
For launch vehicles, reliability growth occurs as the number of flights increases.
Figure 3-20 shows the reliability, or mission success, history of the Atlas launch ve-
hicles [41], [21], [89]. As the number of flights increases, the probability of mission
success for the Atlas launch vehicle also increases, demonstrating the reliability growth
of the Atlas program.
Figure 3-20: Atlas Launch Vehicle Reliability Growth.
3.3.5 Techniques for Improving System Reliability
A number of different techniques exist for improving system reliability which includ-
ing: (1) increasing component reliability, (2) decreasing operating time, (3) increasing
subsystem reliability through the use of redundancy, and (4) performing validation
and verification tests. There are advantages and disadvantages to each method.
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3.3.5.1 Increasing Component Reliability
Increasing component reliability within the space industry can be completed through
a few different strategies. Building in larger design and environmental margins [31]
are two recommendations for increasing component reliability. Higher component
reliability can also be attained by carefully controlling the manufacturing process with
tight tolerances. However, adding margin or using tighter manufacturing tolerances
may increase system cost as the design effort becomes more labor-intensive.
One advantage to increasing component reliability is a potentially lower parts
count. With fewer components in the system, processing and turnaround times will
decrease [76]. While this is not as important for expendable launch vehicles, reusable
vehicles such as the proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) would benefit from
using fewer components. A possible cost decrease from a reduction in processing time
may offset the increased cost of using higher reliability components. However, little
information is found about quantifying the cost of increasing component reliability
within the space industry. The future work section will explain how to incorporate a
model for calculating the cost of increasing component reliability within this method-
ology.
3.3.5.2 Time
When using an exponential function as the governing failure distribution, as shown
in Equation 3-10, reducing the operating time will increase the system reliability.
The operating time can be reduced by increasing the stage thrust-to-weight ratio as
discussed in Section 3.1.5. The example at the beginning of the reliability section
calculated a possible decrease in the mean flights between failure when the operating
time is reduced. Table 3-1 also provided an example of how decreasing the operating
time will increase the probability of mission success.
The assumption of the exponential distribution is important because the reliability
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of a different failure distribution, such as the Weibull distribution, may not increase as
time decreases. If subsystem reliability was governed by a Weibull distribution with
a decreasing failure rate, such as region I in Figure 3-11, then decreasing operating
time will decrease reliability.
3.3.5.3 Redundancy
System reliability can also be increased by using redundancy. Redundant components
are a set of components in a configuration where only one component is required to
operate for success. Redundancy was discussed in Section 3.3.3.2 and Equation 3-15
is used to calculate the reliability of parallel components.
The reliability of a subsystem can be increased by using multiple components of
the same type even though only one component is necessary. For example, a power
subsystem may require only one battery for successful operation but two batteries are
included in the final design. If one battery fails, the power subsystem can continue
operating because of the second battery.
Another type of redundancy is functional redundancy, where two different systems
are used to perform the same function. One example of functional redundancy is
using batteries and fuel cells for the power subsystem when only batteries are needed.
Another example is using two different manufacturers to produce two batteries when
only one is required. A famous example of functional redundancy is the ill-fated
Apollo 13 mission. When the CSM lost its power and oxygen due to an explosion in
the oxygen tanks, the crew was able to use the Lunar Module (LM) for life support
until re-entry [31]. Functional redundancy is not as susceptible to common cause
failure since an inherent flaw in one component may not exist in a separate component.
Therefore, functional redundancy will generally provide a higher system reliability
benefit compared to using identical components in a parallel configuration.
Any type of redundancy will increase mass and processing time, and may increase
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overall cost. There is a debate about the amount of redundancy to include on a
vehicle. The work completed by the Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST), head-
quartered at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), advocates using as little redundancy
as possible [76]. The SPST believes that the penalties on processing time are too great
to justify using multiple components. The SPST advocates increasing the component
reliability in order to use single components within each subsystem. On the other
hand, companies such as Space X have advertised the engine out capability on their
larger launch vehicles [19]. Increasing component reliability to levels high enough
where only single components are necessary may be challenging. Thus, some redun-
dancy may be beneficial, and this dissertation will attempt to quantify the cost of
adding that extra advantage. Redundancy will be split into two types: using identical
components and employing functional redundancy.
3.3.5.4 Validation and Verification
Another technique for improving reliability is validation and verification, which is
accomplished through component, subsystem, and system testing. Testing does not
increase reliability unless changes are made after the tests. The increase in system
reliability through flight testing is called reliability growth and was discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.4.
Classical statistical approaches can be used to understand the impact of testing at
all indenture levels. Confidence intervals are one method for examining the impact of
testing using classical statistics. A confidence interval represents the range of possible
values for a parameter such as the Mean Flights Between Failure. As the number of
tests increases, the confidence interval decreases around the reliability estimate.






The formula for a 1-α confidence interval is shown in Equation 3-21 [35]. This
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formula is based on using the exponential distribution as the governing failure equa-
tion. Equation 3-21 is used to calculate an upper and lower bound for the MFBF
value, denoted by µ. The chi-square distribution with 2n degrees of freedom is used
and the number of tests is the value n. Degrees of freedom refer to the number of
independent values that are used in the estimation [10]. The t̄ symbol represents the
average MFBF generated from the test runs.
A confidence interval can be created once testing has occurred. As the number of
tests increase, the confidence interval will decrease around the most likely estimate.
An example of using a confidence interval is listed in Table 3-4 for the Saturn V
launch vehicle.
Table 3-4: 90% Confidence Interval Comparison of MFBF.





The reliability of the Saturn V was estimated at 76 percent [59], which is equivalent
to 1 failure per 4.16 missions. The confidence interval is 90 percent, which means that
90 percent of all sets of test flights will have a MFBF value between the upper and
lower bounds. After the first flight, the confidence interval is still very wide. After
the fifth flight, the confidence interval has decreased significantly. However, many
more flights are required before the confidence interval begins to center around the
mean. There is one important assumption for this example: the confidence interval
is highly dependent on the average MFBF. Therefore, if the Saturn V program had
112 flights, a failure would have to occur every 4.16 flights, on average, for Table 3-4
to be valid.
A statistical approach based on the number of tests and using Bayes success run
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theorem can be employed to state the confidence in a reliability estimate [49]. Equa-
tion 3-22 illustrates the relationship between a reliability estimate and a confidence
level. A key assumption in Equation 3-22 is the system has never failed [49].
C = 1− (Rc)n+1 (3-22)
In Equation 3-22, the confidence level is C and the reliability estimate is Rc.
The number of flights is the variable n. In Equation 3-22, the analyst is X percent
confident that the reliability value is at least the input estimate or greater. Table 3-5
lists an example of how the confidence estimate in the reliability value grows with the
number of flights.
Table 3-5: Confidence Level for Saturn V Reliability Estimate.




Table 3-5 reveals that by the end of the Apollo program, engineers could be 97.18
percent confident that the Saturn V reliability was at least 76 percent. Furthermore,
if sets of 12 flights were repeated, 97.18 percent of them would have a reliability of
at least 76 percent. When the initial reliability value is higher than the example in
Table 3-5, the confidence level will grow more slowly with the number of tests. The
use of Bayesian statistics results in an increasing confidence level with every successful
flight.
The effects of testing will be shown through the use of reliability growth. Only
complete system flights will be used to demonstrate how launch vehicle reliability
increases; the system reliability will increase as a function of flight number. It is
assumed that the cost modeling, discussed in Section 3.5, will account for the cost
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of testing required to certify hardware at indenture levels below the element level.
An acknowledgment is made that additional testing at the component and subsystem
level may increase the reliability of the components or subsystems, but a method for
quantifying the cost of additional testing is not proposed. Discussion in the future
work section will show how a model that quantifies the cost of additional testing at
indenture levels below the system level could be incorporated into the methodology.
3.4 Present Method for Calculating System Re-
liability
Reliability modeling in this methodology will be completed at the subsystem and
component level. Section 3.3.1 described the indenture levels used within this dis-
sertation. Engine reliability is a significant driver of launch vehicle reliability [1];
therefore, engine reliability analysis is calculated at the component level.
The reliability discipline in this methodology relies upon fault trees, reliability
block diagrams, and uncertainty analysis to calculate the system reliability. The
system reliability is calculated by combining the subsystem and component level
reliability estimates. The subsystem and component level reliability is calculated by
using the exponential distribution shown in Equation 3-10. Uncertainty analysis is
included by using triangular distributions for the failure rate, or λ in Equation 3-10,
at the subsystem and component level. The ranges for the triangular distributions
are determined from historical launch vehicle reliability.
The following section will describe in greater detail how the present method com-
putes system reliability. Special attention is given to the largest driver of system
reliability [1]: engine reliability and engine out. The following section also details
how full subsystem redundancy is treated for the two different types considered in
this methodology. Illustrations will show how uncertainty analysis is used at the
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subsystem and component level. Fault tree diagrams are used to show how the sub-
system and component reliability estimates are combined to calculate the system
reliability. The section will conclude with an explanation of how reliability growth is
incorporated into the methodology.
3.4.1 Engine Modeling
Since the engine is such a significant driver of launch vehicle reliability, it must be
separated from the propulsion subsystem and calculated at the component level.
Throughout the history of launch vehicles, engines have been one of the leading
causes of launch vehicle failure [1]. Figure 3-21 shows the leading subsystem and
component contributors to unreliability of the S-II stage [59]. Engine unreliability
is the leading cause of unreliability for the S-II stage [59]. Figure 3-22 shows that
engine unreliability is expected to be the largest contributor to the first stage of the
Cargo Launch Vehicle [66].
Figure 3-21: S-II Subsystem Unreliability Contribution [59].
In Figure 3-21, the reliability of the propulsion subsystem is determined from the
total engine reliability and the main propulsion subsystem. The main propulsion
subsystem consists of all other components within the propulsion subsystem, such
as the feed lines and thrust vector control components. When engine out is not
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Figure 3-22: CaLV Booster Unreliability Contribution [66].
considered, the total engine reliability is calculated with the series equation shown in
Equation 3-14. The total engine reliability is combined with the other components of
the propulsion subsystem, using Equation 3-14, to calculate the propulsion subsystem
reliability. Engine out modeling requires a different model because engine out is a
dynamic scenario.
3.4.1.1 Catastrophic Engine Model
An engine out scenario is a partially redundant system where two engines must fail
before the vehicle will fail. Therefore, a basic engine out model could use Equation 3-
17 to calculate the total engine reliability. However, Equation 3-17 would ignore
the common cause failure contribution from using identical components along with a
catastrophic failure mode exhibited by engines.
A catastrophic engine failure is an “uncontained” failure that will lead directly to
system failure. An example would be an engine explosion that destroys the launch
vehicle. The benefits of engine out are reduced because of a catastrophic failure mode,
similar to how the reliability benefit of using identical components for redundancy is
reduced by common cause failure. However, a catastrophic failure is different from
CCF because the catastrophic failure mode only affects one engine but causes the
complete system to fail.
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For this methodology, engine out modeling builds upon an ‘m’ out of ‘n’ fault tree
with catastrophic failure modes that was proposed by Huang and et al. [37]. Huang
and et al. [37] propose the percentage of catastrophic failures is between 20 and 40
percent based on historical data. In the model created by Huang and et al. [37],
common cause failure was not a consideration. This dissertation has further modified
the model to include CCF with the Beta (β) model [54] based upon the assumptions
stated earlier regarding CCF. The modified model using the failure rate and CCF
was derived in conjunction with the work completed by Young [97]. A fault tree



























The top calculation in Figure 3-23 is the unreliability of a five engine configuration
with engine out. The model is the S-II propulsion subsystem with a 20 percent
catastrophic failure percentage and 10 percent β value for CCF. The single engine
reliability for the J-2 is 0.988 from Reference [59]. The middle ‘OR’ gate signifies a
benign engine failure mode where at least two engines must fail before the system
will fail. On the same level as the benign engine failure mode are the failure modes
that cause immediate system failure: a common cause failure and the catastrophic
failure probability for each engine in the configuration.
Equation 3-23 shows how the engine out reliability is calculated using Figure 3-23.
N is the number of engines and λ is the original engine failure rate. The catastrophic
failure percentage is C.F. and CCF is represented by β. This engine out model is the
baseline for all engine out reliability calculations.
REO = (e−β∗λengt) ∗ (e−C.F.∗λengt)N ∗ [N ∗ (e−(1−β−C.F.)λengt)N−1 ∗ (1− e−(1−β−C.F.)λengt)] (3-23)
The catastrophic failure model incorporates both common cause failure and the
catastrophic failure mode, but the model does not account for the additional burn
time that occurs when an engine fails. When an engine fails, the vehicle thrust-to-
weight ratio decreases and the burn time to reach orbit will increase. Additional
operating time will decrease the single engine reliability, as seen in Equation 3-10.
While fault tree analysis cannot include the effects of additional burn time, stochastic
petri nets can model the change in reliability.
3.4.1.2 Stochastic Petri Nets and Engine Out Modeling
Apollo 13, in addition to its notorious in-space accident, had a center engine shutdown
two minutes prior to the scheduled cut-off. The engine shutdown because of pogo
oscillations and the remaining four engines had to burn longer for the payload to
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reach orbit [2]. Figure 3-24 is a comparison between the nominal Saturn V trajectory
and the Apollo 13 trajectory which illustrates the additional burn time to orbit for
the Apollo 13 mission.
Figure 3-24: Trajectory Comparison Between a Nominal Saturn V and Apollo 13.
Stochastic petri nets are created for dynamic modeling, such as a propulsion sub-
system with engine out capability. The stochastic petri net model used in this analysis
is illustrated in Figure 3-25 which is a higher fidelity version of the catastrophic failure
model shown in Figure 3-23. Common cause failure is represented with the “CCF”
state, the catastrophic failure mode is represented by the “Catastrophic Failure” state,
and the benign failure modes are represented by the “Benign Engine Failure” state.
For the reliability analysis using stochastic petri nets and the model shown in
Figure 3-25, system failure occurs once a token reaches the “System Failure” state.
System failure can occur if a token moves from either the CCF or catastrophic failure
state. If a benign engine failure occurs, the remaining four tokens move to the “System
Degraded” state. If another benign failure occurs, then an inhibitor will open and
the system will fail. An inhibitor is placed on the catastrophic failure state to stop
this failure mode once a benign engine failure occurs. The next engine failure will
cause loss of mission, so the catastrophic mode does not need to be singled out.
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Figure 3-25: SPN Catastrophic Failure Model.
Once a benign engine failure occurs, the four remaining engines move to the
“System Degraded” state so the failure distribution can be changed. The “System
Degraded” failure rate is higher compared to the “System Operating” stage in order
to account for the increased burn time. It is assumed that because the system has
been designed for engine out capability, the failure rate does not degrade even though
the remaining engines must perform the work of having one additional engine.
As mentioned earlier, the stochastic petri net software package is not conducive
to making automated changes such as the number of engines on a stage. Therefore,
the updated burn time from the trajectory analysis is combined with the catastrophic
engine failure model to capture the effects of using the SPNs. Uncertainty analysis
is also included by using triangular distributions in place of a single failure rate for
each individual engine reliability calculation. A uniform distribution is used for the
catastrophic failure percentage instead of using a single value. Figure 3-26 illustrates
the engine out model used in this dissertation. In Figure 3-26, triangular distributions
replace the deterministic engine failure rates illustrated in Figure 3-23.
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Figure 3-26: Engine Out Model.
Table 3-6 lists a comparison of the engine out unreliability calculations between
the catastrophic engine failure model with the correct burn time and the stochastic
petri net model. Unreliability is used since unreliability is the value calculated by the
SPNs. The J-2 engine is used for the comparison in Table 3-6 and its characteristics
are listed in Appendix F.
Table 3-6: S-II Engine Out Model Unreliability Comparison.
Eng. Configuration SPN C.F. Eng. Model % Diff.
4 Engines w/ Eng. Out 0.0210 0.0203 3.18
5 Engines w/ Eng. Out 0.0257 0.0252 2.19
6 Engines w/ Eng. Out 0.0307 0.0301 2.08
In Table 3-6, three different S-II engine configurations are compared. By using the
engine out burn time with the engine failure rate in the catastrophic engine failure
model, the effect of an increasing burn time has been captured as shown by the good
agreement of the unreliability results in Table 3-6. Since the updated catastrophic
engine failure model produces a result similar to SPN with a faster calculation, the
catastrophic engine failure model is used in this methodology. A stochastic petri
net model will validate the optimal design point to ensure that using this lower fi-
delity analysis is acceptable. A more detailed comparison between different reliability
techniques is listed in Appendix C.
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3.4.2 Redundant Subsystems
While the engine is a leading driver of vehicle unreliability, other subsystems are also
drivers of unreliability. Figure 3-21 showed that the power and avionics subsystems on
the S-II stage are significant drivers of unreliability. Therefore, this methodology will
examine the effects of using full subsystem redundancy, or a one out of two subsystem
configuration, for the power and avionics subsystems on each stage of the Saturn V
and the Cargo Launch Vehicle.
Two different types of fully redundant subsystems will be studied. A fully redun-
dant subsystem is when two sets of subsystem components are included on the vehicle
but only one is required (i.e. a one out of two subsystem configuration). The first
type of one out of two subsystem redundancy is when identical sets of components
are used. For example, two identical sets of components can be combined into a one
out of two configuration to provide redundancy for the power subsystem. This type
of redundancy is susceptible to common cause failure; therefore, the Multiple Greek
Letter model shown in Equation 3-16 is combined with Equation 3-15 to calculate
the subsystem reliability.
The other type of full subsystem redundancy is called functional redundancy and
was discussed in Section 3.3.5.3. It is assumed that common cause failure will not
affect subsystems that use functional redundancy although the cost of using two sep-
arate subsystems will be greater and is discussed in Section 3.6.1. The common cause
failure assumption implies two different methods are used for satisfying the subsys-
tem requirements, such as batteries and fuel cells for the power subsystem. Therefore,
Equation 3-15 is used to calculate the reliability of a subsystem that employs func-
tional redundancy.
Table 3-7 lists a reliability comparison for a one out of two subsystem configuration
for the GNC subsystem on the S-II stage. Row one lists the subsystem reliability
when functional redundancy is used for full subsystem redundancy. Row two lists
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the subsystem reliability when two identical components are arranged in a one out of
two redundancy configuration. The reliability is higher with functional redundancy
because it is assumed that common cause failure does not exist. The mass of each
subsystem is also affected when either type of full subsystem redundancy is selected.
Table 3-7: S-II GNC Redundancy Comparison.
Redundancy Type Reliability MFBF
Functional 0.998 561
Identical Components 0.994 176
When full subsystem redundancy is used for a subsystem, the mass of the subsys-
tem is doubled. For example, if full subsystem redundancy is selected for the power
subsystem, the mass of the power subsystem is doubled. This assumption is accurate
when two identical sets of components are used to provide full subsystem redundancy,
but, when using functionally redundant subsystems, there may be some error in the
subsystem mass estimate.
Only the power and avionics subsystems of each stage are given the possibility
of using full subsystem redundancy. These two subsystems are among the leading
causes of unreliability for launch vehicles [1], [28]. Full subsystem redundancy may
not be applicable for some subsystems, such as the structure subsystem. However,
if a design engineer decides to include the option of using redundancy on additional
subsystems, this methodology can easily incorporate that capability.
3.4.3 Uncertainty Analysis
Uncertainty exists from using historical data to provide reliability estimates for new
components and subsystems which will be operating in a different flight environment.
However, by using Monte Carlo simulation, a range of reliability estimates can be
used to calculate the system level reliability.
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Triangular distributions are used in place of single failure rates for each individual
reliability calculation. For example, the power subsystem will rely upon a range of
λ values in Equation 3-10 to calculate its reliability estimate. Figure 3-27 illustrates
how the component and subsystem reliability computations are combined with uncer-
tainty analysis for the S-IVB stage of the Saturn V. Triangular distributions replace
the deterministic failure rates in Figure 3-27 and the stage and vehicle reliability is
calculated using Monte Carlo Simulation. The ranges for each reliability estimate
are based on historical failure rates from various references [23], [1], [28], [46], [63]
and listed in Appendix A. The ranges for the failure rates were selected by using
engineering judgment.
Figure 3-27: SIVB Reliability Calculation with Uncertainty Analysis.
The subsystem and component level reliability estimates are combined into their
respective stages and the stages are combined into the system level reliability esti-
mate. The system reliability estimate is determined by using a 70 percent certainty
value from the Monte Carlo Simulation, which denotes that 70 percent of the values
generated will be above this value. The 70 percent certainty value is an assumption
and can be easily modified in this methodology.
The system reliability estimate will combine the different subsystem and compo-
nent reliability estimates using fault trees. The process of how the subsystem and
component reliabilities are combined into their respective stages is the focus of the
next section.
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3.4.4 System Reliability Calculation
Each subsystem and component reliability is combined into a stage reliability esti-
mate using Equation 3-18. An illustration of the S-II stage is shown in Figure 3-28.
Uncertainty analysis is always included but is not directly illustrated in Figure 3-28.
The application of this methodology focuses on the propulsion, power, and avionics
subsystems. Therefore, the other subsystems on each stage can be combined into the
“other” event shown in Figure 3-28. If other subsystems were to receive more atten-
tion, then another gate could be added to the fault tree and the subsystem would be
separated from the “other” event.
Figure 3-28: SII Stage Representation with No Subsystem Redundancy.
Figure 3-29: SII Stage Representation with Power and Avionics Redundancy.
The stage fault tree will vary depending upon the options selected by the design
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engineer. If the design engineer prefers to study the effects of including dual redun-
dancy for both the power and avionics subsystems, then the fault tree for the S-II
stage would look like Figure 3-29.
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, the propulsion subsystem is modeled by combining
the total engine reliability with the rest of the components in the propulsion sub-
system. Therefore, the propulsion subsystem will also change depending on whether
engine out capability is used. If engine out capability is included on a stage, then
Figure 3-26 is used to calculate the total engine reliability. If there is no engine out
capability on a stage, then Equation 3-18 can be used to calculate the total engine
reliability.
The system reliability for both the Saturn V and the CaLV is calculated using the
reliability estimates for each stage in a series configuration, as illustrated by the fault
tree in Figure 3-30. Equation 3-18 can be used for this top level calculation.
Figure 3-30: Saturn V Reliability Calculation.
3.4.4.1 Baseline Reliability Estimates
The reliability estimates for the S-II and S-IVB stages are listed in Tables 3-8 and 3-9.
Appendix A contains the remaining reliability estimates for the Saturn V, including
the S-IC stage and the Instrument Unit. The failure rates can be determined from the
reliability estimates by knowing the baseline operating time and using Equation 3-10.
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Table 3-8: S-II Subsystem Reliability Estimates.
S-II Subsystem Reliability MFBF
Structures 0.99832 595
Total Engines 0.95111 21
Main Propulsion System 0.97679 43
Guidance, Navigation, and Control 0.99458 185
Separation 0.99926 1351
Electrical Power & Distribution 0.95778 24
Command, Control & Data Handling 0.99997 33333
Environmental Control and Life Support 0.99626 268
Range Safety 0.99984 6250
Total 0.87952 8.3
Table 3-9: S-IVB Subsystem Reliability Estimates.
S-IVB Subsystem Reliability MFBF
Structures 0.99989 909
Liquid Rocket Engine 0.98800 83.3
Main Propulsion System 0.98276 58
Guidance, Navigation, and Control 0.98000 50
Separation 0.99996 25000
Electrical Power & Distribution 0.96100 26
Command, Control & Data Handling 0.99978 4546
Environmental Control and Life Support 0.99917 1205
Range Safety 0.99968 3125
Total 0.91305 11.5
The power and avionics subsystems, highlighted in red in Tables 3-8 and 3-9, can
be improved by using a form of subsystem redundancy. The total engine reliability,
also highlighted in red in Tables 3-8 and 3-9, can be improved by using engine out.
For the application of this methodology, the reliability of the remaining subsystems
and components in Tables 3-8 and 3-9 (i.e. the non-red subsystems and components)
cannot be improved by the design variables. As mentioned earlier, the methodology
is constructed so that studying the effects of improving the reliability of subsystems
besides the power, avionics, and propulsion disciplines can be easily incorporated.
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The baseline CaLV subsystem reliability estimates are listed in Table 3-10. The re-
liability estimates for the booster stage are from ESAS [66]. The EDS subsystem relia-
bility estimates are determined from examination of historical references [23], [1], [28], [46],
[63] and engineering judgment. As with the Saturn V launch vehicle, only the total
engine, power, and avionics reliability can be improved for the Cargo Launch Vehicle
in the present application.














The Saturn V and Cargo Launch Vehicle reliability will be calculated using the
models and techniques developed in the preceding sections. This reliability value is
the maximum value possible for a particular launch vehicle design. However, there will
be a reliability growth period for those launch vehicles as demonstrated by the Atlas
launch vehicle in Figure 3-20. The Delta and Titan launch vehicles also underwent
reliability growth periods, as will be seen in the next section. The next section will
explain how to combine the launch vehicle reliability growth with the system level
reliability estimates.
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3.4.5 Reliability Growth Model
The reliability growth model used in this dissertation combines the Duane model from
Equation 3-20 with historical data to calculate the growth rate parameter alpha (α).
The historical growth of the Atlas launch vehicle was shown in Figure 3-20. The Delta
and Titan launch vehicles are also used to forecast the reliability growth of the Saturn
V and Cargo Launch Vehicle and their data can be found in Appendix D [41], [21], [89].
The growth rate parameter in Equation 3-20, α, is determined by fitting a power
curve in the form of the Duane model to each data set. Table 3-11 lists the resulting
growth rate parameter from the Atlas, Delta, and Titan data sets.





The growth rate parameters listed in Table 3-11 are lower than the growth rate
parameters quoted in literature [16], [89]. According to the literature, a value of 0.2
means “[c]orrective action is taken for important failure modes.” [16] The Atlas launch
vehicle is an example of this scenario. A value greater than 0.4 shows “[t]here is a
program dedicated to failure elimination.” Thus, while this methodology will use the
growth rate parameters from historical research, higher growth rate parameters may
be more appropriate considering the effort put forth toward correcting design flaws.
However, if little corrective action is required to improve launch vehicle reliability,
such as when there is heritage behind a launch vehicle design, then low values of α
may be appropriate as in the case of the Delta and Titan launch vehicles.
The result of the system reliability analysis is the estimated plateau launch vehicle
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reliability for that particular configuration. However, the initial launch vehicle reli-
ability and the required number of flights to reach the final reliability are unknown.
One of these parameters must be determined to complete the reliability growth anal-
ysis.
When reviewing historical launch vehicle data, the number of flights to reach the
plateau reliability value varies significantly. When considering the Atlas program, Fig-
ure 3-20, over 100 flights were required before the Atlas reliability reached a plateau.
However, the plateau reliability of both the Titan and Delta launch vehicle families
was achieved with fewer flights. In Figure D-1, approximately 40 flights were required
before the Titan launch vehicle reached a plateau reliability. The Delta launch vehicle
reached plateau reliability in approximately 20 flights, as seen in Figure D-2. The
Apollo engineers predicted the Saturn V would reach plateau reliability in 15 to 20
flights [58]. The Exploration System Architecture Study predicted an air-start SSME
would reach a reliability plateau after the fifth flight while a new liquid oxygen and
liquid methane engine developed for the lunar lander would require 19 flights to reach
a plateau value [66].
The initial reliability value can be used instead of the number of flights to com-
plete the reliability growth analysis. Johnson & et al. use launch vehicle heritage to
predict an initial reliability value [42]. However, this value is predicted based upon
baseline launch vehicle configurations and does not vary if the configuration changes.
It is assumed in this methodology that different launch vehicle configurations will
experience the same growth rate as predicted by the Duane model; therefore, using
a single initial reliability value as discussed in Reference [42] would result in each
configuration having the exact same reliability growth curve. Therefore, the number
of flights is varied to illustrate the reliability growth of the optimal launch vehicle
configurations.
Due to the different growth rate parameters listed in Table 3-11, two reliability
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growth figures are presented for both the Saturn V and the CaLV. While the method-
ology’s primary goals are to demonstrate how the final launch vehicle reliability can be
increased with different design choices and to determine the cost of using those design
variables, reliability growth can also be incorporated to reveal additional information
about the launch vehicles.
3.4.6 Reliability Summary
The individual reliability values are calculated at the subsystem level for the majority
of the launch vehicle. Engine reliability is calculated at the component level because
engines are a significant driver of system reliability. After the individual reliabilities
have been calculated using Equation 3-10 with triangular distributions for the failure
rate λ, the individual reliabilities are combined into stage reliability values using
fault trees. The stage reliability values are then combined with another fault tree to
calculate the system level reliability.
Engine out modeling requires its own development because of the additional burn
time that occurs when an engine fails. Stochastic petri nets provide the best method
for incorporating the additional burn time, but the effect is also captured by the
fault tree model shown in Figure 3-26. If engine out is not used on a vehicle, then
Equation 3-18 can be used to calculate the total engine reliability.
Two types of full subsystem redundancy (i.e. a one out of two subsystem con-
figuration) are also included for study within this methodology. The first type is
susceptible to common cause failure because identical sets of components are used
for subsystem redundancy. For the case of functional redundancy, the second type of
full subsystem redundancy, an assumption is made that this redundancy type is not
susceptible to common cause failure.
Using subsystem redundancy and engine out will increase the reliability of a launch
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vehicle. Additionally, a higher thrust-to-weight ratio will also benefit system reliabil-
ity by reducing the burn time of the launch vehicle. While these options are beneficial
for system reliability, the effects on cost must still be determined.
3.5 Cost Analysis
Cost estimation is important since resources are limited and finding the most cost
effective method to meet the mission objectives is one step for ensuring program
success. This section will review the different cost categories, various cost estimating
techniques, and present a rationale for the cost analysis used in this methodology.
The Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) of a vehicle is defined by the NASA systems engineer-
ing handbook [62] as “the total of the direct, indirect, recurring, nonrecurring, and
other related costs incurred, or estimated to be incurred in the design, development,
production, operation, maintenance, support, and retirement over its planned life
span.”
Figure 3-31: DoD LCC Categories [15].
The Department of Defense (DoD) uses Figure 3-31 to illustrate the different LCC
categories [15]. The “R & D” cost in Figure 3-31 refers to research and development
cost. Research and development cost are the costs associated with the beginning
of the program until vehicle production begins. This area encompasses all of the
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costs associated with initial vehicle designs and trade studies along with any final
technology development that is required to enable the vehicle’s operation. All final
design and configuration management is covered under the research and development
cost. The research and development cost in Figure 3-31 also includes the prototype
production along with all testing and evaluation that occurs at each level of the
design. The research and development cost category is equivalent to the Design,
Development, Testing and Evaluation (DDT&E) cost that will be used later as one
part of the cost metric.
The investment cost category in Figure 3-31 is the cost associated with produc-
tion throughout the life of the program. In this methodology and Reference [62],
these costs are referred to as production costs, which are any costs associated with
manufacturing the flight hardware.
The operations and support cost is incurred once the program is operating and
includes all sustaining engineering. Other operations costs include the costs required
for operating the vehicle and its maintenance, along with the costs for the support
systems needed for vehicle operation. Within the operations and support category,
costs can be split into two areas: recurring and non-recurring. The non-recurring
costs include any costs associated with having space flight capability, such as the costs
associated with the technicians that must be kept on staff regardless of whether the
vehicle is flying. A recurring operations cost is the cost of fuel for a launch vehicle. For
reusable vehicles such as tanks, aircraft, and even the Space Transportation System,
the operations and support cost can be the largest driver of LCC, as seen in Figure 3-
31.
The final category in Figure 3-31 is the disposal cost. This cost represents the
costs associated with the end of the vehicle’s life. These costs could include recovery
and permanent dismantling of the vehicle or the propellant cost to boost a satellite
into a disposal orbit.
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The summation of the DDT&E, production, operations and support, and disposal
cost results in a life-cycle cost. To calculate the LCC, a variety of techniques can be
used and a few of them are discussed in the next section.
3.5.1 Cost Calculation Techniques
Three methods for calculating cost are (1) using parametric cost models, (2) analogous
systems, and (3) grass-roots techniques [62]. The NASA Systems Engineering Hand-
book recommends using different techniques for different phases of the program. As
the system becomes more defined, higher fidelity techniques can be used to calculate
the system cost.
Parametric cost models are recommended for the early stages of program develop-
ment because little information is known about the design and the goal is to determine
the significant parameters that drive cost. An example of a parametric cost model
is a Cost Estimating Relationship (CERs). CERs are based on historical data and
correlate an independent variable to the cost of an item using regression. An example
CER is shown in Equation 3-24. The cost of an engine is calculated by raising the
mass of the engine to a power and multiplying it by a coefficient. Equation 3-24 is
an example equation and is not used in this dissertation.
Costengine = 1.85 ∗M0.8engine (3-24)
Parametric cost models are useful in trade studies when rapid estimates of system
cost are needed. CERs provide quick cost estimates and reveal the sensitivity of the
system cost to changes in the design variables. For the space industry, dry mass is the
primary independent variable in a cost estimating relationship. Figure 3-32 illustrates
how the engine cost changes as a function of engine thrust when using parametric
cost modeling. By using parametric cost models during conceptual design, engineers
can determine which parameters need more focus during the detailed design phase.
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Figure 3-32: Engine Costs as a function of Engine Thrust.
Creating cost estimates through analogy requires experience and engineering judg-
ment. When using analogies, cost estimates are created by finding similar characteris-
tics between an existing vehicle and the current vehicle design. The use of engineering
judgment and experience will allow the engineer to increase or decrease the cost esti-
mate based on the differences between the current design and the previously created
vehicle.
Grass-roots cost analysis is a higher fidelity method for cost estimation compared
to parametric cost models and analogous systems. Grass-roots techniques rely on the
engineering group responsible for an item to produce the item’s cost estimate [62].
This technique is a higher fidelity method because the cost relies upon the engineers
who are directly involved with creating the subsystem and all of its parts to pro-
vide a cost estimate. A disadvantage of grass-roots cost analysis is the method is
labor-intensive and time consuming because the cost of each part, component, and
subsystem must be estimated [62]. Therefore, a grass-roots technique is not conducive
for use in rapid trade studies where the component or subsystem will change rapidly
as different vehicle configurations are evaluated.
Parametric cost models are used for application of this methodology. One goal of
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this methodology is to determine the important parameters that need additional focus
during the next design phase. Therefore, rapid cost estimates are needed, which can
be provided with parametric cost models. Additionally, parametric cost models are
traceable and the CERs’ assumptions can be exposed to the decision maker. Finally,
by using parametric cost models, different vehicle configurations are compared in the
same manner, as opposed to other cost techniques which may be influenced by the
engineer responsible for preparing the cost estimate. The parametric cost models
used in this methodology are the focus of the next section.
3.5.2 Calculating Cost for Space Applications
Within the space community, there are a number of tools used for parametric cost
analysis. Cost tools include TRANSCOST and NAFCOM, SEER, PRICE, SOCM,
and an Advanced Missions Cost Model [64], [8], [62]. The cost estimation tools cited
are primarily used for calculating the DDT&E and production costs of a space vehicle.
The exception is TRANSCOST, which calculates operations costs with additional
CERs.
Operations and support costs are also evaluated using the Architectural Assess-
ment Tool - enhanced (AATe) [100] and the Conceptual Operations Manpower Es-
timating Tool/Operations Cost Model (COMET)/(OCM) [64]. COMET/OCM was
developed by the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and relies upon STS and
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) operations data. COMET assesses manpower re-
quirements for the launch vehicle and OCM applies a labor rate and other factors
to calculate an operations cost [64]. AATe is built upon the STS database and uses
system characteristics to produce an overall operations cost for reusable vehicles.
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3.6 Current Cost Estimation
The cost tool used in this dissertation is the NASA/Air Force Costing Model (NAFCOM).
NAFCOM uses CERs to calculate cost by using dry mass as the primary indepen-
dent variable [65]. NAFCOM also allows the user to select analogous systems to tailor
the CER based upon the similarity between the current vehicle design and historical
space systems. For example, a user may decide to include only the vehicles from the
Apollo era for their cost estimates. An example of the NAFCOM tool is shown in
Figure 3-33.
Figure 3-33: NAFCOM Visual Example.
Once the performance disciplines have calculated the subsystem masses of the
launch vehicle, the CERs from NAFCOM will be used to calculate the DDT&E
and production cost. Each item listed in the WBS in Appendix E will have an
associated cost estimate. The summation of these subsystem costs will result in the
vehicle DDT&E and Theoretical First Unit (TFU) cost. The total production cost is
calculated by multiplying the number of flights by the TFU cost. The DDT&E plus
production cost is equivalent to the “R & D” plus the “Investment” cost in Figure 3-
31 and is used in the system optimization as the cost metric. Equation 3-25 is the
formula for calculating the cost metric. The number of flights is set to twelve for both
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the Saturn V and Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) application.
CostMetric = DDT&E + No.F lights ∗ TFU (3-25)
The operations and support costs along with the disposal costs are not included
within the cost metric for this methodology. It is assumed that the disposal costs are
not greatly affected by changing the configuration of a launch vehicle. The operations
costs for launch vehicles are difficult to determine because the private space industry
guards this data closely. AATe and COMET/OCM primarily rely upon the Space
Transportation System (STS) database to produce their operations cost estimates.
Thus, calculating operations costs with a database heavily influenced by the STS may
lead to inaccurate answers.
This methodology was created with the flexibility to easily make additional en-
hancements. Therefore, an operations cost model that can discriminate between
launch vehicle concepts based on their characteristics could be added. The opera-
tions cost would be included in Equation 3-25 and the complete life-cycle would be
evaluated. Methodology enhancements are discussed in Section 3.10.
The time value of money is not considered because schedule is not an integral part
of this methodology. The development schedule could be important because certain
vehicle designs have a larger development cost to save resources later in the program.
Thus, the first flight of a vehicle could be delayed if the budget is constraining the
initial development. However, additional resources could be used to alter the devel-
opment schedule. Therefore, eliminating a configuration because of its schedule may
not be appropriate due to the initial assumptions.
A first order examination of the development schedule is presented for the Saturn
V and CaLV applications. The DDT&E plus the TFU cost is spread over eight
years to represent the cost incurred until after the first flight. A beta distribution
is used to spread the development costs over the time period in accordance with
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NASA guidelines [65], [62]. The probability density function for a beta distribution
is shown in Equation 3-26. The significant parameters are p and q, which define the












When spreading the development costs over a time period, assumptions are made
about when the majority of the resources are used. NASA typically employs a 60
percent profile, which means 60 percent of the total costs are used during the first
half of the defined time period [62]. In other words, 60 percent of the costs are spent
within the first four years of development for an eight year development program. The
beta distribution in Equation 3-26 can be defined with the shape parameters p and
q to match the assumptions about the development schedule. However, NASA has
created a cost calculator for use in determining how the development cost is spread
over a given time period [8]. Table 3-12 lists a comparison of the cost fraction for
different cost profiles.
Table 3-12: Development Cost Comparison.
Development Cost Fraction Cost Fraction Cost Fraction Cost Fraction
Year 40% Constant 60% 70%
1 0.011 0.125 0.050 0.083
2 0.075 0.250 0.188 0.272
3 0.209 0.375 0.385 0.495
4 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700
5 0.615 0.625 0.791 0.857
6 0.812 0.750 0.925 0.953
7 0.950 0.875 0.989 0.994
8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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In Table 3-12, the cost fraction is the percentage of the total development cost
spent by the current year. For example, 40 percent of the total cost is spent by
year four when assuming a 40 percent profile (column two). The cost fraction is
used to determine a year by year profile of the resources required to satisfy the total
development. The constant cost fraction means the development cost is spread evenly
over the eight year time period.
Another important result calculated using the beta distribution to spread develop-
ment cost is the peak year funding. The peak year funding illustrates the maximum
cost incurred in a single year by the program development. The maximum cost may
be significant when exploring a complete budget profile. NASA’s budget is approxi-
mately 17 billion dollars per year and the budget must be apportioned to account for
the peak funding years of a program’s development. The peak year funding values
are presented for the Saturn V and CaLV in the results section.
Figure 3-34: Learning Curve Example.
Additionally, a learning curve is not applied to the vehicle production costs. A
learning curve is a manufacturing concept where the production cost of a vehicle
decreases as more vehicles are created [65]. An example of a learning curve is shown
in Figure 3-34. The goal of this methodology is to determine the optimum design
characteristics for a balance of reliability and cost. The learning curve would be
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an assumption on top of the costs calculated in this process and may affect the
final results. The future work section will discuss how a learning curve could be
incorporated into this methodology.
3.6.1 Cost and Redundancy
The cost model treats the subsystem redundancy strategies differently. Table 3-13 is
a notional example that compares the cost of using a one out of two configuration to
provide full subsystem redundancy. When a launch vehicle configuration does not in-
clude subsystem redundancy, only the baseline subsystem cost estimates are included
in the system cost. Using two identical sets of components to provide redundancy is
referred to as identical components in Table 3-13. When two identical sets of compo-
nents are used to provide full subsystem redundancy, no additional DDT&E cost is
required for developing an identical second unit. However, the production cost will
double because two units are needed.
Table 3-13: Full Subsystem Redundancy Notional Cost Comparison.
Redundancy DDT&E Total TFU
Type [$M FY ’04] [$M FY ’04]
None 1 1
Identical Components 1 2
Functional 2 2
When functional redundancy is used, two different sets of components are created;
therefore, the DDT&E cost of each set of components must be included in the cost
estimate, as listed in Table 3-13. For example, batteries from two different manufac-
turers are developed and thus the DDT&E of each battery must be included. It is
assumed in this methodology that because the batteries are required to perform the
same task, the development cost of two subsystems is equal to double the DDT&E
cost of a single subsystem, as listed in Table 3-13. Furthermore, the production cost
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for both strings is assumed to equal two times the single subsystem production cost.
3.6.2 Uncertainty Analysis
NAFCOM has the capability of including uncertainty analysis within its cost analysis.
Both the mass estimates and CERs are based upon regression analysis of historical
databases of space vehicles and error exists because historical data is used to forecast
the masses of a new vehicle. Therefore, margins are used on the mass estimates
to account for the MER errors while a distribution is assumed for the CERs to
incorporate the cost model uncertainty.
To build a distribution around the CER, a minimum, maximum, and most likely
mass estimate are required. In the application of the methodology to the Saturn V and
Cargo Launch Vehicle, the minimum value is the original subsystem mass estimate
from the MER. The most likely estimate adds a 15 percent margin to the baseline
while the maximum estimate is a 30 percent margin on the original subsystem mass
calculation. Figure 3-35 illustrates the mass margin assumption.
Figure 3-35: Mass Margin.
Using these three mass estimates, a distribution is built around each subsystem
CER. Based on NAFCOM, each subsystem CER uses a lognormal distribution for
the uncertainty analysis. The standard deviation is calculated from the range of sub-
system masses and then multiplied by a factor to account for the specific CERs used
in the cost analysis. The standard deviation multiplier depends upon the NAFCOM
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analogies selected and will be constant as long as the analogies do not change. Fig-
ure 3-36 illustrates the complete process for using uncertainty with the cost analysis.
Figure 3-36: Cost Uncertainty Analysis.
For the single value needed in the objective function for optimization, a 70 percent
certainty value is used. For the cost discipline, 70 percent of the calculated costs will
be lower than this value. The 70 percent estimate is an assumption and can be
changed easily depending upon the engineer’s preference. The results will also show
the range of cost and reliability estimates based upon the 10 and 90 percent confidence
bounds.
3.6.3 Summary of Cost Estimation
The cost metric in this methodology is the DDT&E plus the total production cost for
the launch vehicle, as shown in Equation 3-25. The operations cost was not included
due to a lack of data, but this methodology is capable of finding the parameters that
are the leading factors for system cost and reliability of a launch vehicle. Additionally,
once operations costs become available, these costs can be incorporated into the
process outlined in this dissertation.
Uncertainty analysis is also included within the cost estimate. Margin is included
on the mass estimates, which are the basis for the lognormal distribution used in
place of a deterministic CER. The standard deviation is calculated from the three
mass estimates and multiplied by a factor determined from the analogous systems
selected for calculating the deterministic cost estimate. The cost analysis process
was outlined in Figure 3-36. Cost analysis is included in the optimization scheme,
which is used to find the best design configuration for a specific weighting of system
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reliability and cost. Optimization is the subject of the next section.
3.7 Optimization
Optimization is the practice of determining the best combination of design variables
to meet an objective function. Examples of objective functions include maximizing
the reliability of a vehicle or minimizing its life-cycle cost. An objective function
that uses multiple figures of merit, such as cost and reliability, is referred to as an
Overall Evaluation Criterion (OEC) or a value function. Design variables are defined
as variables that an engineer can control such as the length of a stage, the thrust level
of an engine, or the number of crew on a vehicle. In summary, the goal of optimization
is to determine the combination of design variables that best satisfies the objective
function.
One advantage of using optimization is that bias can be removed from the de-
sign process [68]. Since optimization only uses the analysis results to calculate the
objective function, one set of design variables is not favored over another. Another
advantage of using optimization is automation. Optimization schemes are wrapped
around a set of analysis modules to automate the complete process. Therefore, a user
can select a set of design variables to change, along with an objective function, and
run the optimization scheme with no further action. Optimization is also useful for
complex problems with many design variables. Changing the design variables one
setting at a time or using intuition to select settings of design variables will most
likely lead to a sub-optimal answer. Though the problem may be complex, there are
numerous optimization schemes to suit each problem.
There are disadvantages to using optimization. First, the analysis modules that
calculate the objective function must be repeatable [68]. When analysis modules
are not repeatable, such as when they are combined with Monte Carlo Simulation
(MCS), the objective function may be skewed due to the varying result. Therefore, a
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set of design variables may be the optimal set because they happen to have a favor-
able Monte Carlo run. Additionally, setting up an optimization scheme may require
considerable effort. The proper inputs and outputs must be determined and linked
between the analysis modules along with linking certain outputs to the objective
function. A proper objective function must also be determined. The set of design
variables must be established along with their ranges. A final disadvantage is that
some optimization schemes require a smooth, continuous function. Thus, there is no
single technique that a user can apply to an optimization problem to determine an
answer. Each problem requires knowledge of optimization techniques and familiar-
ity with the problem itself in order to decide which techniques are applicable. Even
though optimization does have its disadvantages, the benefit of knowing which values
of the design variables lead to an optimal solution greatly outweigh those drawbacks.
Optimization techniques can be split into two main categories: domain spanning
and path building. Domain spanning techniques are optimization schemes that cover
the entire design space. Typically, they are less efficient and do not guarantee finding
the best objective function. However, domain spanning optimization techniques can
handle both discrete and continuous variables along with discrete jumps in the ob-
jective function. These techniques do not require an initial guess but they do require
boundaries for the design variables. Two examples of domain spanning techniques
are a grid search and a Genetic Algorithm (GA) [68].
Path building techniques require an initial guess and use its previous history to
find a solution [92]. In a smooth design space, these techniques can find an optimal
solution quicker than domain spanning schemes. When used with objective functions
that may have local solutions, or solutions that are specific to a certain range of
design variables, path building techniques have difficulty moving beyond these local
solutions. If a user believes there is only one solution, path building techniques may
be more effective because they require less time due to their reliance on previous
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history.
Optimization schemes can be decomposed further depending on whether or not
they use gradients of the objective function. A series of schemes exist for zero, first,
and second order techniques, which are named for how they rely upon the gradient
of the objective function. A zero order technique does not rely upon gradient of the
objective function to find the answer. Zero order methods are beneficial when discrete
jumps exist for either the design variables or the objective function. An example of
this optimization technique is called Powell’s method [92].
Using the first or second derivative of the objective function can be beneficial
because the use of the derivative can reduce the time required for the optimization
scheme to find a solution. For example, by using a first order method, the derivative
of the objective function can be used to determine the optimum level for the design
variables in the current search direction. A new search direction is then selected
based upon the algorithm and a new optimum solution is found. This is faster than
zero order methods, which rely upon checking the objective function at a new point
despite not knowing if that point is the optimum in the current direction. An example
of a first order method is the Steepest Descent Method [92].
Second order methods are among the fastest optimization techniques because they
create an estimate of the second derivative. Once this second derivative is known,
these methods will find the optimal solution in a single step for a quadratic design
space. Additional time is required to calculate the second derivative, but that time is
offset by moving directly toward the minimum solution. One second order technique
is called Sequential Quadratic Programming [68] and is used in engineering software
programs such as MATLAB.
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3.7.1 Genetic Algorithm
As mentioned earlier, one example of a domain spanning technique is called a Genetic
Algorithm (GA). GAs are good techniques for large complex problems that have many
design variables and discrete settings within those design variables. A GA “mimics
natural selection over several generations” in order to find the minimum point of
a function [68]. A Genetic Algorithm will be the optimization scheme used in this
methodology to find the best combination of design variables based upon a given
weighting of cost and reliability.
The GA optimization scheme loops through three main steps in order to solve
the optimization problem. The GA process begins by initializing a population with
random designs; each design is a set of design variables at a specific level. Continuous
variables must be discretized at a resolution decided by the user. Each design is
then evaluated for its objective function value. The lowest value is stored. The
next generation of designs is selected using three biologically inspired sub-processes:
reproduction, crossover, and mutation. The GA process is illustrated in Figure 3-37.
Figure 3-37: GA Process.
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In reproduction, which may also be called replication, two different methods can be
used. One method for replication is tournament selection. In this method, two or more
different designs are selected at random. Each design is evaluated; the design with a
lower function value moves forward to the next generation. This process is repeated
until the next generation’s population size is the same as the previous generations’.
An original design is never eliminated during this selection; each design has an equal
chance of being selected for a tournament, regardless of previous tournament history.
The next process in GA is crossover. Two different techniques for crossover can be
used, but two-point crossover will be discussed. In two-point crossover, two designs are
randomly selected for crossover. A random number generator is used to determine if
crossover will occur; depending on the user’s preferences, crossover may occur seventy-
percent of the time. When crossover occurs, an input variable of the two designs is
randomly selected [68]. The two designs will then switch their settings of that input
variable. Another random number generator is then used to determine how many
input variables are switched between the two designs. If a design is selected for
crossover, it is removed from the current generation and cannot be selected again. If
crossover does not occur, the designs move into the next population untouched.
The final GA sub-process is mutation. Mutation is used to move away from the
local minimum in order to ensure global optimization. There is a scenario that all
designs in a generation will have the same value for an input variable. In the first two
sub-processes, a mechanism does not exist for changing a design variable; therefore,
mutation is used to vary the setting of an input variable within a design. If a design
is selected for mutation, then one design variable is changed. According to user
preferences, a design may mutate twenty percent of the time [68]. After the design is
checked for mutation, it moves into the next population.
As a result of stepping through the sub-processes, the next generation has been
created. This generation now goes through the sub-processes again until the best
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objective function is constant for a specific number of generations. This is one type
of convergence criteria. Other convergence criteria include using a maximum number
of objective function evaluations.
In this methodology, a genetic algorithm is used because the optimization problem
has many design variables and may have multiple local solutions. Additionally, these
design variables have a large number of settings, further increasing the dimension-
ality of the problem. A grid search would take too long because of the number of
variables and their settings, while a path-building method cannot be used because
of the multiple local solutions. Optimization techniques that rely upon the gradient
cannot be used because of the discrete input variables in the design process.
3.7.2 Optimization Application
A genetic algorithm is used to determine the best combination of design variables
for a given weighting of reliability and cost. These two metrics are combined in an
OEC shown in Equation 3-28. The goal of the optimization is to maximize the OEC;
the calculated reliability value is scaled by a maximum whereas the cost minimum
is scaled by its calculated variable. The use of the reliability maximum and cost









The variable WR in Equation 3-28 is the weighting on reliability and determines
the weighting on cost. This weighting can be varied to find the maximum reliability,
minimum cost, or any other specified point. The ‘calc’ subscript refers to the calcu-
lated value and the ’max’ and ’min’ subscripts are the baseline values for reliability
and cost, respectively. The first two cases of the integrated model were conducted to
find the maximum reliability and the minimum cost values. Once those values were
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known, a range of weightings were used to force the OEC from reliability centric to
cost centric.
3.8 Integrated Model
Once the performance, cost, and reliability models have been created, they can be
integrated into one environment to study how cost and reliability are coupled for
launch vehicles. A set of design variables will be used to change the launch vehicle
configuration and examine the sensitivity of the design variables on the performance,
reliability and cost metrics. This section will explain how the performance, cost,
and reliability models are integrated into a single environment and reveal the design
variables used in this methodology.
3.8.1 Design Process
Table 3-14 lists the design variables used for a generic launch vehicle in this method-
ology. If a three stage launch vehicle is studied, such as the Saturn V, then a set of
design variables is added for the third stage. Engine out and the selections of full
subsystem redundancy (i.e. a one out of two subsystem configuration) are binary
choices. An example of full subsystem redundancy is when two power subsystems are
included on a stage but only one is required. Subsystem redundancy does not refer
to the propulsion subsystem since engine out is a separate variable choice.
While only one line per stage is shown in Table 3-14, subsystem redundancy can
be used for multiple subsystems on a stage. The variable “subsystem redundancy
type” in Table 3-14 is also a binary choice and refers to the option of using identi-
cal components or functional redundancy for subsystem redundancy. For example,
full subsystem redundancy could be selected for the power subsystem and another
choice is to use identical components to accomplish subsystem redundancy. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.6.1, using identical components is cheaper compared to functional
redundancy.
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Table 3-14: Generic Launch Vehicle Design Variables.
Design Variable
T/W Ratio Stage 1
T/W Ratio Stage 2
Number of Engines Stage 1
Number of Engines Stage 2
Engine Out (Yes/No) Stage 1
Engine Out (Yes/No) Stage 2
Full Subsystem Redundancy (Yes/No) Stage 1
Full Subsystem Redundancy (Yes/No) Stage 2
Subsystem Redundancy Type Stage 1
Subsystem Redundancy Type Stage 2
The design variables are used in an integrated environment illustrated by Figure 3-
38. Figure 3-38 is the design structure matrix created by using this methodology. The
discipline tools are listed in the lower right of Figure 3-38. A genetic algorithm is
used to find the optimum combination of design variables for a given weighting of

































In Figure 3-38, the thrust-to-weight ratio of each stage will determine the mass
ratio of the respective stages. The mass estimates are completed by using the stage
thrust-to-weight ratio, the mass ratio of each stage, and the number of engines per
stage. Additionally, the mass of a subsystem may be doubled if full redundancy
is selected for a particular subsystem. Since the engine mass depends on the engine
thrust, as seen in Figure 3-7, the mass estimates and propulsion disciplines will iterate.
The cost model then uses the mass estimates, along with the type of subsystem
redundancy, if applicable, to calculate the design, development, testing and evaluation
and theoretical first unit cost for each launch vehicle configuration. The cost metric
is calculated using Equation 3-25 and the optimization scheme uses the result of
Equation 3-25 as one half of its overall evaluation criterion.
The stage reliability estimate is calculated by using the number of engines, whether
engine out is utilized, and the type, if any, of full subsystem redundancy. Additionally,
the burn time is calculated in the trajectory discipline and used by the reliability
analysis for the stage operating time. The stage reliability estimates are combined,
as described in Section 3.4.4, to produce the system reliability estimate. This estimate
is the other half of the overall evaluation criterion used by the genetic algorithm for
optimization.
3.8.1.1 Design Variable Effects
Each design variable choice results in a different vehicle configuration with its own
cost and reliability. The stage thrust-to-weight ratio will affect the burn time of the
vehicle, the mass estimates, and the thrust level of each engine. The number of engines
will affect the thrust level of the engine which then affects the mass estimates. Engine
out also affects the mass estimates and thrust level because the stage is required to
carry mass that is not performing any function. The use of subsystem redundancy
will greatly affect the mass estimates since subsystem mass is doubled if subsystem
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redundancy is included.
The cost calculation is affected by all design variables which affect the mass es-
timates. Additionally, cost is affected by the type of subsystem redundancy used on
the vehicle.
Reliability is affected by the stage thrust-to-weight ratio because as the stage
thrust-to-weight ratio increases, the operating time decreases. System reliability is
also affected by the number of engines because as the engine count increases, total
engine reliability decreases. Engine out can be used to increase total engine relia-
bility and system reliability. Finally, using either type of full subsystem redundancy
will improve the system reliability. Functional redundancy will have a greater sys-
tem reliability benefit compared to using identical components for full subsystem
redundancy.
3.8.1.2 Model Validation
When modeling a system, validation is important. The development of this method-
ology required validation due to the performance modeling and the use of response
surface equations. The meta-models must be accurate so a design engineer has con-
fidence in using the response surface equations to replace the higher fidelity analysis.
Validation of both the performance models and the RSEs will be shown in Chap-
ter 4. Validation of the models for application to both the Saturn V and the CaLV
is completed by comparing different subsystem masses of each vehicle. The Saturn V
validation is completed using flight data whereas the CaLV validation is a comparison
of analyses. The dry and gross masses are compared along with the trajectory curves.
For the response surface equations, statistics such as the R2 and R2 − adjusted are
used along with a comparison of the predicted versus actual values in order to confirm
that the meta-models are acceptable. The developed reliability models will also be
validated by comparing the results to models created in RELEX and the stochastic
143
petri net framework.
Additional validation by analysis occurs when an optimized design point is com-
pared to a design with the same input variables but using the higher fidelity analysis
tools such as POST, REDTOP-2, SPN and NAFCOM. The comparison shows that
the RSEs do a satisfactory job of approximating the analysis modules.
3.8.1.3 Integrated Model Summary
Table 3-14 listed the design variables for a generic launch vehicle and Figure 3-38
illustrated the design structure matrix for a generic launch vehicle. In the results
section of both the Saturn V and Cargo Launch Vehicle applications, the specific
design variables and DSM are shown.
The results of using the integrated environment shown in Figure 3-38 will lead
to a better understanding of how launch vehicle reliability can be improved and the
resulting cost of any reliability improvement. The integrated environment created by
linking the performance, cost, and reliability disciplines will also lead to an under-
standing of the significant cost and reliability drivers of a launch vehicle. Chapter 4
will present the results of applying this methodology to the Saturn V and the Cargo
Launch Vehicle. The significant factors of reliability and cost for the Saturn V and
CaLV will be revealed along with a set of optimal configurations based on different
system cost and reliability weightings.
3.9 Research Hypotheses
After creating this methodology, hypotheses are listed regarding the outcome of ap-
plying the present process. The hypotheses will be re-examined in Chapter 5.
• Hypothesis 1: No optimal launch vehicle can be determined but the trade
between cost and reliability can be identified for selection by a decision maker.
• Hypothesis 2: Improvements can be made to the performance based launch
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vehicle design processes reviewed earlier. Some of the slower discipline tools
can be replaced with response surface equations to improve the speed of a func-
tion call. Reliability and cost modeling can be added to the process by using
accepted techniques and developing models specific to launch vehicle design.
These reliability models will be dynamic and change with different launch ve-
hicle configurations.
• Hypothesis 3: Launch vehicle reliability can be increased by (1) reducing
operating time, (2) adding engine out to increase total engine reliability, and
(3) using full subsystem redundancy (i.e. one out two subsystems) for non-
propulsion subsystems. However, both the degree of reliability improvement
due to each strategy and the most cost effective reliability strategy may depend
on the baseline launch vehicle configuration.
• Hypothesis 4: Launch vehicle gross mass may vary greatly when increasing
system reliability but the absolute range is to be determined.
• Hypothesis 5: The range of launch vehicle system cost is expected to be
large because cost is assumed to be a function of mass. The most cost effective
method for increasing system reliability is unknown.
• Hypothesis 6: Uncertainty analysis should be included in the mass, cost, and
reliability disciplines. This will result in a wide range of possible costs and
reliability for each design concept.
3.10 Methodology Enhancements
While this methodology improves upon the launch vehicle design process, a few con-
siderations are not included within the approach outlined in this chapter. The only
metrics evaluated are development and production cost and system reliability. The
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) evaluated many other metrics; each
145
launch vehicle concept was analyzed for a mix of qualitative and quantitative Figures
of Merit [66]. Additionally, the operations cost for each vehicle was considered during
ESAS [66]. The possibility of including these additional features is discussed below.
3.10.1 Additional Metrics
The qualitative metrics, such as risk and extensibility, can still be evaluated by using
discipline experts in the same method that was used for ESAS. While there will
be many more configurations to evaluate, using general guidelines may be able to
speed up the qualitative assessment for configurations whose design variables are very
similar. As mentioned earlier, approaching an optimal solution from the infeasible
region is a process commonly used in optimization and the same process may lead to
configurations that were not previously considered.
Development risk is one of the biggest qualitative drivers and one reason that
“clean-sheet” designs were not evaluated during ESAS. However, the possibility ex-
ists that some of the “clean-sheet” configurations could have similar characteristics to
current launch vehicles. The new designs could be modified to include aspects of cur-
rent launch vehicles without losing their effectiveness and reducing the development
risk. For example, if the J-2S engine is being re-started, the possibility of re-starting
the F-1 engine may be a consideration. Re-starting the F-1 production line could
lead to less engines on the booster stage of the Cargo Launch Vehicle. Therefore,
while risk is not considered in this methodology, the results may lead to a different
configuration that can still be used with some design modifications.
Schedule is another metric that is not considered in detail within this methodology.
Schedule is important because a requirement of the Vision for Space Exploration is
to land on the Moon by the end of 2020 [6]. The CaLV is an enabling element of the
Vision and its development schedule should be considered.
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Schedule is a function of the characteristics of the launch vehicle. New develop-
ment items, like engines, traditionally require longer development time compared to
using existing hardware. However, the development time of certain areas could be
reduced with additional resources. Therefore, to eliminate a configuration without
examining its benefits because its development schedule was deemed too long may
not be appropriate. It will be unknown if a configuration has significantly higher
benefits compared to designs using existing hardware unless the configuration is eval-
uated. This methodology will provide the capability to evaluate the configurations
eliminated due to schedule and examine the assumption that these configurations will
not provide a significant advantage compared to the current concepts.
A quantitative metric that is not evaluated in this methodology is safety. Launch
vehicle safety refers to the probability of loss of crew per mission. As a general trend,
configurations that increase reliability will also increase safety. However, there are
scenarios where uncertainty exists if increasing vehicle reliability will increase safety.
Additionally, evaluating safety requires additional modeling capabilities beyond those
used for reliability. How a component fails and the possibility for abort must be con-
sidered. One example of the additional complexities of calculating safety is increasing
the stage-thrust-to-weight ratio. Increasing this ratio decreases the possibility for suc-
cessful abort near the region of maximum dynamic pressure but vehicle operating time
is reduced. Therefore, it is uncertain how the probability of loss of crew would change
when the stage thrust-to-weight ratio is increased.
Safety would benefit the higher reliability configurations by giving them extra
weight in the selection process. The safety metric could easily be added within the
design process because this methodology was created with a goal of flexibility. There-
fore, if a safety model that depends upon the different characteristics of a launch
vehicle is created, it could be added to this methodology.
147
3.10.2 Operations Costs
Operations costs are a feature that should be included as this methodology evolves.
The results presented will show the best configuration for a combination of the de-
velopment and production cost. Without the operations cost, the full life-cycle is
not included. As mentioned earlier, operations costs are difficult to model. Very
little data exists about launch vehicle operations costs because the private industry
protects these costs due to competition.
The various configurations presented in Chapter 4 will have widely varying mass
estimates and thrust-to-weight ratios, which leads to wide ranges in liftoff thrust
levels. A configuration that requires significant modifications of the existing infras-
tructure compared to the baseline design should be penalized by additional opera-
tions cost. For example, the gross mass of the maximum reliability configuration
of the CaLV is 3,000,000 pounds heavier than the baseline CaLV. Any operations
modifications for the baseline CaLV would require additional improvements to ac-
commodate such a larger vehicle. Adding extra engines or another power subsystem
would increase the processing time and this cost penalty should be accounted for when
evaluating different configurations. An operations cost model that can be used in an
integrated design environment would be an excellent enhancement to the process out-
lined in this dissertation. Additional enhancements, such as the cost of unreliability,
are discussed in the future work section.
3.10.3 Methodology Limitations
There are some limitations when implementing the process outlined in this chapter.
The exponential distribution is used as the governing failure distribution for all reli-
ability analysis. One property of the exponential distribution is a failure rate that is
constant with time. Thus, the different phases of flight, such as liftoff, tower clearance,
area of maximum dynamic pressure, etc., are not considered in great detail. If more
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detail is desired, such as a lower level analysis of engine reliability to analyze engine
ignition, the Weibull distribution may be more appropriate for use as the governing
failure distribution. The Weibull distribution was discussed in Section 3.3.2. The
Weibull distribution allows an engineer to model the different phases of flight with
varying failure rates. A varying failure rate could be useful when analyzing engine
reliability; a degrading failure rate would result in a higher probability of failure for
engine ignition compared to the steady operational phase.
If this methodology were applied to a reusable system, such as the next in-space
human vehicle, then a Weibull distribution should be used because of the change
in failure rate. The changing failure rate will model vehicle aging, which is more
appropriate for reusable systems than a constant failure rate.
A conservative approach to the design of engine out configurations is another lim-
itation of this methodology. An assumption is made to design the engine out config-
urations for the worst case scenario, which is failure during stage ignition. Therefore,
an engine out design may be able to sustain two engine failures later in flight when
some of the propellant has been burned. However, additional reliability credit is not
considered for launch vehicles with this capability. Additionally, a configuration with-
out engine out may be able to sustain a single engine failure later in flight but again,
the additional reliability benefit is not considered.
Another limitation of this methodology is the fidelity of the cost discipline. The
focus of this methodology is on developing the necessary reliability models for creating
an integrated environment. The performance disciplines have been well developed
due to the traditional focus on these areas throughout history. Thus, the fidelity of
the cost discipline differs from the performance and reliability disciplines. In this
methodology, cost is primarily a function of the dry mass of a vehicle. However,
a composite structure may weigh less than an aluminum alloy but could cost more
because of the higher manufacturing complexity of large composite elements. More
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refined cost techniques and estimates are required before a decision maker can have
full confidence in the absolute cost results.
A design option that was not considered was the engine cycle type, which leads to
a different Isp. Adding engine cycle type would alter the original baseline design but
the capability to study thousands of completely different concepts would be beneficial
for launch vehicle design. However, creating response surface equations to replace
the trajectory analysis will become more difficult with the inclusion of engine Isp.
Furthermore, additional RSEs may be required to represent the propulsion discipline




In this chapter, the results of applying the integrated performance, cost, and reliability
methodology to the Saturn V and Cargo Launch Vehicle are presented. The Saturn
V launch vehicle was selected for a demonstration problem since all of the necessary
performance models could be verified by actual flight data. Additionally, reliability
estimates existed for each of the subsystems and components required to calculate
the system reliability.
The second problem selected for application of the methodology is the Cargo
Launch Vehicle (CaLV) which was originally selected for the next lunar mission. The
results will be compared to ESAS [66], which used existing engines for its final CaLV
design.
A genetic algorithm was used to find a series of optimal designs using an overall
evaluation criterion with varying weights on cost and reliability. The optimal designs
show how the launch vehicle configuration changes from a cost centric to a reliability
centric design. The number of function calls to find a converged solution varied from
slightly over 1800 to slightly under 3200. However, with the use of response surface
equations, only five seconds was required to evaluate a launch vehicle concept as
compared to five minutes if the original propulsion and trajectory analysis modules
were incorporated. The uncertainty analysis was the leading cause of evaluation time
and strategies for reducing that time are discussed in the future work section.
The models created for the launch vehicle design process must be validated against
a standard, which could be commercial software, other accepted models, or a baseline.
The reliability modeling is validated by comparing the model development to the
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commercial software package RELEX [75]. Stochastic Petri Nets were used to validate
the engine out model in Section 3.4.1.2. The subsystem redundancy models with
common cause failure are validated using RELEX. The cost model is NAFCOM;
additional validation is unnecessary because NAFCOM is the cost model that NASA
uses for manned missions. The performance models for the Saturn V are validated
against historical references while the CaLV is validated using ESAS [66].
The propulsion and trajectory RSEs must be validated because they are replacing
higher fidelity analysis modules. In addition to examining the statistical measures
of merit, such as R2, further RSE validation is completed by comparing off-design
points to the true values. All of the model and RSE validation is completed within
the first two subsections of the Saturn V and CaLV sections. By building confidence
in the models used within the methodology, the results can be examined for trends
as opposed to questioning their validity.
The results of both applications follow the validation section. This chapter illus-
trates how the total production and development cost will vary as different design
variables are selected to increase system reliability. A graph will be used to show
the optimal configurations based on different weightings of reliability and cost. A
design engineer can use the results of applying this methodology to examine the sys-
tem cost of increasing launch vehicle reliability and know which configurations lead
to particular results.
4.1 Saturn V
The Saturn V launch vehicle was described in Section 2.2.1. For review, the Saturn
V launch vehicle was a three stage launch vehicle with five engines on the S-IC stage,
five engines on the S-II stage, and a single engine on the S-IVB stage. One important
note is that the engines on the S-II and S-IVB stage were the same; therefore, all
Saturn V configurations presented in this section will use the same engine for the
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second and third stage. The mission objectives and trajectory constraints are listed
in Appendix I.
The Saturn V design variables are listed in Table 4-1. For the Saturn V appli-
cation, the only subsystems with the option of using full subsystem redundancy (i.e.
a one of two subsystem redundancy configuration) were the power and avionics sub-
systems. As mentioned earlier in Section 3.4.2, other subsystems could have been
studied with additional reliability models. Since the S-II and the S-IVB stages use
the same engine, only the S-II stage determines the thrust of the engine and the
option of selecting the S-IVB thrust-to-weight ratio is not included. Iteration is used
to match the S-IVB thrust-to-weight ratio with the correct mass ratio.
Table 4-1: Saturn V Design Variables.
Design Variable Minimum Maximum Type
S-IC T/W Ratio 1.1 1.3 Continuous
S-II T/W Ratio 0.65 1.0 Continuous
No. of Engines S-IC 4 7 Discrete
No. of Engines S-II 4 7 Discrete
No. of Engines S-IVB 1 4 Discrete
Engine Out S-IC Yes No Discrete
Engine Out S-II Yes No Discrete
Engine Out S-IVB Yes No Discrete
Full Power Redundancy S-IC Yes No Discrete
Full Avionics Redundancy S-IC Yes No Discrete
Full Power Redundancy S-II Yes No Discrete
Full Avionics Redundancy S-II Yes No Discrete
Full Power Redundancy S-IVB Yes No Discrete
Full Avionics Redundancy S-IVB Yes No Discrete
Power Redundancy Type S-IC Identical Components Functional Discrete
Avionics Redundancy Type S-IC Identical Components Functional Discrete
Power Redundancy Type S-II Identical Components Functional Discrete
Avionics Redundancy Type S-II Identical Components Functional Discrete
Power Redundancy Type S-IVB Identical Components Functional Discrete
Avionics Redundancy Type S-IVB Identical Components Functional Discrete
The design structure matrix for the Saturn V is shown in Figure 4-1. Figure 4-1































The reliability models in the present application are validated with the commercial
software RELEX [75]. As expected, there is no significant difference between the
RELEX calculation and the analysis used in the integrated model. For any calcu-
lations in series, such as when functional redundancy is selected for a subsystem,
Equation 3-18 is used to calculate the reliability. Since the calculation is simple, no
validation is shown; the analysis in the integrated model was cross-checked by hand
to ensure the validity of the calculation. When using full subsystem redundancy (i.e.
a one out two subsystem redundancy configuration) with identical components, com-
mon cause failure is included in the calculations; the validation of this redundancy
model is listed in Table 4-2. The β value is equal to 0.1 and the component reliability
is 0.98. The RELEX model for this system is shown in Appendix B.
Table 4-2: Reliability Validation for Component Redundancy.
Calculation RELEX Model % Difference
Reliability 0.9977 0.9977 0.00
MFBF 430.41 430.29 0.03
The engine out failure model shown in Figure 3-26 is validated by using a model
created in the stochastic petri net framework. Table 3-6 shows good agreement be-
tween the engine out model with uncertainty and the stochastic petri net model.
Equation 3-18 is used to complete the stage and system reliability calculations; these
computations are also cross-checked by hand to ensure the correct calculation.
4.1.1.2 Performance Validation
The performance models also need to be validated. Both the mass estimates and
the trajectory optimization are compared to historical references. The masses are
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calculated with MERs [78] and compared to historical data in Table 4-3 [95]. Table 4-3
and Table 4-4 show good agreement between the MERs and the historical data.
Table 4-3: Dry Mass Comparison for Saturn V Stages[lb].
Stage Reference MERs % Difference
S-IVB 27307 27504 0.07
S-II 97375 97492 0.12
S-IC 287451 287579 0.04
Table 4-4: Gross Mass Comparison for Saturn V Stages[lb].
Stage Reference MERs % Difference
S-IVB 264709 263838 0.33
S-II 1081781 1088195 0.59
S-IC 5030911 5090577 1.19
S-V 6486333 6551541 1.01
The POST validation is completed by comparing a model to a historical reference.
Since POST performs a trajectory optimization, there are a few differences between
the modeled trajectory and the actual performance. Table I-1 in Appendix I lists the
trajectory assumptions used for the Saturn V in the POST analysis.
Figure 4-2: Trajectory Comparison for the Saturn V.
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The Saturn V flight manual is used as a reference for the data values in Figures 4-
2 - 4-4 [61]. Figure 4-2 illustrates the trajectory using an altitude versus time plot.
Figure 4-3 is a comparison of the inertial velocity as a function of time for the Saturn
V. These plots show good agreement, with special attention paid to the bends in the
curve at each staging point. The first staging point is where the largest error occurs
between the reference and the model. However, the error at this point is less than 5
percent and the rest of Figure 4-3 matches well.
Figure 4-3: Inertial Velocity Comparison for the Saturn V.
In Figure 4-4, there is a difference between the curve generated from the historical
data and the curve from POST. The most likely source of error is from comparing a
trajectory optimization to the actual Saturn V flight. When examining Figure 4-4,
the first dip is caused by the center engine shutdown of the F-1 on the S-IC stage. The
reference has the engine shut down occurring later in time at approximately 170 sec-
onds whereas the optimal trajectory has a center engine shutdown at approximately
160 seconds.
The second acceleration peak is different because the Saturn V vehicles in Figure 4-
4 are staging on the same final conditions. Since the POST model shuts down the
center engine earlier than the actual Saturn V, the POST model will burn for a longer
period of time. This explains the difference in the first staging point along with why
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the acceleration peak is higher at the end of the S-IC burn. The opposite is happening
with regard to the S-II stage. The acceleration matches well until center engine cut-
off; then the acceleration plots diverge. In this scenario, the center engine for the
POST model is burning for a longer period of time compared to the reference data,
reaching a higher acceleration peak for the S-II stage. Additionally, the reference
data appears to have a different thrust profile because the thrust-to-weight ratio is
different at S-II center engine shutdown. The difference in thrust profile carries over
to the S-IVB stage where the acceleration plots match the trend, but not the values.
Figure 4-4: Acceleration Comparison for the Saturn V.
The mass ratio and burn time are slightly different when comparing the POST
model and the flight data from the Saturn V. POST is optimizing a trajectory for
minimum propellant mass, which is why these differences are occurring. The opti-
mized solution uses slightly less propellant and can reach the final velocity conditions
in slightly less time. However, the overall POST results match well with the actual
flight data and the trajectory discipline will be based on POST.
4.1.2 RSE Validation
When using response surface equations, additional validation beyond examining the
goodness of fit statistics is recommended to provide full confidence that the RSE can
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be used in place of the analysis module. RSEs are used in both the propulsion and
trajectory discipline to accelerate the process and streamline the methodology. An
RSE was created for the propulsion discipline to generate the J-2 engine thrust-to-
weight (vacuum) ratio as a function of the engine thrust. The data values from the
RSE fit are listed in Table F-7 in Appendix F.
Table F-7 in Appendix F lists a comparison of the REDTOP-2 results with the
values calculated from the RSE using off-design points. Off-design points are data
points that were not used to create the original RSE. The errors are small and within
an acceptable range to justify the use of an RSE to approximate the propulsion
discipline.
A series of response surface equations were generated to replace POST. Two RSEs
were created for each stage; the independent variable was the stage thrust-to-weight
ratio. The dependent variables of the two trajectory RSEs were the stage mass ratio
and the stage burn time. The statistics of the POST RSEs are listed in Appendix F.
Table F-8 in Appendix F lists three points for each stage of the Saturn V that
were not used in the original RSE fit. The mass ratio fit is very good, with little
error on the stages. The burn time has a little error, specifically for the S-IC stage;
however, the burn time error is never larger than a few seconds.
4.1.3 Saturn V Results
Figure 4-5 illustrates how the reliability of the Saturn V launch vehicle could change
by using different settings of the design variables in Table 4-1. Additionally, Figure 4-
5 illustrates the range of system costs that would be required to increase the Saturn





































Figure 4-6 illustrates the same results as Figure 4-5 except mean flights between
failure is the metric along the y-axis instead of reliability. Examining Figure 4-6
shows that the MFBF of the Saturn V could have been reduced from 3.94 to 8.05 for
an additional 2.7 billion dollars [FY ’04]. The decrease in MFBF is 104 percent while
the cost increase is 7.6 percent.
Figure 4-6: System Cost versus MFBF for the Saturn V.
4.1.4 Optimal Configurations
A pareto frontier is shown in Figure 4-7. A pareto frontier is the boundary created by
finding all of the design configurations that have the maximum reliability for a specific
cost. To the right of the pareto frontier are all the possible design configurations while
the left side represents the infeasible area. The Saturn V is identified in Figure 4-7
with a circle.
Table 4-5 lists the design variable settings used to produce the results in Figure 4-
7. The abbreviation “IC” refers to the use of identical components for subsystem
redundancy, while “F” is used to denote functional redundancy. Cost and reliability
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both increase when examining the vehicle designs from left to right across Table 4-5.
A more detailed mass comparison of the minimum cost configuration, “Design 6”, and
the maximum reliability configuration can be found in Table H-1. A more detailed
cost comparison of the three mentioned designs is listed in Table G-1. The trajectory
plots for the minimum cost configuration, design six, and the maximum reliability
configuration can be found in Appendix I.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































By examining Table 4-5, a variety of different trends are revealed. The stage thrust-
to-weight ratio of both the S-IC and S-II increases as greater emphasis is placed on
system reliability. This trend is expected since increasing the stage thrust-to-weight
ratio decreases the stage operating time. Additionally, the number of engines on
each stage decreases as system reliability increases. This occurs because reducing the
number of engines eliminates an additional component with the possibility of failure.
An exception occurs when engine out is included on the second stage; the number of
engines increases but only to accommodate the extra engine used in the engine out
scenario.
The first type of redundancy used on the Saturn V is when full power subsystem
redundancy (i.e. a one of out two power subsystem configuration) is selected for both
the S-II and S-IVB stages on “Design 3” in Table 4-5. Identical components are used
to provide the full power subsystem redundancy with a one out of two subsystem
configuration and this reliability strategy is selected before engine out is utilized.
Table 4-6: Design 3 Reliability Importance.
Reliability System System Cost
Strategy Reliability [$M FY ’04]
None (Baseline) 0.7393 35880
Power Red. S-II 0.7577 36095
Power Red. S-IVB 0.7622 36147
Power Red. S-II & SIVB 0.7814 36339
EO S-II 0.8027 36907
Table 4-6 lists why the power subsystem redundancy is selected before engine
out is chosen. Using “Design 3” without any reliability strategies as a baseline (i.e.
“Design 3” without any type of redundancy), the cost of using engine out on the S-II
stage is too high compared to using power subsystem redundancy in a one out of two
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configuration with identical components. While the reliability benefit of using power
subsystem redundancy is smaller compared to using engine out on the S-II stage,
the cost of using power subsystem redundancy is also less compared to the cost of
employing engine out on the S-II stage.
In Table 4-5, engine out is not included on the S-IC or the S-IVB stage until the
maximum reliability configuration is found. Table 4-7 uses design three from Table 4-
6 as a baseline to compare the benefits of adding engine out to each stage. For the
S-IVB stage, adding an extra engine to increase system reliability does not justify
the extra cost. Likewise, adding an extra engine to the S-IVB increases the mass of
the entire launch vehicle, as seen in Table 3-2. As seen in Table A-1, the S-IC engine
reliability is very high; therefore, engine out on the S-IC stage does not provide a
large enough reliability benefit to justify the additional cost.
Table 4-7: Design 3 Stage Engine Out Comparison.
Reliability System System Cost
Strategy Reliability [$M FY ’04]
None (Baseline) 0.7393 35880
EO S-IC 0.7898 37177
EO S-II 0.8027 36907
EO S-IVB 0.7934 37083
The maximum reliability configuration uses the least amount of engines for the
S-IC and S-II stages, along with engine out for all three stages of the Saturn V. The
thrust-to-weight ratio of both the S-IC and S-II stage are at the maximum values;
as thrust-to-weight ratio increases, the stage burn time will decrease. Additionally,
functional redundancy is included for every subsystem because since it is assumed
that functional redundancy is not susceptible to common cause failure.
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4.1.6 Cost Results
The minimum cost configuration in Table 4-5 uses low stage thrust-to-weight ratios,
no engine out, and no type of subsystem redundancy. Adding any subsystem redun-
dancy adds mass which is not required to meet the mission objectives. Additionally,
engine out capability also adds mass that is not necessary to satisfy the mission con-
straints for the Saturn V. Since cost is calculated from mass, any unneeded mass
becomes a cost burden.
Table 4-8 lists a comparison between the minimum cost configuration from Table 4-
5 and designs that are changed by a single parameter. For example, the design in row
two of Table 4-8 is the same as the minimum cost configuration listed in Table 4-5
except the S-IC thrust-to-weight ratio is changed from 1.129 to 1.1.
Table 4-8: Minimum Cost Comparison.
Parameter New System Cost System
Changed Value [$M FY ’04] Reliability
None Min. Cost 35473 0.6555
S-IC T/W 1.1 35474 0.6547
S-IC T/W 1.15 35484 0.6560
S-II T/W 0.65 35474 0.6547
S-II T/W 0.75 35484 0.6560
S-IC No. Engs. 6 35483 0.6553
S-IC No. Engs. 4 35485 0.6557
S-II No. Engs. 6 35597 0.6837
Table 4-8 shows that increasing and decreasing the S-IC and S-II thrust-to-weight
ratio leads to configurations with higher system costs. Decreasing the stage thrust-
to-weight ratio will increase the dry mass of the launch vehicle because of the higher
trajectory losses, as discussed in Section 3.1.6. A higher dry mass can lead to a higher
system cost.
Engine costs are a primary driver of stage cost, as shown in Figure 4-8 for the
S-II stage. Avionics are also a leading factor of stage cost but the avionics mass is
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not as sensitive to changes in the design variables, unless subsystem redundancy is
employed. Increasing the stage thrust-to-weight ratio will lead to a higher system
cost because of an increasing engine cost. The engine thrust increases as the stage
thrust-to-weight ratio increases; a higher engine thrust leads to a higher engine cost
as seen in Figure 3-32. Table 4-9 lists a comparison of engine costs for the design
configurations listed in Table 4-8.
Figure 4-8: S-II DDT&E Cost Breakdown.
Table 4-9: Engine Cost Comparison for Minimum Cost Configurations [$M FY ’04].
Row Parameter New S-IC Eng. S-IC Eng. S-II Eng. S-II Eng.
Number Changed Value DDT&E TFU DDT&E TFU
1 None Min. Cost 1094 69 923 57
2 S-IC T/W 1.1 1090 69 923 57
3 S-IC T/W 1.15 1097 70 923 57
4 S-II T/W 0.65 1099 70 907 55
5 S-II T/W 0.75 1090 69 938 58
6 S-IC No. Engs 6 1035 79 923 57
7 S-IC No. Engs 4 1172 58 923 57
8 S-II No. Engs 6 1096 69 968 51
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The results listed in Table 4-9 show how the engine costs vary at design points
near the minimum cost configuration. When the S-II engine DDT&E is reduced by
lowering the S-II thrust-to-weight ratio, row four in Table 4-9, the extra propellant
mass required for the S-II stage has a cascade effect on the S-IC stage and the engine
costs of the S-IC stage increase. When six engines are used on the S-IC stage, row
six in Table 4-9, the DDT&E cost is reduced but the total engine TFU cost is higher
than the minimum cost configuration. Therefore, over a campaign of twelve flights,
the difference in TFU cost will account for the difference in DDT&E cost.
The minimum cost configuration will change if the number of campaign flights is
changed. Figure 4-9 shows two other design configurations that could be the minimum
cost configuration if the number of campaign flights changes. Design two could be
the minimum cost configuration if 16 flights are used in the campaign while design
three could be the minimum cost configuration if the campaign has only one flight.
Figure 4-9: Alternative Design Cost Comparison.
Schedule considerations are presented using the cost fractions listed in Table 3-
12. An eight year development is assumed; the distributed cost is the development
(DDT&E) cost plus the first unit (TFU) cost. A detailed cost profile for the designs
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listed in Table 4-5 can be found in Table J-1 - Table J-4 of Appendix J. The differ-
ent tables in Appendix J correspond to various assumptions about the development
schedule. Figure 4-10 illustrates the peak year funding for each of the designs listed
in Table 4-5.
Figure 4-10: Optimal Configuration Peak Funding Comparison.
In Figure 4-10, the large difference in peak funding occurs when a constant de-
velopment spread is used. The constant development spread means that each year
will require a constant amount of resources to complete program development. When
using the other spread assumptions, the peak funding values are relatively close for
each design. However, the peak funding differs across the whole range of optimal
configurations. While the schedule results are a first order analysis, a decision maker
could use Figure 4-10 to examine if any designs should be eliminated because of peak
funding concerns.
Table 4-10 lists a detailed peak funding comparison of the design configurations in
Figure 4-10. Comparing the Saturn V baseline with design five in Table 4-10 reveals
the Saturn V MFBF could have been increased significantly for little additional peak
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funding cost. The increase in cost would have been approximately three percent across
the different distributions while the MFBF would have increased by 78 percent. A
comparison of design four with the Saturn V baseline reveals the MFBF could have
been increased by 47 percent for a peak funding increase of two percent.
Table 4-10: Peak Funding Comparison.
Design 40 Percent Constant 60 Percent 70 Percent Reliability MFBF
Config. Assumption Assumption Assumption Assumption
Min. Cost 2772 1612 2771 2876 0.6555 2.90
2 2801 1628 2800 2905 0.6976 3.31
3 2860 1663 2859 2967 0.7814 4.58
4 2898 1685 2897 3006 0.8271 5.78
5 2953 1717 2952 3063 0.8571 7.00
6 2972 1728 2971 3082 0.8627 7.28
7 3190 1855 3189 3309 0.8924 9.29
8 3219 1872 3218 3339 0.8936 9.40
9 3272 1902 3271 3394 0.8950 9.52
10 3425 1991 3423 3552 0.9082 10.89
11 3537 2056 3535 3668 0.9167 12.01
Max Rel. 4878 2836 4876 5060 0.9215 12.74
Saturn V 2844 1654 2843 2950 0.7460 3.94
4.1.7 Additional Results
Uncertainty analysis is included on the pareto frontier in Figure 4-11 by using the 10
percent and 90 percent confidence bands. A 90 percent confidence band means that
the 90 percent of the reliability estimates are above this value while 90 percent of the
cost results are below this value.
In Figure 4-11, the uncertainty bands are very wide. The uncertainty ranges are
reflective of historical reliability and cost estimates at the time of the Saturn V design.
Therefore, with very little data available, the range of possible results should be very
wide. The minimum cost configuration has a range of nearly 18 billion dollars [FY
’04] (+/- 25%) and a reliability range between 0.62 and 0.72 (+/- 8%). The maximum
reliability configuration has a cost range of nearly 25 billion dollars (+/- 20%) while
the reliability range is between 0.89 and 0.94 (+/- 5%).
170
Figure 4-11: Pareto Frontier with Uncertainty.
The sensitivity of the common cause failure parameter, β, is examined in this
section. Changing β will only affect the reliability calculation of each design configu-
ration. As β increases, the system reliability benefit of using engine out and identical
components to provide full subsystem redundancy (i.e. a one out of two subsystem
redundancy configuration) is reduced. Reducing or eliminating β, as seen in Fig-
ure 3-15, will increase the system reliability benefit of using identical components for
redundancy. Functional redundancy is unaffected by β because it is assumed that
functional redundancy is not affected by common cause failure.
Table 4-11 lists how system reliability varies with changes in β for “Design 3”,
“Design 6” and the maximum reliability launch vehicle design from Table 4-5. The
minimum cost configuration and “Design 2” do not use any redundancy so their
reliability is unaffected by variations in β.
In Table 4-11, the reliability values are slightly different compared to the baseline
calculations. The differences are not large enough to change the optimal configura-
tions shown in Figure 4-7. However, only another study outside the scope of this
dissertation would prove this hypothesis.
171
Table 4-11: β Sensitivity Study.
Design β = 0.1 (Base) β = 0.0 β = 0.2 Cost [$M FY ’04]
Design 3 0.7814 0.7858 0.7773 36339
Design 6 0.8627 0.8694 0.8559 37889
Max. Rel. 0.9215 0.9237 0.9193 63070
4.1.8 Results Summary
The pareto frontier illustrated in Figure 4-7 shows that the Saturn V reliability could
have been increased by nearly 15 percent for an additional 1.76 billion dollars [FY
’04] (5% cost increase). The increase in reliability corresponds to an increase from
3.94 to 7.0 in the mean flights between failure. The significant parameters are the
stage thrust-to-weight ratio, the number of engines, and the use of power redundancy
in a one out of two configuration with identical components. Increasing the stage
thrust-to-weight ratio increased the burn time while reducing the number of engines
eliminated another possibility for component failure. These results are in contrast to
previous studies that minimized the thrust-to-weight ratio to minimize dry mass as
a surrogate for system cost.
Engine out was only important for the S-II stage; the system reliability benefit of
using engine out on the S-IC and S-IVB stage did not warrant its inclusion unless a
maximum reliability configuration was desired. Using identical components for power
subsystem redundancy provided a system reliability increase for minimal increase in
system cost. By altering the original configuration of the Saturn V, a lower cost
design could have been utilized. With respect to system reliability, the Saturn V
reliability could have been increased significantly with little additional cost.
With Figure 4-7 illustrating that significant improvements in Saturn V reliability
were possible for little additional cost, the question arises about why these improve-
ments were not implemented. There are a few reasons that the Apollo engineers may
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not have altered the Saturn V configuration to increase its reliability. One reason was
contracts were already created for specific engines early in the design phase because of
President Kennedy’s time constraint [57]. Another reason for not improving the Sat-
urn V reliability with configuration changes during the conceptual design phase may
have been because of the uncertainty regarding the final results from each discipline.
As noted earlier in Section 2.2.1, uncertainty about the final mass of the payload
led to the addition of an extra engine on the S-IC stage. Another reason for not
improving Saturn V reliability may have been the infancy of the reliability discipline.
While the traditional aerospace disciplines, such as aerodynamics and propulsion, had
years of research to draw upon, the reliability discipline was still emerging during the
Apollo era. Fault trees were not introduced until the early 1960s and Petri Nets were
not developed until Dr. Petri’s dissertation in 1962 [87]. Therefore, due to Apollo
era capability and the contracts for set engines, the Saturn V did not undergo any
configuration changes to increase its reliability.
4.1.9 Optimal Design Point Validation
Design six from Table 4-5 is validated by using the higher fidelity tools to check that
the values produced from the integrated environment are correct. In Table 4-12, the
reliability discipline is validated by using the stochastic petri nets. Since only the
S-II stage from design six uses engine out capability, the S-II engine reliability is the
only propulsion subsystem included in Table 4-12. The other reliability calculations
use the series and parallel formulas from Section 3.3 and were previously validated.
The parameter values from POST and REDTOP-2 are compared with the cal-
culations from the response surface equations used in the methodology. The mass
calculations are compared using the POST mass ratio estimates and the RSE mass
ratio values. Table 4-12 lists the comparison for each design tool, the values, and the
percentage difference. All cost units are in millions of dollars [FY ’04] and the masses
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are in pounds.
Table 4-12 shows good agreement between the parameters calculated using the
higher fidelity analysis tools and the response surface equations. There is minimal
error in the burn time of the S-IC stage, but the absolute burn time does not vary
by more than six seconds (3.7% of the total S-IC burn time). Furthermore, the total
Saturn V burn time does not vary by more than ten seconds, which is only 1.7 percent
of the total burn time. The difference in Saturn V reliability is less than one percent.
Table 4-12: Optimal Design Validation.
Discipline Tool Tool Check
Trajectory POST RSE % Diff.
S-IC Mass Ratio 3.505 3.495 0.26
S-II Mass Ratio 2.866 2.852 0.50
S-IVB Mass Ratio 1.223 1.224 0.08
S-IC Burn Time 167 161 3.88
S-II Burn Time 326 324 0.46
S-IVB Mass Ratio 91 93 2.02
Propulsion REDTOP-2 RSE % Diff.
T/Weng. 73.34 73.44 0.13
Weights POST RSE % Diff.
S-IC Dry Mass 304782 301908 0.94
S-IC Gross Mass 5341405 5372003 1.09
S-II Dry Mass 112365 111663 0.62
S-II Gross Mass 1139278 1129129 0.89
S-IVB Dry Mass 33116 33051 0.20
S-IVB Gross Mass 276656 276800 0.05
Saturn V Gross Mass 6947534 6878127 1.00
Reliability SPN Model % Diff.
S-II Total Engine Unreliability 0.0227 0.0226 0.10
S-II Propulsion Reliability 0.9774 0.9774 0.002
Saturn V Reliability 0.8627 0.8627 0.002
4.1.10 Saturn V Reliability Growth
The pareto frontier illustrated in Figure 4-7 shows the plateau launch vehicle reli-
ability for the design configurations listed in Table 4-5. The designs in Table 4-5
can be expected to experience some reliability growth before reaching their plateau.
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To estimate the reliability growth, the Duane model has been used to calculate the
growth rate parameter from the Atlas and Delta launch vehicles. A historical re-
view of launch vehicle reliability provides the number of flights required to reach the
plateau reliability. Three designs from Table 4-5 are selected for comparison; the
minimum cost configuration, design six, and the maximum reliability configuration.
A summary of those designs is listed in Table 4-13.
Table 4-13: Saturn V Reliability Growth Configurations.
Design Plateau DDT&E TFU
Description Reliability [$M FY ’04] [$M FY ’04]
Min. Cost 0.6555 10064 1633
Design 6 0.8627 10810 1748
Max. Rel. 0.9215 17655 2869
Figure 4-12 and Figure 4-13 illustrate the reliability growth for each of the designs
in Table 4-13. As mentioned earlier, two different growth rate parameters are used
based upon the Atlas, Figure 4-12, and Delta, Figure 4-13, launch vehicles. Addi-
tionally, it is assumed in Figure 4-12 and Figure 4-13 that ten flights are required to
reach the plateau reliability. The first flight includes the development cost and first
unit cost while the second flight adds another vehicle production cost.
Figure 4-12: Saturn V Reliability Growth with α = 0.2006 [Atlas].
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In Figure 4-12, the maximum reliability configuration costs the highest initially
and does not provide a large reliability benefit until much later in the campaign. De-
sign six has a higher initial reliability and provides a better reliability value compared
to the minimum cost configuration.
Figure 4-13: Saturn V Reliability Growth with α = 0.0669 [Delta].
Figure 4-13 illustrates the reliability growth of the same three launch vehicle
designs using the growth rate parameter derived from the Delta launch vehicle. Design
six has a higher reliability for the same cost as the minimum cost configuration.
The maximum reliability configuration also provides a better value compared to the
minimum cost configuration once the 20 billion dollar [FY ’04] threshold is reached.
Other reliability growth models can be incorporated into this methodology. The
methodology will predict a final reliability value based on the design choices used
in the integrated environment. The cost estimates are already completed by using
the integrated environment so a different reliability growth model can use those cost
values. Thus, more information is provided to assist with selecting the optimal launch
vehicle design based upon its cost and reliability.
176
4.2 Cargo Launch Vehicle
The results of applying the methodology to the Cargo Launch Vehicle described in
the Exploration System Architecture Study [66] and Section 2.2.3 are presented in
this section. The specific design variables used in the CaLV application are listed
in Table 4-14. As with the Saturn V, the only subsystems given the option of full
subsystem redundancy (i.e. a one out of two subsystem configuration) are the avionics
and power subsystems. The CaLV application requires less design variables compared
to the Saturn V because the CaLV has one less stage.
Table 4-14: CaLV Design Variables.
Design Variable Minimum Maximum Type
CaLV T/W Ratio 1.38 1.5 Continuous
EDS T/W Ratio 0.4 1.1 Continuous
No. of Engines Boos. 2 7 Discrete
No. of Engines EDS 1 4 Discrete
Engine Out Boos. Yes No Discrete
Engine Out EDS Yes No Discrete
Full Power Redundancy Boos. Yes No Discrete
Full Avionics Redundancy Boos. Yes No Discrete
Full Power Redundancy EDS Yes No Discrete
Full Avionics Redundancy EDS Yes No Discrete
Power Redundancy Type Boos. Identical Components Functional Discrete
Avionics Redundancy Type Boos. Identical Components Functional Discrete
Power Redundancy Type EDS Identical Components Functional Discrete
Avionics Redundancy Type EDS Identical Components Functional Discrete
The CaLV application uses the same design process illustrated in Figure 3-38.




























4.2.1 CaLV Model Validation
The reliability modeling used in this section is very similar to the modeling used for
the Saturn V application and a repeat of the validation shown in Section 4.1.1.1 is
unnecessary.
For the cost analysis, the Solid Rocket Boosters were assumed to cost 450 million
dollars [FY ’04] for the DDT&E and 120 million dollars [FY ’04] in total TFU. These
values are based on the work completed by Young [98] for verifying the performance
of the CLV.
4.2.1.1 Performance Modeling
The performance models are built upon the work completed by Young and et al. [99]
The mass validation is listed in Table 4-15. There is good agreement between the
CaLV model created by Young and et al. [99] and the model used in ESAS [66]. The
work breakdown structure listed in Table E-2 shows the validation in more detail by
comparing subsystem mass estimates.
Table 4-15: CaLV Mass Comparison Between ESAS and Young [lb].
Booster ESAS MERs % Difference
Dry Mass 194997 194563 0.22
Gross Mass 2428061 2442803 0.61
EDS ESAS MERs % Difference
Dry Mass 42645 42528 0.27
Gross Mass 640171 650816 1.66
CaLV ESAS MERs % Difference
Gross Mass 6393975 6408445 0.23
The trajectory models were also built upon the work completed by Young and et
al. [99] As with the Saturn V, POST is used for the trajectory optimization of the
CaLV and the results are compared to ESAS [66]. Appendix I lists the requirements
and assumptions for the trajectory analysis. Figure 4-15 shows a comparison between
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the trajectory curve from ESAS [66] and the trajectory curve produced by Young and
et al. [99]. There is a little error between the curves but the trends and slopes are
similar.
Figure 4-15: Trajectory Comparison for CaLV.
Figure 4-16 is the comparison of the inertial velocity. The main discrepancy in
Figure 4-16 is from the staging point of the booster; the staging point occurs a little
bit earlier for ESAS when compared to the Young model. The error may result from
not having all of the ESAS assumptions and information incorporated in the model.
Figure 4-16: Inertial Velocity Comparison for CaLV.
Figure 4-17 is a comparison of the acceleration profiles of the Young and the
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ESAS models. There is a small discrepancy in Figure 4-17 and this error may lead
to the discrepancies seen in the previous two figures. The exact thrust profile and
staging condition of the Solid Rocket Boosters may be unknown, which could cause
the discrepancy seen in Figure 4-17. The general trend in Figure 4-17 is virtually
identical, but the acceleration changes occur at different points in time.
Figure 4-17: Acceleration Comparison for CaLV.
The early differences in the acceleration profile cascade to the later points; the
booster in the Young model stages later when compared to the ESAS analysis but
the SRB acceleration profile also changed later for the Young model. Furthermore,
the peak acceleration of the Young model is slightly higher when compared to the
ESAS model. In Figure 4-17, the general trends are close and both plots include the
acceleration rise around 100 seconds.
4.2.2 CaLV RSE Validation
The Cargo Launch Vehicle application also relies upon response surface equations.
The previous propulsion RSE from the Saturn V application was used along with a
lower thrust RSE to calculate the J-2S engine thrust-to-weight ratio based upon the
J-2S thrust. Table F-13 in Appendix F lists all of the RSE statistics, such as R2 and
R2 − adjusted, for the propulsion RSE. Also in Appendix F is a comparison between
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using REDTOP-2 and the propulsion RSE to calculate the engine thrust-to-weight
ratio based on data not included in the original RSE fit.
As with the Saturn V application, a series of trajectory RSEs are used to calcu-
late the stage mass ratio based upon the stage thrust-to-weight ratio. Another two
response surface equations are used to calculate the burn time of the booster and the
EDS stage based upon the stage thrust-to-weight ratio.
The RSE fit statistics for the mass ratio and burn time are listed in Table F-9
through Table F-12 in Appendix F. Table F-14 of Appendix F lists a comparison of
the burn time and mass ratio when using POST and the RSE for points not used in
the original fit. There is a little error in the Earth Departure Stage burn time, but
the absolute error is small compared to the total trajectory time.
4.2.3 CaLV Results
The Cargo Launch Vehicle results are illustrated in Figure 4-18. One reason that the
final CaLV design was selected in ESAS was because it used existing engines. Since
the true costs of the ESAS CaLV have not been published, a series of data points are
created to represent the ESAS CaLV based upon a percentage of predicted engine
DDT&E cost. In Figure 4-18, the left most data point is the ESAS CaLV design
that does not incur any engine DDT&E costs. The engine DDT&E cost percentage is
applied to the engines on both the booster and Earth Departure Stage. Five different
cost values are presented for the ESAS CaLV design in Figure 4-18 which represent
increasing the engine DDT&E cost by 25 percent. The right most data point in the
series of ESAS CaLV data points represents a CaLV design that incurs 100 percent





















Figure 4-18 shows that if the full engine DDT&E cost is paid, then the CaLV is a
sub-optimal design for the two metrics used in this methodology. There are different
configurations of the CaLV that will result in a lower cost launch vehicle or a design
with higher reliability for the same cost. The break-even point is at the 75% cost
level for engine DDT&E; if greater than 75% of the engine DDT&E costs are paid
for, then a different CaLV configuration should be selected.
Figure 4-19 illustrates the same results as Figure 4-18, except the mean flights
between failure is the y-axis metric. The MFBF of the CaLV design can be increased
significantly for an additional 28 percent in system cost if the CaLV program does
not pay for any engine DDT&E costs. The CaLV MFBF can be increased from 42.4
to 99.2 for an additional 5.8 billion dollars [FY ’04] if the CaLV program does not
pay for engine DDT&E.
Figure 4-19: CaLV Cost versus MFBF.
4.2.4 CaLV Optimal Configurations
Figure 4-20 illustrates the pareto frontier for the Cargo Launch Vehicle. The data
points in Figure 4-20 represent the maximum reliability configurations for a specific
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cost value. The CaLV from ESAS is shown by the series of five data points repre-
senting the percentage of engine DDT&E cost incurred in the design. Figure 4-20
reinforces that a different CaLV design may be more appropriate if the engine DDT&E
costs are greater than 75 percent of the total predicted value.
Figure 4-20: CaLV Pareto Frontier.
A sample of the design points shown in Figure 4-20 are listed in Table 4-16. As
with the Saturn V results, the abbreviation “IC” refers to using identical components
for subsystem redundancy, while “F” is used to denote functional redundancy. Cost
and reliability both increase when examining the launch vehicle designs from left
to right across Table 4-16. Table H-2 lists a more detailed mass comparison of the
minimum cost configuration, “Design 9”, and the maximum reliability configuration
from Table 4-16. A more detailed cost comparison for the three previously mentioned
configurations can be found in Table G-3. The trajectory plots for the minimum cost




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.5 CaLV Reliability Results
The maximum reliability configuration listed in Table 4-16 is expected. The design
relies upon the highest stage thrust-to-weight ratio, uses engine out with the least
amount of engines, and also includes functional redundancy for the subsystems. In-
creasing the stage thrust-to-weight ratio decreases the launch vehicle operating time
which then increases the system reliability.
Engine out is not used on the configurations in Table 4-16 until there is more focus
on system reliability. When using engine out capability, the thrust level of the engines
is equivalent to a different design that has one less engine on its stage. However,
the design with engine out is carrying unnecessary mass, so the thrust level of a
stage with engine out capability will be higher compared to a design with no engine
out capability and one less engine. The value of using engine out to boost system
reliability is not large enough to justify the increase in system cost. Furthermore, the
baseline reliability estimates for the booster and Earth Departure Stage, as listed in
Table 3-10, are much higher compared to the Saturn V launch vehicle. Therefore,
using engine out on the CaLV does not provide as large of a reliability benefit as the
Saturn V launch vehicle. From Table 4-16, the bigger system reliability benefit comes
from reducing the operating time through increasing the stage thrust-to-weight ratio
and reducing the number of engines.
Table 4-17 lists a comparison of changing different design variables to increase
system reliability. In Table 4-17 the abbreviation “EO” refers to engine out capability
and “IC” refers to using identical components to provide full subsystem redundancy.
The baseline for these trades is “Design 2” in Table 4-16.
While using engine out on both the booster and EDS stage does provide a large
system reliability benefit, Table 4-17 shows that a comparable reliability benefit can be
gained by reducing the number of engines for a lower system cost. The results listed in
Table 4-17 also reveal the engine out on the EDS is more beneficial compared to engine
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Table 4-17: CaLV Design 2 Reliability Trade Study.
Reliability Parameter System System Cost
Strategy Value Reliability [$M FY ’04]
None Design 3 0.9695 24263
Boos. T/W 1.45 0.9703 24398
EDS T/W 0.7 0.9729 24714
No. Engs. Boos. 3 0.9719 24331
No. Engs. EDS 3 0.9733 24287
EO Boos. Yes 0.9758 26960
EO EDS Yes 0.9791 25577
Boos. Power IC 0.9709 25004
EDS Power IC 0.9715 25123
out on the booster stage. The EDS is required to perform the trans-lunar injection
burn, which adds significant burn time to its total operating time. Additionally, the
EDS engine has a lower reliability value, so providing engine out capability will also
enhance its total engine reliability. However, the reliability benefit of using engine
out does not provide the same value as reducing the number of engines, as seen in
Table 4-16.
Neither power nor avionics subsystem redundancy is included on any of the opti-
mal designs in Table 4-16 until there is greater emphasis on system reliability. The
reliability estimates for these subsystems are initially high, as seen in Table 3-10, and
therefore the cost of adding redundancy with a one out of two configuration for these
subsystems does not justify the increase in system reliability. Table 4-17 also showed
that adding an additional power subsystem provided a lower system reliability in-
crease compared to reducing the number of engines or increasing the thrust-to-weight
ratio of the EDS stage. The cost of adding an additional power subsystem was higher
compared to the other reliability options. Functional redundancy is not included on
any designs because the system reliability benefit is not large enough to justify the
additional cost.
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4.2.6 CaLV Cost Results
The minimum cost configuration in Table 4-16 uses multiple engines without engine
out capability on both stages, and neither power nor avionics subsystem redundancy.
As discussed in Section 4.1.6, adding mass that is not required to complete the mis-
sion objectives will add unnecessary cost. Therefore, since engine out capability and
additional subsystems for redundancy are unneeded mass, they are not included on
the minimum cost configuration.
The stage thrust-to-weight ratio is determined by balancing the engine costs and
minimizing the dry mass. Increasing the stage thrust-to-weight ratio will lower the
propellant mass, which lowers the required structure and tank mass. However, engine
thrust increases with an increasing thrust-to-weight ratio which also increases system
cost. Selecting the number of engines on each stage is also based upon the same
reasoning. The engine DDT&E cost decreases as the engine thrust decreases, which
can be accomplished by using more engines to provide the required thrust. However,
there is a balance because too many engines will increase the total TFU cost. Table 4-
18 shows how changing the stage thrust-to-weight ratio and the number of engines
per stage will increase the system cost from the minimum cost configuration.
Table 4-18: CaLV Minimum Cost Comparison.
Parameter New System Cost System
Changed Value [$M FY ’04] Reliability
None Min. Cost 24253 0.9695
Boos. T/W 1.38 24466 0.9669
Boos. T/W 1.45 24375 0.9703
EDS T/W 0.45 24710 0.9631
EDS T/W 0.70 24714 0.9729
Boos. No. Engs 5 24265 0.9653
Boos. No. Engs 3 24308 0.9719
EDS No. Engs 3 24287 0.9733
Table 4-18 reveals the balance between finding a low engine thrust and a stage
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thrust-to-weight ratio that does not excessively increase the structure and tank mass.
The engine costs are the primary cost driver for both stages. Figure 4-21 and Fig-
ure 4-22 show the percentage contribution to DDT&E and TFU cost by subsystem,
respectively.
Figure 4-21: CaLV DDT&E Subsystem Cost Percentage.
Figure 4-22: CaLV TFU Subsystem Cost Percentage.
Table 4-19 compares the booster and EDS engine costs of each configuration listed
in Table 4-18 to demonstrate how the engine costs increase; the engine costs are larger
because of a higher DDT&E, total TFU cost, or both.
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Table 4-19: Engine Cost Comparison for CaLV Minimum Cost Configurations [$M
FY ’04].
Row Parameter New Boos. Eng. Boos. Eng. EDS Eng. EDS Eng.
Number Changed Value DDT&E TFU DDT&E TFU
1 None Min. Cost 1767 290 585 48
2 Boos. T/W 1.38 1769 290 585 48
3 Boos. T/W 1.45 1794 298 585 48
4 EDS T/W 0.45 1831 308 558 44
5 EDS T/W 0.70 1749 285 635 55
6 Boos. No. Engs. 5 1625 314 585 48
7 Boos. No. Engs. 3 1969 262 585 48
8 EDS No. Engs. 3 1767 290 643 42
Using five engines on the booster stage, row six in Table 4-19, reduces the engine
DDT&E cost compared to the minimum cost configuration. However, the difference
in total engine TFU cost between the minimum cost configuration and the design
listed on row six in Table 4-19 is large enough to overcome the difference in engine
DDT&E cost.
Using a lower booster thrust-to-weight ratio, row two in Table 4-19, nearly leads
to a lower engine DDT&E cost. The mass increase on the configuration in row two
from the extra propellant is the reason why its engines are so large. Additionally, the
other subsystems masses on the configuration listed in row two are larger because of
the higher propellant mass and will lead to a higher system cost.
Increasing the EDS thrust-to-weight ratio, row five in Table 4-19, and decreasing
the number of engines on the EDS, row eight in Table 4-19, causes the same effect on
system cost. The engine thrust increases which increases the system cost. Decreasing
the EDS thrust-to-weight ratio, row four in Table 4-19, also increases the propellant
mass of the EDS. A cascade effect then occurs on the booster stage and the booster
must increase its engine thrust to maintain a constant thrust-to-weight ratio.
As with the Saturn V, the number of flights in the campaign had an effect on the
minimum cost configuration. Figure 4-23 illustrates two other designs that could have
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been the minimum cost configuration if the number of flights were different. If ten
flights were used in a campaign, then design two in Figure 4-23 would have been the
minimum cost configuration. If the number of campaign flights was 20, then design
three would have been the minimum cost configuration.
Figure 4-23: CaLV Minimum Cost Configurations.
A set of development cost profiles for the optimal CaLV configurations listed in
Table 4-16 are listed in Table J-5 - Table J-8 of Appendix J. As with the Saturn
V results, each table corresponds to a different distribution assumption. The peak
funding requirements for each design are illustrated in Figure 4-24.
When a constant funding profile is used in Figure 4-24, the peak year funding is
significantly lower compared to the maximum funding value using the other distribu-
tion assumptions. However, this level of funding must be maintained throughout the
program development which may constrain other programs within NASA. The other
assumption values result in similar peak funding values within each design. However,
the peak funding does vary by design, which is expected because the cost results have
a wide range.
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Figure 4-24: CaLV Optimal Configuration Peak Funding Comparison.
Table 4-20: CaLV Peak Funding Comparison.
Design 40 Percent Constant 60 Percent 70 Percent Reliability MFBF
Config. Assumption Assumption Assumption Assumption
Min. Cost 1951 1135 1951 2024 0.9676 30.91
2 1952 1135 1951 2024 0.9695 32.80
3 1968 1144 1968 2042 0.9733 37.39
4 2077 1208 2077 2155 0.9805 51.24
5 2135 1241 2134 2214 0.9836 60.82
6 2251 1309 2251 2335 0.9861 71.75
7 2277 1324 2276 2361 0.9879 82.59
8 2281 1326 2281 2366 0.9879 82.62
9 2325 1352 2324 2411 0.9899 99.15
10 3164 1840 3163 3282 0.9939 163.29
11 3123 1816 3122 3240 0.9945 180.26
Max Rel. 4305 2503 4303 4465 0.9958 238.56
CaLV 2009 1168 2008 2084 0.9764 42.37
Table 4-20 lists a detailed peak funding comparison of the optimal configurations
listed in Table 4-16. By comparing design six with the CaLV baseline, Table 4-20
reveals the CaLV MFBF could be increased by 70 percent for an approximate increase
of twelve percent in peak funding across the different distribution assumptions. By
comparing design four with the CaLV baseline, a peak funding increase of six percent
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could increase the MFBF by 44 percent. The CaLV baseline listed in Table 4-20
assumes the concept incurs the full engine development cost.
4.2.7 CaLV Additional Results
Figure 4-25 illustrates the range of possible cost and reliability values around the
pareto frontier using the 10 percent and 90 percent confidence bands. The 10 percent
band is shorter because the minimum cost configuration will have a higher reliability
and the maximum reliability configuration will have a lower system cost. There is a
wide range of cost estimates for the maximum reliability configuration; the absolute
width is approximately 14 billion dollars [FY ’04] (+/- 15%). The absolute cost
range is significantly smaller for the lower reliability configurations with the width
equal to approximately 6 billion dollars [FY ’04] (+/- 11%) for the minimum cost
configuration. The reliability estimates also change significantly; the mean flights
between failure varies between 197 and 343 (+/- 31%) for the maximum reliability
configuration and 25.83 and 46.94 (+/- 34%) for the minimum cost configuration.
Figure 4-25: CaLV Pareto Frontier with Uncertainty.
The sensitivity of the β parameter in the common cause failure calculation is
194
examined in Table 4-21. Varying the β parameter does not have as large of an effect
on system reliability compared to the results in the Saturn V section. The baseline
subsystem and component reliability estimates of the CaLV are higher than the Saturn
V, which makes the final reliability estimate of the CaLV less sensitive to changes in
the common cause failure assumption.
Table 4-21: CaLV β Sensitivity Study.
Design β = 0.1 (Base) β = 0.0 β = 0.2 Cost [$M FY ’04]
Design 9 0.9899 0.9902 0.9896 27008
Design 11 0.9945 0.9950 0.9939 42412
Max. Rel. 0.9958 0.9962 0.9954 56403
4.2.8 CaLV Results Summary
The CaLV demonstrates great potential for increasing its system reliability without
incurring a large increase in system cost. The results in Figure 4-20 showed that the
reliability of the CaLV could be increased by an additional percent for zero increase
in system cost if the CaLV program incurs the entire engine DDT&E cost. Though
the additional percent increase in reliability appears low, this increase corresponds to
a 70 percent increase in the CaLV mean flights between failure metric. Even if the
CaLV will incur no engine DDT&E cost, the MFBF can be increased from 42 to 99
with an additional 5.8 billion dollars [FY ’04].
Additionally, if the CaLV incurs 75 percent or more of the predicted engine
DDT&E cost, selecting an alternative configuration may reduce the system cost.
A configuration with four engines on both the booster and EDS stages has a lower
system cost, but also a lower system reliability. Figure 4-20 shows the results of using
an integrated environment to perform rapid trade studies between reliability and cost.
This additional information could be very useful in guiding a decision maker about
which configurations deserve further study in the next design phase.
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While the CaLV is still in conceptual design phase, configuration changes to im-
prove its reliability appear unlikely. One reason is due to the constraint of using
existing engines. Assumptions were made about the cost of modifying the SSME
and re-starting the J-2S production line that result in the selection of the baseline
CaLV as the heavy lift launch vehicle for lunar operations. Additionally, assumptions
were made regarding the development risk of a new engine program that eliminated
thousands of alternative configurations from quantitative evaluation. However, as
seen in the cost results presented earlier, the allocation of resources can be altered to
enable the development of a configuration that requires new engines. Therefore, by
quantitatively evaluating alternative configurations as demonstrated in this disserta-
tion, additional information can be generated that may prompt a review of the initial
assumptions.
4.2.9 CaLV Optimal Design Point Validation
Design nine from Table 4-16 is used as a baseline for comparison between the higher
fidelity analysis tools and the response surface equations used in this methodology.
Since design nine does not use engine out capability, the reliability validation from
the stochastic petri net tool is unnecessary.
Table 4-22 compares the results of the higher fidelity analysis tools and results
of using the RSEs. The EDS burn time has some error, which is expected since the
EDS burn time fit was not as good as the other RSE fits. However, the absolute
error is small and the difference in system reliability when using the true burn time is
0.04 percent. The rest of the comparisons listed in Table 4-22 show good agreement
between the results of the higher fidelity analysis and the results of the response
surface equations.
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Table 4-22: CaLV Design Nine Validation.
Discipline Tool Tool Check
Trajectory POST RSE % Diff.
Boos. Mass Ratio 3.514 3.506 0.22
EDS Mass Ratio 1.695 1.690 0.27
Boos. Burn Time 396 395 0.15
EDS Mass Ratio 257 249 3.25
Propulsion REDTOP-2 RSE % Diff.
EDS T/Weng. 78.36 78.68 0.41
Weights POST RSE % Diff.
Boos. Dry Mass 209222 207193 0.97
EDS Gross Mass 2467648 2447477 0.82
Boos. Dry Mass 41259 41152 0.26
EDS Gross Mass 554735 552478 0.41
CaLV Gross Mass 6436104 6413675 0.35
4.2.10 CaLV Reliability Growth
The reliability growth for the minimum cost configuration, design nine, and the max-
imum reliability configuration in Table 4-16 are compared using the same approach
demonstrated in the Saturn V results. Table 4-23 lists a summary of these configu-
rations.
Table 4-23: CaLV Reliability Growth Configurations.
Design Plateau DDT&E TFU
Description Reliability [$M FY ’04] [$M FY ’04]
Min. Cost 0.9676 8003 1117
Design 9 0.9899 9634 1178
Max. Rel. 0.9958 17428 2594
Figure 4-26 and Figure 4-27 illustrate the reliability growth results using the Atlas
and Delta growth rate parameters, respectively. The required number of flights to
reach the plateau reliability is ten in these two figures.
In Figure 4-26, the minimum cost configuration provides the best reliability value
because this configuration completes the twelve flight campaign for less cost and
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Figure 4-26: CaLV Reliability Growth with α = 0.2006 [Atlas].
almost identical reliability as design nine. The maximum reliability configuration does
not provide a high enough reliability benefit for the required costs to be considered
for a final design solution when using the present growth rate and flight number
assumptions.
Figure 4-27: CaLV Reliability Growth with α = 0.0669 [Delta].
The best design solution in Figure 4-27 is not as clear compared to Figure 4-26. If
the 20 billion dollar [FY ’04] threshold is crossed in Figure 4-27, then design nine may
be the best design given the current assumptions about growth rate and campaign
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flight number. As seen earlier, the maximum reliability configuration does not provide
a high enough reliability benefit for the required resources to be considered as a final
design solution.
When comparing the reliability growth figures, the minimum cost configuration
consistently provides the best reliability value. Given these assumptions the maximum
reliability configuration costs too much to be considered. For a full system study, the
reliability growth of all optimal designs should be studied to increase the information
available to a decision maker. This information may be important because the best
configuration in Figure 4-20 may not be the optimal configuration when reliability
growth is included.
This dissertation demonstrated one approach for reliability growth and compared
three optimal configurations. A different reliability growth model may predict that
the minimum cost configuration does not provide the best reliability value, but with
this methodology, a new reliability growth model is easily incorporated.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
The methodology in this dissertation can be used to create an integrated environment
to evaluate the system cost and reliability of a launch vehicle. New information about
each launch vehicle was created by using the methodology outlined in this disserta-
tion. This information should assist decision makers when selecting a final vehicle
configuration during conceptual design. Additionally, the design process created in
this dissertation can rapidly evaluate thousands of launch vehicle configurations al-
lowing the quantitative evaluation of alternative configurations.
The design environment was created by using performance and cost discipline tools
accepted by the space community. The reliability modeling was developed specifically
for use in launch vehicle design and the primary historical causes of unreliability were
captured.
Hypothesis one was confirmed by the pareto frontiers illustrated in both the Saturn
V and CaLV results’ sections. The pareto frontiers showed that a single optimal
configuration for cost and reliability could not be created. However, based upon
a decision maker’s preference, an optimal configuration can be found for a specific
weighting of cost and reliability.
Hypothesis two was verified because improvements were made in the efficiency
of the launch vehicle design process. The reliability models in this dissertation dy-
namically updated as the configuration varied; this was important for demonstrating
that reliability modeling can be included in an integrated design environment. The
design process was improved because thousands of configurations can be evaluated in
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a matter of hours.
The best method for improving launch vehicle reliability depended on the type of
launch vehicle, as postulated in hypothesis three in Section 3.9. For the Saturn V,
using engine out on the S-II stage was one of the first choices for increasing reliability
while attempting to minimize cost. However, reducing the number of engines and
increasing the stage thrust-to-weight ratios proved to be better values for increasing
the reliability of the Cargo Launch Vehicle. Subsystem redundancy, whether through
identical components or functional redundancy, was not as effective for increasing
system reliability while minimizing cost.
As shown in Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-19, the reliability of each launch vehicle
increased significantly by using the different reliability strategies, as postulated in
hypothesis three. There was a 330 percent increase in the mean flights between
failure between the minimum cost Saturn V configuration and the maximum reliability
Saturn V configuration. The Cargo Launch Vehicle had a 670 percent increase in the
mean flights between failure from the minimum cost configuration to the maximum
reliability configuration.
There were significant variations in gross mass between the minimum cost config-
uration and the maximum reliability configuration, as postulated by hypothesis four.
For the Saturn V, as listed in Table H-1, the range of mass was nearly 3,000,000
pounds. The difference in CaLV mass was just over 1,000,000 pounds, as seen in
Table H-2.
For both the Saturn V and the Cargo Launch Vehicle, the cost range was also
large, as postulated by hypothesis five. The absolute range was on the order of 30
billion dollars [FY ’04] for the Saturn V and 25 billion dollars for the CaLV [FY ’04].
Additionally, the relative increases were close to 100 percent between the minimum
cost configurations and the maximum reliability configurations.
Hypothesis six proposed that uncertainty analysis could be applied within the
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mass, cost, and reliability disciplines to provide more information about each launch
vehicle. Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-25 revealed the possible ranges of both reliability
and cost for the optimal Saturn V and CaLV configurations. Additionally, multiple
references were found that could be used to provide future uncertainty ranges.
The results from applying this methodology to the Saturn V revealed that the Sat-
urn V launch vehicle had great potential to increase its reliability without significant
increases in additional resources. Figure 4-7 showed the range of optimal configura-
tions that could have been used to increase the Saturn V reliability and the potential
system cost. Table 4-5 listed the specifications of each design shown in Figure 4-7 in
greater detail.
The mean flights between failure of the Saturn V could have been increased by
78 percent for an additional 1.76 billion dollars [FY ’04]. Engine out capability
was important for the S-II stage but not as important for the other two stages.
Additionally, reducing the operating time by increasing the stage thrust-to-weight
ratio provided a large system reliability benefit without a significant increase in system
cost.
Figure 4-18 illustrated how the reliability of the Cargo Launch Vehicle could be
improved along with resulting system cost. The cost of the CaLV from the Exploration
System Architecture Study is also included in Figure 4-18 as a series of designs that
depend upon the amount of engine DDT&E cost incurred. Figure 4-20 showed that
if the total engine DDT&E cost exceeds 75 percent, then a different configuration
should be considered.
While engine out is often mentioned as a solution for increasing launch vehicle
reliability, the configurations listed in Table 4-16 showed that a better solution for
increasing reliability would be to reduce the number of engines. Reducing the number
of engines provides a reliability increase for lower costs compared to using engine out
capability. Reducing the operating time by increasing the stage thrust-to-weight ratio
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may also be a good solution for increasing system reliability while trying to minimize
system cost.
Figure 4-20 showed there is justification for bringing multiple launch vehicle con-
figurations forward to the detail design phase. If the assumptions regarding the use
of existing engines change during the detail design phase, other configurations may
provide higher launch vehicle reliability for a similar cost.
It is acknowledged that development risk has not been considered. The risk of
developing a new engine is much higher compared to the risk of modifying an existing
engine. However, modifying an existing engine to work in a new environment has
its own challenges [9]. Therefore, while risk has not been considered, the possibility
exists that the assumptions regarding the risk of modifying an existing engine may
be aggressive and additional configurations should be brought forward to the detail
design phase to keep the trade space open.
The Saturn V and CaLV have significant differences in system reliability. One
reason for the difference in the baseline reliability estimates may be due to launch
vehicle heritage. The Saturn V had little heritage to build upon while the CaLV is
a derived vehicle. The CaLV uses modified Shuttle hardware with the accumulated
experience of over 100 flights. This experience may provide engineers with greater
confidence in their launch vehicle designs. Another reason for the differences in reli-
ability estimate could be the growth of the reliability discipline. Current reliability
analysis methods are much more advanced compared to the Apollo era. Therefore,
more physics based reliability analysis can be completed instead of relying upon con-
servative approaches such as large safety margins. The advancement of the reliability
disciplines has been accompanied by the large increase in available data as hundreds
of different launch vehicles have flown since the Apollo era. With the increase of
quantitative data, reliability estimates can be improved based upon actual flight ex-
perience. While the Saturn V reliability estimate appears conservative, future CaLV
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launches should demonstrate an improvement in the accuracy of reliability analysis.
The flexibility of this methodology was also demonstrated in this dissertation by
applying the methodology to two different launch vehicles. The Saturn V was a
three stage launch vehicle and required additional design variables to study the trade
space. The inclusion of the Solid Rocket Boosters on the CaLV make closing the
vehicle design more challenging compared to a launch vehicle with only two stages.
Yet, the methodology was applied to both cases and new information was generated
in the results section of both applications.
First order development schedule results were also presented. Assumptions were
made to create the funding profile over an eight year development. Careful considera-
tion should be given to development schedule because the results vary based upon the
underlying assumptions. Figure 4-10 illustrates the mean flights between failure of the
Saturn V could have been increased by 78 percent for an increase in 3 percent in peak
year funding using a 60 percent distribution assumption. The comparison is between
design five in Figure 4-10 and the baseline Saturn V. The CaLV results, illustrated
in Figure 4-24, showed that the mean flights between failure could be increased by
70 percent for an additional 250 million dollars [FY ’04] (12 percent) in peak funding
by switching to design six and assuming a 60 percent distribution assumption. This
comparison was made assuming the CaLV incurs the full engine development cost.
By examining the schedule results in the Saturn V and CaLV applications, the
complete NASA budget profile over the defined time period should be considered
before eliminating any design options. A configuration that demonstrates significant
improvement over the baseline design may require a different resource allocation to
fit within the year to year budget. The improved configuration might not have been
discovered if it was eliminated without evaluating its quantitative system metrics.
The process outlined in this methodology can be used to perform integrated launch
vehicle design and study thousands of configurations within a few hours. Cost and
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reliability are coupled through the performance of the launch vehicle and the results
show the sensitivity of cost to increases in system reliability. While life-cycle cost
is not included in this process, the methodology was created with enough flexibility
to easily add an operations cost model when one becomes available. Additionally, if
safety modeling was completed, this metric could be added to study how safety and
cost are coupled.
This methodology satisfied all of its objectives and created a process for linking
cost and reliability for launch vehicle design. New information about the cost of
reliability has been created for both the Saturn V and Cargo Launch Vehicle. Using
the figures created by the application of this methodology, a decision maker will
have additional information about a launch vehicle that was not available prior to
the completion of this dissertation. More informed decisions should lead to fewer
design changes later in the program where design changes have a higher system cost
compared to revisions made during the conceptual design phase. The primary goals
of the dissertation have been satisfied and the approach created in this dissertation
is another tool that can be used to aid the launch vehicle selection process during
conceptual design.
5.2 Future Work
There are a few improvements that could be made to this methodology to completely
link reliability and life-cycle cost. The first area that needs to be addressed is the
operations cost. Operations cost data is very difficult to acquire and that is the
reason operations analysis was not addressed. However, by obtaining data on the
shuttle, more detailed data on the Saturn V, and data from the ESAS study, a foun-
dation could be established for creating an operations model for integration with this
methodology. Subsystem redundancy is added with only a mass and extra devel-
opment cost penalty but the operations impact would magnify the penalty of using
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redundancy. If this methodology was used on a reusable launch vehicle that flies a
campaign of four flights a year for twenty years, then the cost of having to check dual
and triple redundant systems would add up quickly. In conjunction with develop-
ing an operations cost model, another model for upgrading component reliability is
needed.
The cost of increasing component reliability is not considered due to a lack of data.
However, a trade exists between the use of fully redundant subsystems and whether
to increase component reliability. Quantifying the increase of component reliability
will rely upon obtaining additional data, but an engineer with access to testing data
could develop the required model. The cost and reliability models could be modified
to include the capability to study increasing component reliability. This methodology
would benefit from using industry data about increasing component reliability to add
another design option for increasing system reliability.
Learning curve affects were not included in this methodology. A learning curve
could be applied to calculate the cost of each production vehicle based upon the
original first unit value. Then the cost metric would become the summation of these
production costs and the total development cost.
Another discipline to add is safety. As mentioned earlier, safety requires con-
sideration of how a component/subsystem/stage will fail and how an abort can be
performed. Yet, the methodology is flexible enough to include safety once the mod-
eling capability is created. The complexity of the safety model will determine how
much, if any, the time required for the design process will increase.
The cost of unreliability was not considered during this methodology. If a launch
vehicle fails in today’s environment, there is time lost due to an investigation into
root causes and to the design alterations once a solution is found. For example, the
Space Transportation System did not fly for two years after the Columbia accident
but NASA had to pay to keep its space flight capability operational. The cost of
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unreliability would further benefit increased reliability systems because the cost could
be distributed using the mean flights between failure for each concept. Therefore,
configurations with a higher mean flights between failure estimate would have a lower
cost per flight.
First order development cost profiles were presented in this dissertation. Future
enhancements could improve upon the development schedule results with additional
study and detail. However, because the development cost profile is sensitive to the
underlying assumptions, schedule should not be used as the sole metric for evaluating
launch vehicle configurations.
The Weibull distribution should be considered for future enhancements of this
methodology. A Weibull distribution may provide additional detail about the opera-
tional phases of a launch vehicle. Additionally, by using a varying failure rate, cost
and reliability could be coupled for the conceptual design of the next in-space human
element.
The methodology focused exclusively on space hardware. However, software and
human reliability also deserve future consideration. An implicit assumption was made
that configuration changes will not affect human or software reliability, but a more
rigorous analysis may prove differently. Human reliability analysis may be coupled
with operations analysis as varying the number of components on a vehicle could
change the human reliability contribution as the processing time gets longer. Addi-
tionally, more software is required as the number of components increases; therefore,
the software reliability may degrade with additional subsystems.
While the design time for evaluating thousands of alternative launch vehicle con-
figurations only requires a few hours, improvements could be made to speed up this
process. The cause for a five second evaluation time per design is due to the uncer-
tainty analysis. However, there are techniques that can perform uncertainty analysis
faster than Monte Carlo simulation, as described by McCormick [53]. Using one of
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these techniques, such as Discrete Probability Optimal Matching Distribution, could




S-IC SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY AND
RELIABILITY UNCERTAINTY RANGES
Table A-1: S-IC Subsystem Reliability Estimates.
S-IC Subsystem Reliability MFBF
Structures 0.0.9976 416.6
Propulsion System (Engines Only) 0.995 200
Feed System 0.99 100
Guidance, Navigation, and Control 0.99 100
Separation 0.999988 83333.3
Electrical Power & Distribution 0.999997 333333.3
Range Safety 0.999999 1000000
Total 0.975 40
Instrument Unit 0.972 35.7
Table A-2: Saturn V MCS Reliability Ranges.
Subsystem Minimum Maximum Distribution
F-1 Reliability 0.9995 0.9999 Triangular
S-IC Power 0.956 0.9999 Triangular
S-IC Avionics 0.98 0.9999 Triangular
S-IC Other 0.99 0.9999 Triangular
J-2 Reliability 0.955 0.999 Triangular
S-II Power 0.956 0.999 Triangular
S-II Avionics 0.98 0.999 Triangular
S-II Other 0.99 0.9999 Triangular
S-IVB Power 0.956 0.999 Triangular
S-IVB Avionics 0.98 0.999 Triangular
S-IVB Other 0.97 0.9999 Triangular
Catastrophic Percentage 0.2 0.4 Uniform
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Table A-3: CaLV MCS Reliability Ranges.
Subsystem Minimum Maximum Distribution
SSME Reliability 0.995 0.9999 Triangular
Boos. Power 0.9957 0.99999 Triangular
Boos. Avionics 0.99957 0.99999 Triangular
Boos. Other 0.999 0.99999 Triangular
J-2S Reliability 0.995 0.9999 Triangular
EDS Power 0.9957 0.9999 Triangular
EDS Avionics 0.99957 0.9999 Triangular
EDS Other 0.999 0.99999 Triangular






































Table C-1 lists a comparison of the different reliability analysis methods. Table C-
1 also lists a comparison between the baseline S-II propulsion subsystem and using
engine out on the S-II. The baseline configuration in Table C-1 and on the S-II was a
five engine configuration in series. The J-2 reliability was equal to 0.988. The units
are per mission; for example, 94.4% reliability per mission for the S-II baseline and
4.3 missions until Saturn V failure as shown under the MTTF column. The initials
“E.O.” denote a five engine configuration with engine out capability; thus, only four
engines are needed to complete the mission.
The first line lists the single J-2 engine reliability and the MTTF. The baseline
S-II stage is the second line without including MCS. This line is calculated using
Equation 3-14. Uncertainty analysis is incorporated on the third line in Table C-1
and the last line of Table C-1. As discussed in the previous section, a triangular
distribution is assumed for the J-2 engine reliability. Once MCS is included, the
baseline Saturn V is severely degraded because the minimum value for J-2 reliability












































































































































































































































































































































An engine out scenario is calculated on the fourth line of Table C-1 without
including CCF or using the catastrophic engine failure model. Equation 3-17 is used
for this calculation. Using engine out raises the Saturn V reliability. However, CCF
decreases the propulsion subsystem reliability as listed on the fifth line of Table C-
1. This calculation was completed by combining Equation 3-17 with Equation 3-
16 [54]. The Saturn V reliability does not change very much from the initial engine
out calculation on line four. This occurs because there are many other subsystems in
this calculation and some of them are significant drivers of system reliability.
The sixth line incorporates the catastrophic failure model shown in Figure 3-23
and the reliability of the propulsion subsystem decreases. The effect on the Saturn V
MTTF is small compared to the fault tree model in line four. Line seven incorporates
the effects of uncertainty analysis with the catastrophic engine failure model. Line
seven is the model used in this methodology.
The next two lines are the reliability analysis completed with the SPN model
shown in Figure 3-25. Line eight is a SPN model that incorporates the effects of
modeling the additional burn time in the reliability analysis. There is a decrease in
the propulsion subsystem compared to the full catastrophic model, but the effect of
the Saturn V is small. The SPN model on line nine increased the J-2 engine failure
rate by an order of magnitude after a benign engine failure occurred. The MTTF of




Figure D-1: Titan Launch Vehicle Reliability Growth.




Table E-1: Saturn V WBS.
Subsystem Reference Mass [lb] Mass Estimate [lb] % Diff.
S-IC Stage
Structures 142162 142450 0.2
Main Prop. 47020 45062 4.16
Engines 92490 93347 0.93
Power 947 973 2.77
Avionics 3457 3417 1.15
Separation 1375 2331 69.51
Total Dry 287451 287579 0.04
Total Gross 5030911 5090577 1.19
S-II Stage
Structures 62169 62379 0.34
Main Prop. 10217 10282 4.36
Engines 15925 15873 0.32
Power 817 897 2.96
Avionics 4432 4310 2.74
Separation 3761 3750 0.12
Total Dry 97375 97492 0.12
Total Gross 1081781 1089583 0.72
S-IVB Stage
Structures 13686 13648 0.28
Main Prop. 2986 2886 4.02
Engines 3185 3175 0.32
Power 2157 2181 1.10
Avionics 2522 2601 3.11
Separation 2699 3034 12.42
Total Dry 27235 27504 0.99
Total Gross 264709 262694 0.76
Total SV Gross 6551541 6486333 1.01
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Table E-2: CaLV WBS.
Subsystem Reference Mass [lb] Mass Estimate [lb] % Diff.
Booster Stage
Structures 116599 116771 0.56
Main Prop. 23065 21099 36.5
Engines 34950 34950 0.00
Power 4726 4730 3.33
Avionics 670 715 6.69
Growth 14986 15375 2.59
EDS Stage
Structures 24026 24040 0.06
Main Prop. 5358 5352 0.11
Engines 7291 7290 0.01
Power 1833 1817 0.88
Avionics 431 430 0.15




Table F-1: Saturn V SIC Mass Ratio RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.983
Table F-2: Saturn V SIC Burn Time RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.999
Table F-3: Saturn V SII Mass Ratio RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.997
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Table F-4: Saturn V SII Burn Time RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.999
Table F-5: Saturn V SIVB Mass Ratio RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.997
Table F-6: Saturn V SIVB Burn Time RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.999
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Table F-7: Saturn V T/Weng RSE Validation.
Thrust Level [lb] REDTOP-2 RSE % Difference
225000 72.136 72.398 0.363
245000 72.670 72.606 0.088
265000 72.716 72.821 0.145
285000 72.916 73.037 0.166
305000 73.124 73.248 0.170
325000 73.313 73.450 0.187
345000 73.735 73.636 0.135
365000 73.894 73.801 0.126
385000 74.039 73.940 0.133
405000 74.174 74.048 0.170
Table F-8: Saturn V Mass Ratio & Burn Time RSE Validation.
SIC T/W POST MR RSE MR % Error POST BT[s] RSE BT[s] % Error-
1.125 3.539 3.539 0.01 170 166 2.41
1.225 3.426 3.434 0.24 155 151 2.79
1.275 3.425 3.437 0.34 148 146 1.27
SII T/W POST MR RSE MR % Error POST BT[s] RSE BT[s] % Error-
0.675 2.975 2.976 0.04 418 418 0.04
0.825 2.863 2.863 0.01 336 335 0.22
0.975 2.819 2.815 0.11 282 281 0.48
SII T/W POST MR RSE MR % Error POST BT[s] RSE BT[s] % Error-
0.625 1.223 1.225 0.17 124 125 0.93
0.875 1.222 1.224 0.15 88 88 0.26
1.075 1.222 1.224 0.15 72 73 1.96
Table F-9: CaLV Booster Mass Ratio RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.998
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Table F-10: CaLV Booster Burn Time RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.993
Table F-11: CaLV EDS Mass Ratio RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.991
Table F-12: CaLV EDS Burn Time RSE Data.





R2 − adj 0.996
Table F-13: CaLV T/Weng RSE Validation.
Thrust Level [lbs] REDTOP-2 RSE % Difference
105000 69.05 69.27 0.312
115000 69.43 69.64 0.294
125000 69.81 69.97 0.231
135000 70.15 70.27 0.180
145000 70.45 70.55 0.140
165000 71.21 71.04 0.246
175000 71.21 71.26 0.064
185000 71.42 71.46 0.055
195000 71.86 71.66 0.272
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Table F-14: CaLV Mass Ratio & Burn Time RSE Validation.
CaLV T/W POST MR RSE MR % Error POST BT[s] RSE BT[s] % Error-
1.395 3.642 3.638 0.11 422 425 0.67
1.445 3.472 3.470 0.05 384 385 0.23
1.495 3.414 3.400 0.42 347 347 0.83
EDS T/W POST MR RSE MR % Error POST BT[s] RSE BT[s] % Error-
0.475 1.764 1.779 0.82 416 423 1.64
0.625 1.702 1.702 0.04 304 295 2.97




Table G-1: Saturn V Design Configuration Cost Comparison [$M FY ’04].
Subsystem Min. Design 6 Max Rel. Min. Design 6 Max Rel.
Element Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost
S-IC Stage DDT&E DDT&E DDT&E TFU TFU TFU
Structures 693 708 883 141 144 189
Main Prop. 516 535 817 89 93 145
Single Engine 1094 1114 1495 17 17 29
Power 87 85 283 10 20 37
Avionics 1289 1296 2761 190 191 410
Separation 19 19 25 5 5 7
Total 5127 5205 823 683 855 1447
S-II Stage DDT&E DDT&E DDT&E TFU TFU TFU
Structures 135 138 153 43 44 50
Main Prop. 280 366 492 40 53 73
Single Engine 922 1171 1489 10 14 21
Power 85 84 236 11 21 31
Avionics 1567 1612 2573 267 274 443
Separation 32 36 46 4 5 7
Total 4210 4747 6954 688 750 1114
S-IVB Stage DDT&E DDT&E DDT&E TFU TFU TFU
Structures 70 72 80 8 8 10
Main Prop. 135 212 478 7 11 27
Engines 0 0 0 9 14 21
Power 143 142 487 2 4 7
Avionics 101 104 229 36 37 84
Separation 28 31 48 3 4 8
Total 725 857 2018 121 143 308
Saturn V 10064 10810 17655 1633 1748 2869
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Table G-3: CaLV Design Configuration Cost Comparison [$M FY ’04].
Subsystem Min. Design 9 Max Rel. Min. Design 9 Max Rel.
Element Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost
Boos. Stage DDT&E DDT&E DDT&E TFU TFU TFU
Structures 477 471 580 103 101 132
Main Prop. 467 469 1116 57 57 141
Single Engine 1767 2301 4030 73 114 294
Power 230 246 667 32 35 105
Avionics 176 170 701 43 86 222
Separation 94 94 149 18 17 32
Total 5611 6566 12684 689 708 1641
EDS Stage DDT&E DDT&E DDT&E TFU TFU TFU
Structures 207 207 223 38 38 41
Main Prop. 329 403 991 70 88 241
Single Engine 585 1017 1237 12 31 45
Power 150 165 370 30 34 80
Avionics 72 76 239 26 57 115
Separation 40 41 56 5 5 8
Total 1903 2630 4294 304 376 833




Table H-1: Saturn V Design Mass Comparison.
Subsystem Min. Cost Design 6 Max Rel.
Element Mass [lb.] Mass [lb.] Mass [lb.]
S-IC Stage
Structures 144228 148811 219148
Main Prop. 44516 47236 98566
Total Engines 92453 98103 204706
Power 972 1875 4187
Avionics 3417 3438 7390
Separation 2346 2446 4000
Total Dry Mass 287932 301908 537996
S-II Stage
Structures 62424 64706 81110
Main Prop. 9103 14467 24086
Total Engines 14193 22033 38614
Power 885 1758 2885
Avionics 4290 4403 7159
Separation 3636 4295 6154
Total Dry Mass 94531 111663 160008
S-IVB Stage
Structures 13338 14046 18065
Main Prop. 1812 4032 16783
Total Engines 2027 4406 19307
Power 2142 4257 9490
Avionics 2564 2662 5939
Separation 2714 3646 8629
Total Dry 24597 33051 78214
Saturn V GLOW 6646164 6878139 9581353
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Table H-2: CaLV Design Mass Comparison.
Subsystem Min. Cost Design 9 Max Rel.
Element Mass [lb.] Mass [lb.] Mass [lb.]
Boos. Stage
Structures 118108 116728 169951
Main Prop. 25206 26029 119762
Total Engines 41518 42821 185309
Power 4855 8755 18903
Avionics 695 712 3590
Separation 11879 12148 24914
Total Dry Mass 202260 207193 522428
EDS Stage
Structures 23975 24040 27602
Main Prop. 3070 4188 15958
Total Engines 4682 6307 22728
Power 1767 3264 5062
Avionics 370 417 1570
Separation 2685 2936 4618
Total Dry Mass 36549 41152 77538
CaLV GLOW 6443663 6413668 7843252
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APPENDIX I
TRAJECTORY AND ENGINE DATA
Table I-1: Saturn V POST Assumptions.
Parameter Value
Max. Q [psf] 780
Max. Accel [gs] 4.0
TLI δV [ft/s] 10900
Final Velocity [ft/s] 25622
Perigee Altitude [nmi] 90
Apogee Altitude [nmi] 97
Lunar Payload [lb] 100932
Table I-2: CaLV POST Assumptions.
Parameter Value
Max. Q [psf] 620
Max. Accel [gs] 3.85
TLI δV [ft/s] 10334
Final Velocity [ft/s] 25707
Perigee Altitude [nmi] 16.2
Perigee Altitude [nmi] 86.4
Lunar Payload [lb] 160112
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Table I-3: Engine Characteristics.
Parameter J-2 J-2S F1 SSME
Thrust [psf] 230000 274500 1740134 512410
Ispvac [s] 425 452 304 452
T/Weng 72.5 75.3 94.1 67.2
Reliability 0.988 0.998 0.999 0.9987
DDT&E [$M FY ’04] 1015 629 1044 923
TFU [$M FY ’04] 12 23 16 56
Figure I-1: Trajectory Results for Saturn V Configurations.
229
Figure I-2: Velocity Comparison for Saturn V Configurations.
Figure I-3: Acceleration Comparison for Saturn V Configurations.
230
Figure I-4: Trajectory Results for Optimal CaLV Configurations.
Figure I-5: Velocity Comparison for Optimal CaLV Configurations.
231
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